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THE TRAGEDY OF DISTRUST IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS· 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the dream, it works something like this: The huge hall of Environmental Control is 
lit from above. Operators below press controls and the translucent dome glows with 
the streams slashing the Upper Atmosphere, shaping the world's weather. Other 
controls are pressed and the flow changes color. Now it illuminates the Middle 
Atmosphere over America, showing regional smog-bearing inversions that may lock 
over cities within hours. In and out of walls glide panels on which river basins shine 
with flood-crest warnings or change hue to show rise and fall of pollution . . . . 
Nearby, in the Surveillance Center of Environmental Health Services, pesticides, 
oxides, nitrates, adulterants, all 30,000 chemicals used by industry or everyday life are 
indexed, cross-referenced, computerized for interaction and contaminations. I 
Author Theodore White offered this fantastical description of a federal 
environmental agency just two weeks before President Nixon transmitted to 
Congress on July 9, 1970 his long-awaited executive order proposing the 
creation of the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").2 
Were EPA's performance now to be measured, more than twenty years later, 
against that of the mythical agency in White's dream, many would consider 
EPA a colossal failure. Surely, however, no one would use such a yardstick to 
judge EPA. White's portrait was not intended to reflect reality. 
Imagine nonetheless that Congress had rejected the President's proposal 
back in 1970 and enacted in its place enabling legislation creating an EPA 
more akin to that fantasized by White. Also imagine that the statute 
mandated that the new EPA achieve that level and type of environmental 
control within six months. 
Faced with an impossible task, EPA might have adopted a "loose" 
construction of the law under which it could reject such an approach based on 
Copyright © 1991 by Law and Contemporary Problems 
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1. Theodore H.' White, The Nixon Administration Has Drawn Up Its Plan to Untangle the 
EnvironmPlltal jllngle-BIlI There Are Problems-How Do We Get from Here to There?, Life 36, 37-38 Oune 
26. 1970). 
2. Reorganization Plan No 3 of 1970. 5 USC Reorg Plan of 1970 No 3, App (1988). 
HeinOnline -- 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 312 1991
312 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 54: No.4 
the law's impracticability. A court, however, would likely have overturned the 
agency's construction, thereby compelling EPA to spend substantial resources 
in making a good faith, albeit futile, effort to comply with the congressional 
mandate. Significant institutional obstacles would then have quickly arisen. 
The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") would invariably have 
opposed such a wasteful expenditure of monies. Heads of other federal 
agencies would have likely expressed opposition based on the program's 
potential interference with the operation of their own programs. State 
government officials would have been concerned with its federalism 
implications. The congressional appropriations committees, feeling the 
pressure to fund other programs competing for scarce federal dollars, would 
likely have provided EPA with only limited funds to develop an environmental 
control command center of such dubious efficacy. Those on the 
appropriations committees concerned about the impact on free market forces, 
other federal programs, or federalism, might have also placed riders on EPA's 
appropriations, limiting the agency's ability to spend funds on certain aspects 
of the program. 
When EPA failed to meet the statutory deadline, the congressional 
subcommittees that drafted the agency's enabling law would have condemned 
the agency at oversight hearings. Those subcommittees would also have 
secured passage of legislation imposing additional deadlines on the agency 
and eliminating the agency's substantive discretion to ensure future agency 
compliance. 
At EPA, the resulting crisis atmosphere would have stifled pollution 
control efforts. Agency resources would have been spent preparing for 
litigation, testifying before oversight hearings, placating state officials, and 
justifying agency expenditures on the program to skeptical OMB and White 
House officials. EPA officials would have created numerous working groups 
to consider how, in the absence of any foundation in science or technology, 
they might have created the type of highly centralized system of command and 
control envisioned by Congress. Because of the pending litigation, the 
agency's lawyers would have displaced other agency professionals (scientists, 
engineers, and economists) in developing the agency's response. OMB would 
have sought to delay any implementation of the plan. When the program was 
finally promulgated, affected industries would have promptly sought a federal 
court injunction barring any effort by EPA to implement a program disruptive 
of industry's vested economic interests. Based on the program's severe 
economic impact and the thinness of its scientific support, the court would 
have likely granted the injunction and remanded to EPA for further 
administrative proceedings. 
Within EPA, the congressional, judicial, and public demand for immediate 
results would have discouraged long-term planning. The pall of suspicion 
cast upon the agency's motives by repeated failures would have likewise 
deterred innovation. The agency's inevitable loss of credibility before 
Congress, the courts, and the public would have decreased its influence in 
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those forums. As a result, the agency's own perception of national 
environmental priorities would have increasingly diverged from that of the 
public and its elected representatives, leading to increasingly inflexible 
programs mandated by Congress. Because most of the agency professionals 
were attracted to EPA by a strong sense of its mission rather than by hope of 
significant monetary reward, their consequent demoralization would have 
prompted quick turnover and the loss of sustained agency expertise. 
Needless and irreversible degradation of the natural environment would have 
continued. 
The imagined scenario should seem highly improbable, if not absurd. 
Congress would never mandate that an agency perform the impossible, 
decline to appropriate the funds necessary for a good faith effort in the 
mandated direction, and then condemn the agency publicly for trying and 
failing. Nor would any such philosophical schism concerning environmental 
protection policy persist between the executive and legislative branches, thus 
placing a federal agency charged with the policy's implementation in an 
untenable position. After all, both the president and Congress are responsive 
to the same electorate. Finally, there should be no reason to believe that 
courts would order EPA to take certain action, only subsequently to impede 
the agency's specific efforts at achieving the judicial mandate. 
A review of EPA's last twenty years, however, suggests otherwise. To be 
sure, Congress did not reject President Nixon's proposed reorganization.3 
Congress acquiesced, and EPA commenced operations on December 2, 1970, 
amidst much fanfare and congressional good wishes. EPA's tenure has 
nonetheless been marked by the very type of crisis and controversy just 
described. What should seem to be unlikely combinations of institutional 
forces have in fact seriously frustrated from the outset the agency's 
development and implementation of federal environmental protection policy. 
Congress has repeatedly demanded that the agency perform impossible 
tasks under unrealistic deadlines.4 Courts have rejected many of the agency's 
efforts to provide itself with more leeway in their implementation, while the 
White House, OMB, and congressional appropriation committees have 
simultaneously resisted subsequent agency efforts to comply with strict 
judicial mandates. 5 The agency spends much of its limited resources 
defending its decisions in court, negotiating with OMB and the White House, 
and justifying its decisions to multiple congressional committees.6 A virtual 
3. President Nixon announced Reorganization Plan No 3 of 1970 pursuant to the 
Reorganization Act of 1949, then codified at 5 USC §§ 901-913 (1970), which authorized the 
president to propose reorganization of the executive branch to promote better execution of the laws. 
Pursuant to that statute, a proposed reorganization was effective unless either chamber adopted a 
disapproving resolution within sixty days of the president's transmittal of the proposal to Congress. 
See 5 USC § 906 (1970). There was some sentiment in the HOllse in favor of disapproval, but a 
resolution to that effect was rejected. See H Res 1209. 91 st Cong, 2d Sess I (1970). in 116 Cong Rec 
33871-76. 33879-84 (Sept 28. 1970). There was no floor vote in the Senate. 
4. See text accompanying notes 46-93. 
5. See text accompanying notes 156-60. 170-74. 
6. See text accompanying notes 277-300. 
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state of siege and a crisis mentality have persisted at the agency for much of its 
existence as Congress has responded to each EPA failure by passing even 
more restrictive deadline legislation that the agency again fails to meet. 7 
In short, a pathological cycle has emerged: agency distrust has begotten 
failure, breeding further distrust and further failure. The destructive cycle is 
not simply a product of personality or partisan politics. Replacing Anne 
Gorsuch with William Ruckelshaus as EPA administrator averted agency 
collapse in 1983 but did not eliminate the pattern. Nor, at an earlier time, did 
the coupling of a Democratic president (Carter) with Democratic majorities in 
both congressional chambers yield fundamental change. 8 
The cycle results from the way in which our governmental institutions have 
responded to persistent public schizophrenia concerning environmental 
protection policy. Public aspirations for environmental quality are relatively 
uniform and strongly held. But those aspirations contrast sharply with the 
public's understanding of their implications and its demonstrated 
unwillingness to take the steps necessary to have those aspirations realized. 
There is an appearance of harmony underlain by much actual disharmony. 
Our governmental institutions have exacerbated rather than redressed the 
discrepancy. These institutions are founded on deep-seated skepticism of 
those who wield governmental authority, and they seek, through the checks 
and balances embraced by our tripartite system, to curb potential 
governmental overreaching and any branch's abuse of the public trust. In the 
case of EPA, the illusion of harmony suggested agency abuse of its public trust 
as public aspirations have gone unrealized. At the same time, the various 
interests that are in disharmony have exploited to their own advantage the 
institutional forces of distrust within the government to guard against adverse 
EPA actions. The upshot has been a pattern of agency crisis and controversy 
and, as described, a cycle of regulatory failure. 
The cycle must now be reversed. The need to reduce dramatically the 
strain we place on the natural environment is simultaneously immediate and 
long-term. Our domestic laws reflect that understanding and express a 
symbolic commitment to that goal. Those laws have achieved, moreover, 
significant improvement in discrete areas and, in some others, have managed 
to resist further environmental degradation in the face of a growing 
economy.9 For that reason, they warrant great praise. The past twenty years 
nevertheless reveal that those same laws decline to undertake the concomitant 
modification of our governmental institutions, and the way we think about 
them, which is necessary for a fuller realization of our environmental goals. 
EPA's 20th anniversary and expected elevation to cabinet status as the 
Department of the Environment provide an appropriate occasion to initiate a 
7. See text accompanying notes 185-234. 
8. See R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act 33-35 (Brookings 
Inst, 1983). Nor, for that malter, did the combination of a Republican administration and a 
Republican.controlled Senate from 1980 to 1986 eliminate the tension. 
9. See Council on Environmental Quality, Seventeenth Annl1al Report 17 (U.S. Govt Printing 
Office, 1986) (descrihing significant advances in environmental quality since 1970). 
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much needed institutional study of the federal environmental protection 
effort, which is the purpose of this article. A retrospective on EPA illustrates 
the causes and effects of the cycle of distrust that has plagued the agency since 
its inception. More importantly, the inquiry lays the foundation for a more 
positive discussion of how to avoid repeating the cycle and how instead to 
facilitate the type of social and institutional innovation necessary for 
protection of the natural environment. 
II 
THE ORIGINS OF EPA AND ITS EARLY YEARS: 
AGENCY CAPTURE AND THE SEEDS OF DISTRUST 
Historically, the creation of EPA in 1970 was a modest step in the wake of 
decades of debate concerning how best to institutionalize natural resource 
planning and environmental protection within the federal government. IO 
President Nixon ultimately rejected the recommendation of his Advisory 
Council on Executive Branch Reorganization-the "Ash Council" headed by 
Roy Ash-that he establish a cabinet level Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources. I I The Ash Report called for a consolidation into one 
agency of most of the natural resource and pollution control programs then 
located in forty-four bureaus and offices within nine different agencies, 
including the Army Corps of Engineers, Soil Conservation Service, Forest 
Service, and Rural Electrification Administration. 12 Congress likewise shelved 
parallel suggestions that it too should foster systematic and coordinated 
federal environmental and natural resource policy planning by reducing the 
fragmentation of authority over that subject matter then reflected in its 
committee structure. Congress took no such action,13 and President Nixon 
ultimately proposed only the creation of a noncabinet-Ievel federal agency 
10. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge to Modern Society 197-225 (Natural History 
Press, 1970): Charles O. jones, Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control 54-71 (U 
Pittsburgh Press, 1975). 
II. Detailed accounts of the debates leading to the creation of EPA can be found in j. Clarence 
Davies, III & Barbara S. Davies, The Politics of Pollution 103-20 (Bobbs-Merrill, 2d ed 1975); Alfred A. 
Marcus, Promise and Performance: Choosing and Implementing an Environmental Policy 32- 4 7 (Greenwood 
Press, 1980); john C. Whitaker, Striking A Balance 54-60 (Am Inst Public Policy Res, 1976). See also 
Department of Environmental Protection Act, Committee of the Whole House on the State of the 
Union, HR Rep No 101-428, IOlst Cong, 2d Sess 19-20 (1990); Paul R. Portney, ed, Public Policiesfor 
Environmental Protection 9-11 (Resources for the Future, 1990). The Ash Council staff originally 
recommended to Roy Ash, its chair, a separate noncabinet-Ievel agency concerned with pollution 
control, but was overruled by Ash. Ash then promoted adoption of a plan under which the number 
of cabinet agencies would be decreased to four super departments (community development, 
economic affairs, human resources, and natural resources). He was concerned that a separate 
pollution control agency would undermine his general plan. See Davies & Davies, The Politics of 
Pollution at 107-08 (cited earlier in this note); Marcus, Promise and Performance at 37-38 (cited earlier in 
this note). The Ash Council did ultimately recommend the creation of a comprehensive 
"Department of Natural Resources" that consolidated in that new agency the principal natural 
resources programs of the executive branch. See generally President's Advisory Council on 
Executive Organization. Memorandum for the President on the Establishment of a Department of 
Natural Resources (May 12, 1970). 
12. Whitaker, Striking a Balance at 54-55 (cited in note II). 
13. See notes 37-38. 353 and accompanying text. 
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that consolidated the federal pollution standard setting functions then located 
in fifteen offices within four agencies and one interagency council. I4 The 
reorganization transferred to EPA only nine of approximately fifty federal 
programs then pertaining to the environment. 15 
A major reason why both President Nixon. and Congress took relatively 
modest action in institutionalizing a federal role for environmental protection 
also explains much of EPA's subsequent history. It underlies the subsequent 
whipsawing of EPA within and among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches over the last twenty years, and it finds its ultimate expression in the 
pathological cycle of regulatory failure and controversy that has plagued the 
agency from the outset. 
Simply put, EPA was not trusted. Myriad interest groups were potentially 
affected by a federal agency responsible for environmental protection. Some 
favored the agency's establishment and its mandate; many others, however, 
were threatened by both. All recognized that the agency would face 
tremendous pressures in its effort to fashion and implement federal 
environmental protection laws. Each therefore sought to prevent "agency 
capture," meaning EPA's domination by an adverse competing interest. 
In particular, three variants of agency capture theory have predominated 
and strongly influenced EPA's institutional development. The first 
hypothesis, identified with the works of Professor Marver Bernstein, 16 
concerns the tendency of administrative agencies to ally themselves, over 
time, with the community they regulate. At the time of EPA's creation, Ralph 
Nader's organization had published a series of books, relying on Bernstein's 
thesis, that accused various federal agencies (including the Department of 
Agriculture's pesticides program) of being in a state of agency capture.l7 
14. EPA inherited 5,743 employees from 15 agencies, including the (I) Federal Water Quality 
Administration (Interior); (2) Bureau of Water Hygiene (Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"»; 
(3) National Air Pollution Control Administration (HEW); (4) Bureau of Solid Waste Management 
(HEW); (5) Bureau of Radiological Health (with exceptions) (HEW); (6) functions relating to the 
establishment of tolerances for pesticide chemicals (HEW); (7) functions relating to the provision of 
technical assistance to the states and to conduct research regarding pesticide chemicals (HEW); (8) 
Pesticides Regulation Division (Agriculture); (9) functions under 21 USC § 346(aH I) of the Federal 
Food, Drug. and Cosmetic Act (Agriculture); (10) Environmental Quality Branch of the Plant 
Protection Division of the Agricultural Research Service (Agriculture); (II) functions relating to 
studies on effects of pesticides on wildlife and fish (Interior); (12) functions of the Gulf Breeze 
Bi010gical Laboratory of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (Interior); (13) Federal Radiation 
Council (interagency council); (14) Division of Radiation Protection Standards (Atomic Energy 
Commission); and (15) functions of the Council on Environmental Quality under 42 USC § 4344(5) 
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USC §§ 4321 et seq (1988». Reorganization 
Plan No 3 § 2 (cited in note 2). See Joseph L. Bower & Charles J. Christenson. Public Afanagement: 
Text and Cases 100-03 (Irwin, 1978). 
15. Reorganization Plan No 3 of 1970. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive and 
Legislative Reorganization of the House Committee on Govt Operations, 91st Cong, 2d Sess 57 
(1970) (statement of Rep. Blatnik and testimony of Mr. Ash). 
16. See, for example. Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 79-94 
(Princeton U Press. 1955). See also James Q Wilson, Bureaucracy: JI·nat Govemment Agencies Do and 
IVh)' Thp)' Do It 73· 74 (Basic Books. 1990); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation o/American Administrative 
Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1667, 1685-86 (1975). 
17. See generally Robert C. Fellmeth. Edward F. Cox & John E. Schulz. The .Vader Report on the 
Federal Trade Commission (R.W. Baron. 1969); James S. Turner, The Chemical Feast: The Ralph Nader 
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The second thesis, most thoughtfully articulated by Professor Joseph Sax, 
concerns the tendency of agency personnel to bargain away environmental 
values as part of the political process. IS According to Sax, agency officials are 
simply incapable of providing natural resources with long-term protection 
from persistent and influential economic interests. 19 The constant demands 
on the bureaucracy for compromise are too great. 20 
Finally, there are those who fear the agency's capture by its own 
bureaucracy.21 Unlike the other two theories, the primary proponents of this 
view are concerned with the agency paying too little attention to the needs of 
the regulated. The theory is premised on the reputedly liberal, pro-
regulatory bias of the federal bureaucracy, particularly that in an agency 
rearrangement such as EPA with a social mission. 22 
EPA's creation and the manner in which it was initially received within the 
executive branch, by Congress, and the courts can largely be traced to these 
three different capture theories. These theories affected EPA's organization 
within the executive branch, its internal structure, the structure and focus of 
the federal environmental laws under its jurisdiction, and the amount and 
character of judicial review of its actions. 
A. Executive Branch 
Within the Executive Office of the President and Cabinet in 1970, there 
were two competing philosophies regarding environmental regulation. Those 
sympathetic to an active federal pollution control program were opposed to 
its inclusion in a cabinet agency along with the government's traditional 
natural resource management programs. The historically pro-development 
Study Group Report on Food Protection and the FDA (Grossman, 1970); Robert C. Fellmeth, The Interstate 
Commerce Commission: The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
Transportation (Grossman, 1970); John C. Esposito, Vanishing Air: The Ralph Nader Study Group Report 
on Air Pollution (Grossman, 1970); David Zwick, Water Wasteland: The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on 
Water Pollution (Grossman, 1971). See also Michael Frome, The Forest Service (Praeger, 1971). 
18. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment (Knopf, 1970). 
19. Id at 53-55, 88-89. 
20. Id at 55. 
21. President Nixon reportedly was concerned generally with liberals in the bureaucracy 
undermining his agenda. See Wilson, Bureaucracy at 50, 76 (cited in note 16). Others in the White 
House have since frequently harbored suspicions that EPA career employees have conspired with 
environmental organizations against the administration. See Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 115 
(cited in note 8). The Reagan White House exhibited similar concerns. See J. Clarence Davies, 
Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration, in Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft, eds, 
Environmental Policy in the I 980s: Reagan's Ni!UI Agenda 144 (Cong Q, 1984); Christopher Harris, 
William L. Want & Morris A. Ward, Hazardous Waste-Confronting the Challenge 30-31 (Quorem, 1987). 
Some political appointees allegedly prepared hit lists to rid the agency of its liberal influence. See 
Donald V. Feliciano, The United States Environmental Protection Agency: An Analysis of Its Controversies 44 
(Cong Res Serv, 1983) ("EPA: An Analysis of Its Controversies"). The Bush Administratio.n has not 
been immune from harboring similar suspicions toward EPA's bureaucracy. See Maureen Dowd, 
SWI/Inu on Environment: His Influence is Debated, NY Times A I col I (Feb 15, 1990). President Bush's 
Chief of Staff, John Sununu. explained that he helps to formulate environmental policy because of his 
"deep distrust of the EPA bureaucrats 'who forget that it is Bill Reilly and the President who make 
policy.' .. Id at AI4 col 4. Unnamed White House officials reportedly believe that "Reilly has been 
captured by his bureaucracy." Id at A I 4 col I. 
22. Wilson. Bureaucracy at 65-66 (cited in note 16). 
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bias of those natural resource programs, it was feared, would dominate the 
agency and undermine pollution control efforts.23 Conversely, those in the 
executive branch, including President Nixon, who were concerned about the 
possible adverse economic impact of environmental protection on existing 
federal programs, sought to limit the new agency's jurisdiction and maintain 
presidential control over the agency's decisions.24 
The final presidential proposal reflected a compromise of these forces. 
The agency was independent in the sense that it was placed outside the formal 
jurisdiction of any other agency, but unlike a truly independent agency, its 
administrator and assistant administrators were to serve at the President's 
pleasure and formally report to the President through OMB.25 The agency's 
pollution control jurisdiction was not combined with any of the federal 
government's natural resource management authority, but neither was the 
pollution control dimension of that management authority surrendered to the 
new agency. For instance, the President did not transfer to EPA all of the 
Department of Agriculture's jurisdiction over pesticide regulation. The Army 
Corps of Engineers also retained jurisdiction to regulate certain types of 
environmentally harmful activities occurring within the nation's traditional 
navigable waters. 
In addition, at the same time that the President proposed the creation of 
EPA, he counterbalanced it with the creation of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") and National Industrial Pollution 
Control Council ("NIPCC") within the Department of Commerce.26 
Commerce's pro-business perspective, the President believed, would 
minimize the chance of NOAA impeding economic activity within the coastal 
zone. NIPCC was made up of senior officials of major domestic corporations 
and trade associations and was designed to provide an authoritative source 
within the government on the adverse economic impact of pollution contro1.27 
Working with OMB, NIPCC was intended to provide the President with an 
institutional mechanism for maintaining control over EPA.28 
Finally, the internal structure of EPA reflected competing agency capture 
concerns. The Ash Council contemplated that, like the Defense Department, 
23. See Davies & Davies, The Politics of Pollution at 108 (cited in note II); Marcus, Promise and 
Performance at 35 (cited in note II). 
24. Marcus, Promise and Performance at 41 (cited in note II). 
25. Sheldon M. Novick, Donald W. Stever & Margaret G. Mellon, eds, Law of Environmental 
Protection § 4.01(1) (Clark-Boardman, 1990). 
26. See Reorganization Plan No 4 of 1970, 5 USC Reorg Plan of 1970 No 4, App (1988) 
(proposing NOAA); Environmental Protection Agency and National Oceanic Atmospheric 
Administration, The President's Message to the Congress upon Transmitting Reorganization Plans 
to Establish the Two Agencies, 35 CFR 5993 (April 9, 1970) (establishing NIPCC). Note that NIPCC 
was officially disbanded on January 5, 1975 under the provisions of Pub L No 92-463, 86 Stat 770. 
27. See Statement on Establishing the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, April 9, 
1970, 6 Weekly Comp Pres Docs 502 (April 13, 1970). See generally Henry J. Steck, Private Influence 
on Environmental Policy: The Case of the National Industrial Pollution Control Coul/cil, 5 Envir L 241, 253-59 
(1975); Whitaker, Striking a Balance at 40 (cited in' note II). 
28. Steck. 5 Envir L at 259-79 (cited in note 27). Congress. however, retaliated against the 
NIPCC by declining in 1973 to appropriate any staff funds for fiscal year 1974. See id at 280. In 
January 1975. the Commerce Department formally terminated the council. Id at 279. 
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EPA would be organized by function (for example, by abatement, monitoring, 
enforcement, standard setting, and research).29 Such a structure would allow 
the agency to approach the environment as an interrelated system, as 
suggested by the President in his message transmitting the reorganization 
plan to Congress, rather than as a series of discrete media (for example, air, 
water, and land).30 There were many perceived advantages to a cross-media 
approach, including avoidance of the tendency of media-specific programs to 
ignore their impact on other media.31 
EPA's first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, however, never fully 
adopted the contemplated functional, integrated organization. He was not 
persuaded of the importance of organization in the first instance, and he 
anticipated objections from members of Congress and the environmental 
community who, because they were themselves organized by media, would be 
concerned about the adverse impact of such an organizational scheme on 
their respective abilities to influence agency policy. 32 The final agency 
structure was a compromise that still persists today under which EPA is 
simultaneously organized both by media and by function. 
B. Congress 
EPA's initial reception in Congress reflects the same tension between 
different philosophies and agency capture theories. There were those in 
Congress concerned about EPA's possible capture by the regulated 
community and about the bureaucratic tendency to give in to the political 
forces that can be wielded in the executive branch by powerful economic 
interests opposed to expensive pollution control measures.33 There were also 
members of Congress concerned about the dangers of a runaway bureaucracy 
imposing excessive costs on the nation's economy.34 
In hearings on the nominations of EPA officials, members of Congress 
repeatedly questioned presidential appointees about their willingness to 
exercise judgment independent of the President. 35 They also reminded 
29. Marcus, Promise and Perfonnance at 102-03 (cited in note II). 
30. Message of the President Relative to Reorganization Plan No 3, July 9, 1970.6 Weekly 
Comp Pres Docs 908 Ouly 13, 1970). 
31. Id ("Control of the air pollution may produce more solid wastes, which then pollute the land 
or water. Control of the water-polluting effluent may convert it into solid wastes, which must be 
disposed of on land."). 
32. Marcus, Promise and Perfonnance at 103-06 (cited in note II); Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts 
& Stephen R. Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions 35 (Oxford U 
Press, 1990) ("EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions"). 
33. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 33-34 (cited in note 32). 
34. Davies & Davies, The Politics of Pollution at 73-74 (cited in note II). See notes 165. 171-74 
and accompanying text. 
35. See, for example, Nomination of William D. Ruckelshaus, Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Public Works, 91st Cong, 2d Sess 15-16 (1970); Nomination of Russell E. Train, 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Public Works, 93rd Cong, 1st Sess 7-8 (1973); 
Nominations of Anne M. Gorsuch and John W. Hernandez. Jr., Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 36-37 (1981); Nomination of 
William K. Reilly, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, IOlst 
Cong, 1st Sess 50-52 (1989). See generally Stanley Bach, Goven/melltal COllstraillts ill Ellvirollmental 
HeinOnline -- 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 320 1991
320 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 54: No.4 
nominees about the need for consultation with congressional committees 
prior to the agency making any significant decisions.36 
Congressional committees dominated by those favoring a strong federal 
pollution control effort secured passage of statutes specifically designed to 
minimize the possibility of bureaucratic neglect and compromise and of 
agency capture by regulated industry. 37 Those in Congress who were more 
wary of the economic costs of pollution control also sought to oversee and 
influence EPA's work. Neither side favored consolidation of environmental 
jurisdiction in a few committees. Each wanted to avoid any reduction in 
leverage over the agency that might result from any loss of committee 
jurisdiction. As a result, there was great resistance to many of the early efforts 
to achieve a congressional reorganization of environmental jurisdiction that 
was similar to that which was occurring within the executive branch.38 
Regulation, in Nat! Res Council, ed, 2b Decisionmaking at the Environmental Protection Agency: Selected 
Working Papers 181 (Nat! Acad Sciences, 1977) ("some Congressional staff members argue that 
Congress has delegated regulatory functions to EPA which are to be carried out without presidential 
influence or interference"). In Administrator Train's hearing, however, he was also sharply 
questioned by Senator William Scott who was upset by Train's earlier intimation that EPA would be 
free "to defy the White House." See Nomination of Russell E. Train at 52-55 (cited earlier in this 
note). 
36. See, for example, Nomination of Russell E. Train at 47 (cited in note 35) (Randolph advice 
to Train); Christopher H. Foreman, Signals From the Hill 83 (Yale U Press, 1988) (Muskie advice to 
Train); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 32 (cited in note 8) (Muskie advice to Ruckelshaus). At 
least in EPA's early years, EPA reportedly did consult substantially with congressional committees in 
its decisionmaking. See Bach, Governmental Constmints at 188-92 (cited in note 35). 
37. Gary C. Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion: Law and Policy in Federal RegulatoT)' Agencies 94-108 
(Pergamon, 1987). See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and "Fine Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan L Rev 1267, 1271 (\985); Edmund S. Muskie. 
Reflections on a Quarter Century of Environmental Activism: On Postponing Deadlines, Second-Guessing the 
Congress, and Ignoring Problems Until II Is Too Late, 18 Envir L Rptr 10081, 10082-83 (March 1988); 
David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L Rev 740, 
742-45 (1983); Richard B. Stewart,' Regulation, Innovation, and Administmtive Law: A Conceptual 
Fmmework, 69 Cal L Rev 1259, 1265 (\ 981). See also Wilson, Bureaucmcv at 71 (cited in note 16). 
38. The National Academy of Sciences in January 1970 issued a report that suggested the need 
for both executive and congressional reorganization for effective federal governmental management 
of the environment. See Institutions for Effective Management of the Environment, Report of the 
Environmental Study Group to the Environmental Studies Board of the National Academy of 
Sciences and National Academy of Engineering Part I, 52 (Jan 1970). There were some initial efforts 
made to coordinate environmental jurisdiction (see Environmental Policy Division of the 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Congress and the Nation's Environment, 
Environmental and Natural Resources Affairs of the 92d Congress, Senate Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 833-36 (\ 973) ("Environmental Policy Division"); Report of 
the Council on Environmental Quality, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 91 st Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Muskie); House Hearings on Reorganization Plan No 3 at 118 (cited in note 15) (statement of Rep 
Dingell)), and some modest reorganization in the Senate years later (see note 355), but efforts to 
consolidate jurisdiction in the House have met with little success. See Henry C. Kenski & Margaret 
Corgan Kenski, Congress Against the Presidmt: The Struggle Over the Environment, in Vig & Kraft, 
Environmental Policy in the 1980s at 110 (cited in note 21). 
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C. Courts 
Finally, the initial relationship between EPA and the courts was likewise 
heavily influenced by various forms of the capture theory.39 As summarized 
by one commentator, the courts' opinions reflected two different views of the 
agency. Some courts viewed the agency's work as the product of an 
overzealous bureaucracy that acted without proper regard for economic 
concerns; others "pictured the EPA as a marginally competent but 
occasionally careless agency that from time to time needs to be reminded of 
the importance of its statutory goals and warned against bowing to demands 
from the White House and industry."4o The effect was the spawning of the 
so-called "hard look" doctrine and modern administrative law of the 1970s, 
much of which was fashioned in the context of environmentallitigation.41 
III 
THE COLLISION OF INSTITUTIONAL FORCES: THE BREEDING OF 
REGULATORY FAILURE AND CONTROVERSY 
The tug-of-war in which EPA found itself might have turned out to be 
nothing more than a benign, even healthy, application of the checks and 
balances necessary to realize this country's commitment to the separation of 
powers. After all, where important regulatory authority is at stake, the various 
branches will invariably vie for influence in fashioning national policy. It 
should be no great surprise, moreover, that those institutions should do so at 
the behest of an interest group seeking to avoid the domination of the 
regulatory process by an adverse and competing interest. 
In the case of EPA, however, the effect has been neither benign nor 
healthy. The institutional forces set into motion by the various capture 
theories have repeatedly collided, breeding conflict, controversy, and 
ultimately a destructive pattern of regulatory failure. No one individual or 
institution is to blame for this phenomenon.42 Indeed, "blame" is an 
inappropriate characterization. Many of the problems that have arisen in the 
implementation of environmental law were likely the inevitable result of such 
a dramatic infusion of new values and priorities into the nation's laws. But, be 
that as it may, it is possible to understand why this phenomenon resulted and 
how the cycle may now finally be reversed as we move into the 1990s. 
Most simply put, the forces designed to prevent EPA's capture became 
pathologically destructive because the country's spiritual environmental 
39. Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years Of Law and 
Politics, 54 L & Contemp Probs 249 (Autumn 1991). 
40. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 371 (cited in note 8). 
41. Glicksman & Schroeder, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 267-68 (cited in note 39); Harold 
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U Pa L Rev 509, 514 (1974); 
James L. Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 NYU L Rev 498, 499 (1977); William H. 
Rodgers,Jr., Environmental Law § 1.5,16-23 (West, 1977); Stewart, 69 Cal L Rev at 1274-77 (cited in 
note 37). 
42. Some former EPA officials, however, have suggested that Congress should be blamed. See 
John Quarles, Runaway Regulation? Blame Congress, Washington Post 88 col I (May 20, 1979). 
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awakening in the 1970s occurred without much of an intellectual 
understanding of its implications. A strong national consensus in favor of 
environmental protection prompted the President to create EPA, Congress to 
pass sweeping environmental laws, and courts to open their doors to 
environmental plaintiffs. But both the public and those institutions were 
remarkably unsophisticated about the demands that they were placing upon 
themselves. 
There was little, if any, sense of the huge short-term costs associated with 
treating pollution as a cost of doing business. Nor was there much awareness 
of the degree to which settled expectations and lifestyles could be disrupted if 
the natural environment were to be treated as more than an economic 
commodity. The public and governmental institutions likewise did not truly 
appreciate the incalculable nature of the benefits of environmental protection, 
including the scientific uncertainty associated with the measurement of those 
benefits and the long term intergenerational nature of their realization. 
There was especially little apprehension of how those characteristics would 
challenge the patience of both those sympathetic to, and those skeptical of, 
the new federal programs. 
Nor were the late 1960s and early 1970s a time susceptible to the type of 
candid dialogue between citizen groups and business, Congress and the 
President, or scientists and economists that would have been required to 
begin to reach consensus on these issues.43 The civil rights and antiwar 
movements had polarized the nation. In the aftermath of powerful 
denunciations of the chemical and auto industries and government by activists 
Rachel Carson (Silent Spring (1962» and Ralph Nader (Unsafe at Any Speed 
(1965)), the credibility of government and business on health and safety 
issues was exceedingly low.44 Indeed, because of the civil rights and antiwar 
movements, there was a pressing need for national consensus on some 
important issue. That need satisfied itself by embracing the environmental 
movement. The social consensus behind the environmental movement was 
illusory, however, and as the conflicts became apparent, EPA, which was the 
object of the country's hopes and dreams about the environment, often 
became the object of its frustration and scorn.45 
43. John McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise 69-87 (Indiana U Press, 1989) (describing the 
"prophets of doom" behind the environmental movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s). 
44. See, for example, Billee Shoecraft, Sue the Bastards vii-x, xxi-xxiii, 446-51 (1971); Victor John 
Yannacone, Jr., COUTts of Equity to Pm!ect OUT Environment, in Proceedings, 63rd Annual Convention of 
the National Audubon Society (Sept 30, 1967), excerpted in Victor John Yannacone, Jr., The 
Environment and the Law, 9 Forum 795, 797-98 (1974). 
45. Professor Louis Jaffe long ago predicted this chain of events. See Louis L. Jaffe, Two Da)'s to 
Save the World, 24 Okla L Rev 17 (1971). See also James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimac),-, The 
Administrative Process and American Government 264 (Cambridge U Press, 1978) (arguing that the limits 
of administrative process generally coincide with "the bounds of the social consensus on the agency's 
statutory responsibilities" and "when society does not respect these limits ... it condemns agencies 
to undertake tasks beyond their institutional capacity to perform effectively"). 
HeinOnline -- 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 323 1991
Page 311: Autumn 1991] TRAGEDY OF DISTRUST 323 
A. The Breeding of Regulatory Failure 
Congress responded to the perception of a national consensus in 
environmental protection by passing a series of laws in the 1970s that set the 
stage for institutional conflict and agency failure. Congress lacked the 
incentive to address or emphasize the pitfalls and chose instead to join the 
chorus in favor of immediate and fundamental change.46 The congressional 
votes in favor of the new laws were accordingly overwhelmingly favorable. 
The average vote in favor of major federal environmental legislation during 
the 1970s was seventy-six to five in the Senate and 331 to thirty in the 
House.47 As one legislator put it in describing his reluctant vote in favor of 
safe drinking water legislation in 1974, "[a]fter all, if one votes against safe 
drinking water, it is like voting against home and mother."48 
l. From Public Aspiration to Statutory Mandate. The federal environmental 
statutes of the early 1970s were dramatic, sweeping, and uncompromising, 
consistent with the nation's spiritual and moral resolution of the issue. The 
laws also reflected skepticism and distrust of agency implementation of 
statutory mandates, consistent with agency capture theory and the general 
political ill will then existing between the executive and legislative branches. 
The statutes imposed hundreds of stringent deadlines on the agency and 
removed much of the agency's substantive discretion in accomplishing them. 
One-third of the deadlines were for six months or less.49 Sixty percent were 
for one year or less.50 According to EPA's current administrator, William 
Reilly, Congress and the courts had imposed 800 deadlines on the agency 
through 1989.51 Congress made no effort to bridge the gap between the 
nation's aspirations for environmental protection and its understanding of the 
underlying issues and its own capacity for change. 
The result was a seemingly never-ending onslaught of impossible agency 
tasks. Eighty-six percent of the statutory deadlines applied specifically to 
46. John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q 233 (1990). 
47. These numbers are based on the last recorded roll call vote taken in each chamber for each 
of the major bills ultimately passed by Congress in the 1970s. In most cases, the final votes were 
voice votes. The statutes covered include the Clean Air Act of 1970 ("CAA"), the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"), the 1977 Clean Air Act, the 1977 Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), and the Toxic Substances Control Act ('TSCA"). The numbers do not 
reRect the votes in favor of the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") in 1974 because there does not 
appear ever to have been a recorded roll call vote in the Senate. The formal votes are not, of course, 
an accurate measure of congressional support for every aspect of the bills passed. Many parts of 
those bills were likely quite contentious and, if added by amendment during debate, might well have 
been adopted by the narrowest of margins. The final votes are more lopsided because each legislator 
is faced with an all or nothing choice. 
48. 120 Cong Rec 37594 (Nov 26, (974) (remarks of Sen. Cotton). 
49. Statutory Deadlines In Environmental Legislation: Necessary But Need Improvement 13-14 (Envir & 
Energy Study Inst and Envir L Inst, (985) ("EESI, Statutory Deadlines"). 
50. Id. 
51. See William K. Reilly, The Tuming Point: An Environmental Vision for the 1990.1 (Marshall 
Lecture at the Natural Resources Defense Council, Nov 27, 1989), reprinted in 20 Envir Rptr Curr 
Dev (BNA) 1386, 1389 (Dec 8, 1989). 
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EPA.52 EPA was "told to eliminate water pollution, and all risk from air 
pollution, prevent hazardous waste from reaching ground water, establish 
standards for all toxic drinking water contaminants, and register all 
pesticides."53 To date, EPA has met only about 14 percent of the 
congressional deadlines imposed and has had 80 to 85 percent of its major 
regulations challenged in court. 54 
a. Air Pollution. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,55 Congress 
mandated the achievement by 1975 of national ambient air quality standards 
("NMQS") necessary for the protection of public health (primary standard) 
and public welfare (secondary standard).56 Congress also instructed EPA to 
publish an initial listing of "hazardous" air pollutants within ninety days and 
then, within 180 days of its listing, to publish for each such pollutant a 
proposed "emission standard" for the protection of public health.57 The 
deadline for final emission standard regulations was 180 days later.58 
Congress established a similarly rigid schedule for EPA's listing of categories 
of stationary sources that "may contribute significantly to air pollution which 
causes or contributes to the endangerment of public health or welfare" 
(ninety days), and an even tighter schedule for promulgation of regulations 
for new sources (120 days after inclusion as a secondary source for proposal; 
ninety days after proposal for final promulgation).59 The Clean Air Act also 
mandated that the administrator achieve a 90 percent reduction in existing 
automotive pollutant levels by 1975 (hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide) 
and 1976 (nitrogen oxides), with a narrow provision for a possible one-year 
extension.60 
The administrative task was enormous. It required strict regulation of 
20,000 to 40,000 major stationary sources of air pollution, millions of cars 
52. EESI, Statutory Deadlines at II (cited in note 49). The remaining 14'10 was evenly divided 
between the regulated community (including public water supply companies) and the states. Id. 
53. Council on Environmental Quality, Sixteenth Annual Report 14 (U.S. Govt Printing Office, 
1985) ("CEQ, Sixteenth Annual Report"). 
54. EESI, Statutory Deadlines at ii, 12 (cited in note 49) (14% compliance refers to all 
environmental statutory deadlines, 86% of which apply to EPA); Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion at 117 
(cited in note 37) (80'10 of EPA's major regulations challenged in court). See CEQ Sixteenth Annual 
Report at 2-3 (cited in note 53) ("Fully 85 percent of EPA's regulations result in litigation."). 
55. Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676 (1970), then codified at 42 USC §§ 1857 et seq (1970). 
Apart from scattered minor revisions, Congress has amended the Clean Air Act twice: in 1977 (Pub 
L No 95-95, 91 Stat 685 (1977» and 1990 (Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2391 (1990». The 1977 
amendments also called for a recodification of the entire Act, now found at 42 USC §§ 7401-7642 
(1988). 
56. Congress authorized EPA to extend for up to two years the 1975 deadline for compliance 
with the primary standard. Congress also authorized EPA to extend the deadline for submission of 
the plans for compliance with the Act's secondary standards. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970, Pub L No 91-604, §§ 109,110,84 Stat 1679-83, then codified at42 USC §§ 1857c-4, 1857c-5 
(1970). See generally James E. Krier & Edmund Ursin, Pollution and Policy 200-08 (U Cal Press, 
1977). 
57. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, §§ 112(b)(l)(A)-(B). 84 Stat 1685, 
then codified at 42 USC §§ 1857c-7(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1970). 
58. 42 USC § 1857c-7(b)(l)(B) (1970). 
59. Id § 1857c-6(b)(l). 
60. Id § 1857f-1. 
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and trucks being driven by average citizens,61 and 275 toxic air pollutants 
(sixty of which are known or suspected carcinogens),62 many of which were 
emitted by industries vital to local economies. In short, the Act challenged 
not only "business as usual" but "life as usual" in the United States and 
demanded that EPA immediately seek dramatic change in both. The short 
time scale necessarily precluded prolonged attention to the tremendous 
scientific uncertainty associated with the complex mechanics of air pollution. 
It also did not allow for much serious agency consideration of the relative 
costs and benefits of air pollution reduction. Neither the NAAQS nor the 
toxic emission standards allowed for any significant consideration of their 
economic costs. 
Not surprisingly, fewer than 15 percent of the Clean Air Act's deadlines 
were met. None of those met pertained to compliance with environmental 
quality standards.63 Twenty years later, many areas of the nation still have not 
met the NAAQS. Both EPA and Congress have given the auto companies 
numerous extensions of the deadline for meeting 90 percent reduction in 
emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides, and, 
twenty years later, the companies have still not reduced nitrogen oxides by 90 
percent.64 EPA has acted on only seven of the 274 known hazardous 
substances emitted into the air.65 
b. Water Pollution. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 took a similar approach.66 The 1972 enactment sought 
fishable and swimmable waters everywhere by 1983 and zero discharge of 
pollutants by 1985,67 and it made unlawful any discharge of pollutants into 
navigable waters absent a permit issued by EPA. The act instructed EPA to 
require through the permitting process that industry secure the "best 
practicable control technology currently available" ("BPT") by 1977 and 
"best available technology economically achievable" ("BAT") by 1984.68 
61. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 307 (cited in note 8). 
62. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Report of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, HR Rep No 101-490, IOlst Cong, 2d Sess 151-52 (1990). 
63. See EESI, Statutory Deadlines at 11-16 (cited in note 49). The 15% figure reflects the number 
of Clean Air Act deadlines that EPA had met as 011985 when the Environmental and Energy Study 
Institute released its report on statutory deadlines. Because, however, that study necessarily 
included the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, which extended some of the deadlines established 
in the original 1970 Act, the 15% figure is likely high with regard to EPA's meeting the earlier 
deadlines. 
64. See Frederick R. Anderson, Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: 
Law & Policy 203-06 (Little, Brown, 1990). 
65. HR Rep No 101-490 at 151 (cited in note 62). 
66. Pub L No 92-500,86 Stat 816-903, then codified at 33 USC §§ 1251-1376 (Supp II 1972). 
Congress has since enacted scattered revisions of the law but has passed comprehensive amendments 
on only two subsequent occasions: in 1977 when Congress renamed the law the Clean Water Act 
(Pub L No 95-217, 91 Stat 1566) and then again in 1987 (Pub L 100-4, 101 Stat 7). 
67. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, §§ 101 (a)(l)-
(2),86 Stat 816, then codified at 33 USC §§ 1251(a)(l), (2) (Supp II 1972). See generally Rodgers, 
Environmental Law § 4.2, at 361-68 (cited in note 41). 
68. Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 844, then codified at 33 USC §§ 1311(b)(I)(A), (2)(A) (Supp II 
1972). 
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Section 306 of the Act compelled EPA to require new sources of water 
pollution to achieve effluent reduction "achievable through the application of 
the best available demonstrated control technology" ("BDT").69 EPA was 
supposed to promulgate effluent guidelines by October 1973 and permit 
limitations by December 1974.70 
The required administrative undertaking was no less daunting than that 
posed by the Clean Air Act. There are at least 68,000 point sources of water 
pollution requiring federal permits and probably thousands more. 71 As one 
commentator put it, to develop appropriate effluent limits for each of those 
sources based on BPT, BAT, and BDT technological standards demanded 
"omniscience."72 The zero discharge goal was plainly impossible and the 
fishable/swimmable mandate could not, in any event, be met by the strict 
technology-based effluent reduction requirements of the permit program; the 
large amount of nonpoint pollution not covered by the Act's permitting 
program was sufficient, by itself, to prevent EPA's success. 73 By 1985, only 18 
percent of the deadlines established by federal water pollution legislation had 
been met. 74 As with the Clean Air Act, none of the deadlines for compliance 
with environmental quality standards was met.75 
c. Pesticides, Toxic Substances, and Hazardous Waste. In the 1972 
amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
("FIFRA"),76 Congress gave EPA just four years to review approximately 
50,000 pesticides that had previously been registered under far more 
permissive statutory requirements. 77 For registration, EPA had to determine 
that the pesticide's intended use would not cause "unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment" when used "in accordance with widespread and 
commonly recognized practice. "78 The 1976 deadline, like others, proved 
69. Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 854, then codified at 33 USC § 1316 (Supp II 1972). 
70. Id § 1316(b)(I). 
71. EPA had issued this number of permits under the act by October 1982. A. Myrick Freeman, 
III, Water Pollution Policy, in Portney, ed, Public Policies for Environmental Protection at 112 (cited in note 
II). Thousands of facilities discharge into permitted, publicly owned treatment works. See State of 
the Environment-A View Toward the Nineties 102 (Conservation Foundation, 1987) ("A recent EPA 
study, for instance, identifies about 160,000 industrial and commercial facilities that discharged 
wastes containing hazardous constituents to publicly owned treatment works."). 
72. Charles L. Schultze, The Public Use of the Private Interest 52 (Brookings Inst, 1977). 
73. See John E. Bonine & Thomas O. McGarity, The Law of Environmental Protection: Cases-
Legislation-Policies 436-37 (West, 1984). See generally State of the Environment at 104-06 (cited in note 
71); Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Non-Point Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done, 65 Chi-Kent L 
Rev 479, 480-82 (1989). 
74. EESI. Statutory Deadlines at 12 (cited in note 49). 
75. Id at 12, 15. 
76. Pub L No 92-516, 86 Stat 973-999. then codified at 7 USC §§ 136-136y (Supp II 1972). 
77. See Note, Pesticide Safety Regulation Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act: 
Debacle at the Environmental Protection Agency. I Fordham Envir LJ 47,51 (1989) (authored by John P. 
Gasior). Unlike the congressional committees that fashioned the other major environmental 
protection laws of the early and mid-1970s. those who drafted the 1972 FIFRA amendments were 
not "strongly committed to environmental values." Rodgers, Environmental Lau' § 8.3, at 849 (cited 
in note 41). As a result, the law's "sometimes contradictory aims compound the usual problems of 
interpretation." Id at 850. 
78. 7 USC § 136a(c)(5) (Supp II 1972). 
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impossible. EPA believed that it would take at least ten years to complete the 
re-registration process, and it has actually taken much longer. 79 EPA has 
issued relatively few final re-registrations each year.80 By 1984, EPA had re-
registered less than half of the 600 active pesticide ingredients and had not 
addressed any of the 900 inert ingredients, some of which may be more toxic 
than the active ingredients.81 Before recent changes in the pesticides law, 
EPA's rate of re-registration suggested that the agency would not complete 
the re-registration process until 2024.82 
The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), which became law in 
1976,83 asked EPA to review approximately 50,000 to 55,000 chemicals then 
in commerce as well as each of the 1,000 new chemicals introduced each year 
to determine if they "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
the environment. "84 By 1985, EPA had performed the necessary health 
assessments on fewer than 100 of the chemicals in commerce. 85 
Finally, congressional dictates to EPA regarding the regulation and 
cleanup of hazardous wastes were no less overwhelming. In the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"),86 enacted just ten days 
after TSCA, Congress gave EPA only eighteen months to promulgate 
regulations regarding the identification, generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes.87 In the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
("CERCLA"), enacted in 1980,88 Congress authorized EPA to take action to 
clean up inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites either by filing 
lawsuits against those who contributed to the sites to force them to clean up 
the sites themselves, or by arranging for government cleanup, followed by 
lawsuits for reimbursement from contributors.89 
These mandates on hazardous waste control and cleanup may have proved 
the most difficult to achieve. There are approximately 650,000 generators of 
hazardous wastes producing 250 million metric tons of such waste each 
79. Anderson, Mandelker & Tarlock. Environmental Protection at 577 (cited in note 64). 
80. Id. 
81. CEQ, Sixteenth Annual Report at 14·15 (cited in note 53). A more recent Washington Post 
editorial found even less EPA progress in pesticide re-registration. See More l\1inuel on Pesticides, 
Washington Post A26 (Nov 2, 1989) ("Of more than 600 active ingredients in older pesticides, EPA 
has managed in 17 years to complete the reevaluation by modern techniques of fewer than 10."). 
82. William H. Rodgers. 3 Environmental Law: Pesticides and Toxic Substances XI (West, 1988). 
83. Pub L No 94-469, 90 Stat 2003-2051, codified at 15 USC §§ 2601-2629 (1988). 
84. See 15 USC § 2603(a)(I )(A) (1988) (TSCA testing requirements); Steven Cohen, EPA: A 
Qualified Success, in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien & Michael Clarke, eds, Controversies in 
Environmental Policy 191 (State U NY Press, 1986); Portney. Public Policies for Environmental Protection at 
21-22 (cited in note 11). 
85. CEQ, Si.xteenth Annual Report at 15 (cited in note 53). See also Portney, Public Policies for 
Enuil'Ollme1ltal Pmteetion at 21-22 (cited in note II). 
86. Pub L No 94-580, § 2, 90 Stat 2795-2841, then codified at 42 USC §§ 6901-6987 (1976). 
87. Id, 90 Stat 2806-2808, then codified at 42 USC §§ 6921-6925 (1976). 
88. Pub L No 96-510, § 2. 94 Stat 2767-2811, then codified at 42 USC §§ 9601-9657 (Supp IV 
1980). 
89. 42 USC §§ 9604-9607 (1988). 
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year.90 There are 5,000 facilities authorized to treat, store, or dispose of 
hazardous waste and approximately 27,000 abandoned hazardous waste sites, 
2,000 of which will require federal action.91 The Office of Technology 
Assessment estimates that there are also about 600,000 active or former solid 
waste disposal facilities, 10,000 of which may require federal action.92 EPA 
did not meet any of the 1978 RCRA deadlines and as of 1989 had completed 
cleanup at fewer than fifty abandoned sites.93 
2. The Coalition for Failure. These series of impossible tasks did more than 
guarantee repeated agency failure; they triggered a chain of events that 
profoundly influenced EPA's institutional development and the evolution of 
federal environmental law. Those who supported these statutory mandates 
sought judicial review and enlisted some in Congress to oversee EPA's 
implementation. Their aim was to guard against EPA's abdication of its 
statutory responsibilities. At the same time, those who were opposed to the 
statutory mandates but who were unable to muster the political capital to 
defeat their passage, were nonetheless quite successful in enlisting others in 
Congress, the executive branch, and some courts to impede EPA's 
implementation of the mandates. 
a. Agency Funding. Forces within Congress were able to secure passage 
of various environmental statutes that reflected the nation's aspirations for 
environmental quality, but a very different set of institutional forces was 
responsible for appropriating funds for the implementation of those laws. 
Members of the appropriations committees typically did not share the 
environmental zeal of those on the committees who drafted the laws. Indeed, 
some were quite skeptical of the efficacy of those laws.94 The skeptics may 
have been reluctant to voice publicly their opposition to passage of the 
statutes-because of the popular appeal of environmental protection-but 
they felt far more secure in undermining the statutory mandates in a less 
visible way through the appropriation process.95 Such congressional skeptics 
were joined in their efforts by those in the executive branch, especially in the 
90. Roger C. Dower, Hazardous Wastes, in Portney, ed, Public Policies for Environmental Protection 
154-55 (cited in note 11). Until 1984, Congress exempted from EPA's regulation the 130,000 small 
generators that create between 100 and 1,000 kg per month of hazardous waste. See id at 165. 
91. Id at 154-57; Council on Environmental Quality, Fifteenth Annual Report 164-65 (U.S. Govt 
Printing Office, 1984) ("CEQ, Fifteenth Annual Report"). The General Accounting Office estimates the 
number of sites to be between 13,000 and 425,000. Dower, Hazardous Wastes at 157 (cited in note 
90). . 
92. Dower, Hazardous Wastes at 158 (cited in note 90). 
93. EESI, Statutory Deadlines at 12 (cited in note 49) (RCRA); Dower, Hazardous Wastes at 177 
(cited in note 90). . 
94. See, for example, Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 
1974, Hearings Before a SubcOl!lmittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong, 1st 
Sess Pt 5, 789-90 (1973) (testimony of EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus); see notes 170-74 
and accompanying text. 
95. James L. Regens & Robert W. Rycroft, Funding for Enviro/lmental Protection: Comparing 
Congressional and ExeClltive Influl'llces, 26 Social SciJ 289, 299 (1989); Cohen, EPA: A Qualified Success at 
181 (cited in note 84). 
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White House and OMB, who shared their policy outlook and who, 
accordingly, routinely requested less funding for EPA than Congress 
ultimately provided.96 This coalition for modest EPA funding proved 
virtually unbeatable. 
EPA has consistently received a level of funding far lower than the amount 
required to provide the agency with even a small chance of moderate success 
in implementing its statutory mandates.97 In constant dollars, the 
congressional appropriations for EPA were less under President Carter than 
they were under either Presidents Ford or Nixon.98 Between the last EPA 
budget of President Carter's administration (fiscal year 1981) and President 
Reagan's EPA budget for fiscal year 1984, EPA's operating budget (excluding 
Superfund) was reduced 22 percent and its research and development budget 
was reduced by more than 50 percent.99 Even when President Reagan 
increased the budget under Administrator Ruckelshaus for fiscal year 1985, 
the increase was less than half of what Ruckelshaus had sought and (in 
constant dollars) left the agency with 10 percent less than the budget in the 
last year of the Carter Administration-an amount roughly equivalent to the 
agency's level of funding ten years earlier.lOo The trend has not since 
reversed. There has been a 12 percent decrease in constant dollars in EPA's 
budget since 1981. 101 The number of EPA employees in research and 
development has fallen from about 2,300 to 1,800.102 
Of course, during this same period, Congress dramatically increased the 
scope of EPA's statutory responsibilities. As described above, following the 
passage of air and water pollution legislation in the early 1970s, Congress 
added FIFRA to EPA's mandate in 1973, the Safe Drinking Water Act in 
1974,103 and TSCA and RCRA in 1976. Further programmatic expansions 
were called for by the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments, 1 04 the 1977 Clean 
Water Act,105 and CERCLA, passed in 1980. Finally, amendments to RCRA 
in 1984 106 and to CERCLA in 1986107 further exacerbated the gap between 
96. See Regens & Rycroft, 26 Soc Sci J at 292-99 (cited in note 95). 
97. See Natl Res Council, ed, 2 Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection Agency 2 (Natl Acad 
Sciences, 1977) (noting that "EPA's budget and personnel levels continue to fall far short of the 
demands of the ambitious statutory mandates laid upon the Agency"). 
98. Regens & Rycroft, 26 Soc Sci J at 293-94 (cited in note 95). 
99. Robert Bartlett, The Budgetary Process and Environmental Polic)" in Vig & Kraft. eds, 
Environmental Policies in the 1980's at 121, 131, 133 (cited in note 21). 
100. Vig & Kraft. eds, Environmental Policies in the 1980s at 374 n27 (cited in note 21). 
10 I. Department of the Environment Act of 1990, Report of the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs to accompany S 1006, S Rep No 101-262, IOlst Cong, 2d Sess 16 (1990). 
102. Id. 
103. Pub L No 93-523, 88 Stat 1661 (1974), then codified at 42 USC §§ 300f et seq (Supp IV 
1974). 
104. Pub L No 95-95, 91 Stat 685 (1977), then codified at 42 USC § § 7401 et seq (Supp I 1977). 
105. Pub L No 95-217, 91 Stat 1566 (1977), then codified at 33 USC §§ 1251 et seq (Supp I 
1977). 
106. Pub L No 98-616. 98 Stat 3248 (1984). then codified at 42 USC §§ 6921 et seq (Supp II 
1984). 
107. Pub L No 99-499. 100 Stat 1613 (1986), then codified at 42 USC §§ 9601 et seq (Supp IV 
1986). 
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statutory responsibilities and agency funding by imposing even greater and 
more rigid statutory responsibilities on the agency. 
EPA consequently has had far fewer lawyers per significant regulation and 
fewer dollars for evaluation than other federal agencies. lOS One former EPA 
official recently noted that EPA's water program "budget has declined 43 
percent in real purchasing power since 1981, although during that period the 
number of pollutants to be regulated jumped from five to several hundred, 
and the number of people subject to regulation has risen roughly from 45,000 
to 120,000."109 The number of hazardous waste generators regulated by EPA 
under RCRA has similarly increased-by a factor of nine during the last ten 
years. I 10 
Hence, Congress has spoken with two different voices to EPA. Each voice 
reflected the distinct legislative path followed by the authorization and 
appropriation processes within Congress. Legislators demanded immediate 
action requiring a massive agency undertaking. At the same time, however, 
they never provided a remotely commensurate level of agency funding. I II 
Ironically, therefore, while Congress was willing to ask American business and 
the public to curtail pollution, regardless of the cost, in order to ensure public 
health, Congress itself refused to fund the level of agency activity necessary 
for even a good faith effort to implement such an ambitious program. 1I2 
b. Executive Branch Oversight. OMB was naturally hostile to the federal 
environmental statutes of the 1970s because those laws took little account of 
their economic impact. The White House exhibited a similar bias, perhaps 
because of its enhanced sensitivity to those national economic indicators that 
are often utilized to measure the relative success of an administration. 113 
Such concerns likely prompted the White House's and OMB's persistent 
requests for low funding of EPA's environmental programs. 
The executive branch's funding requests were not, however, the only 
expression of its concerns. The White House ventured into pending litigation 
108. Cohen, EPA: A Qualified Success at 182 (cited in note 84). 
109. Am Bar Assn Standing Committee on Environmental Law, Environmental Compliance: Is the 
System Working? 20 (Presentation before the 18th Annual Conference on the Environment, May 19-
20, 1989) (remarks of William Drayton). 
ItO. EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, The Nation:S Hazardous Waste 
Management Program At a Crossroads: The RCRA Implementation Study 7 (EPA,July 1990) ("EPA, Program 
at a Crossroads"). 
Ill. Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion at 118 (cited in note 37) (noting that Congress "has imposed 
overwhelming responsibilities on the agency to remedy an almost unlimited array of environmental 
problems, without providing adequate resources to even begin to solve these problems"). 
112. See William F. Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and Betrayal in the 
Environmental Statlltes, 5 J Contemp Health L & Pol 161 (1989); William F. Rodgers, The Lesson of the 
Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of the Environmental Statlltes, 4 J Land Use & Envir 
L 377 (1989). 
113. Presidential /IIanagemellt of RlIlemaking ill Regulatory Agencies 25 (Nat! Acad Pub Admin, 1987) 
("NAPA, PresidPlltial Management"); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 34-35 (cited in note 8). The 
White House was reponedly largely disinterested in environmental law until its economic costs 
became more apparent. Bach, Governmental Constraints at 166-68 (cited in note 35). 
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to express its interests I 14 and sometimes became directly involved in agency 
rulemaking. 115 Of even greater historical significance was the substantive role 
OMB defined for itself in reviewing proposed EPA regulations to influence 
their final content. 116 Both the White House and OMB were motivated at 
least in part by fear of possible "capture" of agency political appointees by 
career staff. I 17 
The OMB review process began, not coincidentally, just a few months 
after EPA commenced operations, and has gradually and inexorably increased 
in significance ever since. I IS Under President Nixon, the process was dubbed 
the "Quality of Life Review" and focused primarily on the economic impact of 
EPA rules. I 19 Under President Ford, EPA was required to submit an inflation 
impact statement along with every proposed major regulation or rule. 120 
President Carter issued an executive order requiring each agency to prepare a 
regulatory analysis for every proposed regulation that either would cost the 
economy more than $100 million or threatened to cause a major price 
increase. 121 The executive order directed OMB to oversee the order's 
implementation. 122 Under all three presidents, frequent and significant 
confrontations resulted between OMB and EPA concerning proposed EPA 
rules. 123 
114. See Mercury Pollution and Enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899, Hearings before the 
Subcomminee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Comminee on Government 
Operations, 92d Cong, 1st & 2d Sess, 1134-1228, 1281-1363 (1971 & 1972) (oversight hearings on 
White House interference with pending Department of Justice enforcement action against alleged 
polluter). 
115. See Bach, Governmental Constraints at 177 (cited in note 35). 
116. OMB was joined initially in its efforts by NIPCC, which the President had created and 
affiliated with the Department of Commerce in order to ensure that industry would have an effective 
voice in shaping federal environmental protection policy. See notes 27, 28 and accompanying text. 
NIPCC is credited with having made high ranking administration officials, including the President, 
more appreciative of the COSts of pollution control. Steck, 5 Envir L at 268-69 (cited in note 27). 
NIPCC also commented on EPA proposed rules outside of the time provided for public notice and 
comment under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC §§ 551 et seq. Steck, 5 Envir L at 274-79 
(cited in note 27). As described above (see note 28), Congress ultimately retaliated by cuning off any 
funding for the council. 
117. See Erik Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of 
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12291, 4 Va J Nat Res L I, II, 12 n35 
(1984); Robert Percival, Checks without Balance: Executive Office Oversight Of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, 54 L & Contemp Probs 127 (Autumn 199\). 
118. On May 21, 1971, OMB Director George Schultz informed Administrator Ruckelshaus that 
OMB and the Department of Commerce had to clear EPA regulations prior to their promulgation. 
Marcus, Promise and Perfomlance at 125 (cited in note II). See generally Percival, 54 L & Contemp 
Probs 127 (cited in note 117); V. Kerry Smith, Environmental Policymaking under Executive Order 12291: 
An 1ntroduction, in V. Kerry Smith, ed, Environmental Policymaking under Reagan'S Executive Order 3-5 (U 
North Carolina Press, 1984). 
119. See Bach, Governmental Constraints at 168-71, 173-74, 178-81 (cited in note 35);]. Clarence 
Davies & Charles Lellow, The 1mpact of Federal 1nstitutional Arrangements, in Erica Dolgin & Thomas 
Guilbert. eds, Federal Environmental Law 126, 136-37 (West, 1973); Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 9-10 
(cited in note 117). 
120. See Exec Order 11821. 3 CFR 926 (1971-1975), amended by Exec Order 11949,3 CFR 161 
(1977). 
121. Exec Order 12044,3 CFR 152 (1979). 
122. Id. 
123. See NAPA. Presidential Management at 25 (cited in note 113); Implementation of the Clean Air 
Act of 1970. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comminee 
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The review process reached its zenith under President Reagan and his first 
OMB director, David Stockman. 124 Stockman believed that EPA rules "would 
practically shut down the economy if they were put into effect," and he was 
therefore determined to establish "a whole new mind set down at EPA."125 
An OMB official under Stockman reportedly asked one applicant for the EPA 
administrator position whether he "[w]ould ... be willing to bring EPA to its 
knees." 126 
The result was the establishment of the Presidential Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief, chaired by then Vice President Bush, and the issuance of 
Executive Order 12291. 127 The task force identified specific federal 
regulations for revision in order to provide business with regulatory relief.128 
EPA had promulgated a disproportionate number (more than half) of those 
regulations targeted by the task force. 129 Executive Order 12291, like 
executive orders issued by prior presidents, authorized OMB to review 
proposed agency regulations. 130 Unlike its predecessors, however, Executive 
Order 12291 took the further step of requiring OMB approval of the 
regulatory analysis that accompanied all major regulations, unless such 
approval was prohibited by statute. 131 OMB's leverage over agencies such as 
EPA therefore dramatically increased. OMB's power of review and ensuing 
power to delay regulations enabled OMB, in effect, to compel modifications of 
EPA's proposed rules to satisfy OMB's fiscal concerns. 132 As in prior 
on Public Works, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 3-177, 224-328 (1972) (accusations that OMB undermining EPA 
authority);John Quarles, Cleaning Up America: An Insider s View of the environmental Protection Agency 117-
19 (Houghton Mifflin, 1976) (noting that Ruckelshaus reportedly threatened to quit unless President 
Nixon agreed that EPA and not OMB or the White House would have final say on content of EPA 
rules); Special Report: Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Policymaking, 
Faces Little External Review, 7 Envir Rptr Curr Dev (BNA) 693 (1976); Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: 
Asking the Wrong Questions at 66-75 (cited in note 32) (discussing conflict between OMB (and White 
House) and EPA (Administrator Costle) concerning promulgation of ozone standard); see also Anne 
Burford, Are You Tough Enough? 83 (McGraw-Hili, 1986) (Gorsuch confrontation with OMB over 
promulgation of EPA rule). Anne Gorsuch changed her last name to "Burford" following her 
marriage in February 1983, which was shortly before she resigned as EPA administrator. 
124. According to William Ruckelshaus, however, the problems presented by OMB review that he 
faced as administrator of EPA in the early 1970s were "exactly the same" as those he faced as 
administrator in 1983 and 1984. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas Is More A 
iV1anager Than A Policymaker, 18 Natl L J 391, 392 (Feb 15, 1986). 
125. Constance Holden, The Reagan Years: Environmentalists Tremble, 210 Science 988 (Nov 28, 
1980). 
i 26. Burford, Are you Tough Enough? at 84 (cited in note 123). 
127. See Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 17 Weekly Comp Pres Docs 33 (Jan 22, 
1981). 
128. See Exec Order 12291, 17 Weekly Comp Pres Docs 124 (Feb 17, 1981). 
129. Burford, Are You Tough Enough? at 121 (cited in note 123). 
130. See Bach. Governmental Constraints at 178-81 (cited in note 35); Natl Res Council, ed, 2 
Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection Agency at 88 (cited in note 97). 
131. NAPA, Presidential Management at 25 (cited in note 113); Olson, 4 Va J Nat Res L at 10-12 
(cited in note 117); Charles E. Ludlam, The Reagan Regulatory Program in Context 57 (Alliance for 
Justice, 1981). 
132. Olson, 4 Va J Nat Res L at 43- 46, 51 (cited in note 117). In her account of her tenure as 
EPA administrator, Anne Gorsuch descrihes the OMB process for reviewing EPA's budget and rules. 
See Burford, Ar!' }'ou Tough Enough? at 75-84 (cited in note 123). When Gorsuch once approved final 
EPA rules without waiting for OMB clearance, an OMB official warned her: "There's a price to pay 
for this, and you've only begun to pay." Id at 83. 
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administrations, the practice generated considerable controversy and was 
widely criticized, although to a much greater degree under the Reagan 
Administration. 133 
The relative power of OMB did not significantly decrease during President 
Reagan's second term, nor has it more recently under President Bush. While 
OMB's review is now subject to more public scrutiny,134 it remains a strong 
force in the development of EPA regulations. During 1985,1986, and 1987, 
EPA revised 74.5, 66.2, and 66.2 percent, respectively, of agency rules 
reviewed by OMB.135 When disagreements between EPA and OMB have 
arisen, OMB has invariably won. 136 OMB continues to "hold" EPA rules for 
months and years based on OMB concerns with the cost of compliance with a 
rule. 137 
Finally, while the OMB review process formally applies to all maJbr agency 
regulations, its practical impact on EPA remains far greater than on other 
agencies. In 1988, for example, OMB rejected EPA regulations three times 
more frequently than those presented by other agencies: 21 percent of the 
133. See, for example, Role of OMB in Regulation, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong, 1st 
Sess I (1982); EPA's Asbestos Regulations, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong, 1st Sess I (1985); 
EPA's Asbestos Regulations: Report on a Case Study of OMB Interference in Agency Rulemaking, 
Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
99th Cong, 1st Sess I (Comm Print, 1985); EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses 
Part 3, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 5-8, 79-83 (1983) (testimony of John Daniel, 
administrator's chief of staff). 
134. In October 1986, OMB agreed (upon federal agency request) to provide the agency with 
copies of written material that it receives fro"m persons outside the federal government and to advise 
the agency of any oral communications. OMB also agreed to invite the agency to schedule meetings 
with those same individuals concerning the agency rules, to make available in a public reading room 
all written material received, as well as to list all meeting and all communications with outside 
persons pertaining to the agency rules. See NAPA, Presidential Management at 3 (cited in note 113); 
Bernard Rosen, Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable 51 (Praeger, 2d ed 1989); Bryner, 
Bureaucratic Discretion at 118 (cited in note 37); Harold Bruff, Presidential Management Of Agency 
Rulemaking, 57 Ceo Wash L Rev 533 (1989). Just last year, in response to increased congressional 
pressure (including a threat to eliminate relevant OMB funding and to limit OMB review to 60 days), 
the President apparently agreed to limit OMB review. See Congress, White House Agree on Executive Order 
to Limit OMB Review of EPA Regs, II Inside EPA 3 (July 20, 1990); text accompanying note 351; see 
also White House Backs Out of Deal Limiting OMB Authority Over EPA Rules, II Inside EPA I (June 15, 
1990). 
135. NAPA, PresidentiallHanagernent at 24 (cited in note 113). 
136. See OMB Said to Have Influenced About One- Third of Regulations Proposed by EPA in 1986, 17 
Envir Rptr (BNA) 1616 (Jan 1987). 
137. For instance, OMB "held" a rule proposed by EPA pursuant to the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 USC § § 690 I, et seq, from October 1988 to July 1990. See EPA Releases Delayed 
Corrective Action Rule, Calls It "Milestone" In Cleanup Of RCRA Facilities, 21 Envir Rptr (BNA) 475 (July 
13, 1990). Reportedly, OMB Director Richard Darman earlier had instructed his agency to "kill this" 
and "OMB's attitude has been that this rule is never going to see the light of day." See Budget Office, 
EPA Remain Far Apart on Draft Corrective Action Rule, 21 Envir Rptr (BNA) 187 (May 18, 1990); OlH B 
Continues to Hold RCRA Cleanup Rille Hos/age, /0 Chagrin of EPA, II Inside EPA 9- 10 (June 8, 1990). See 
also, for example, OMB Objections :Ha)' Force EPA /0 Drop Source Separation from Illcinera/or Proposal, 20 
Envir Rptr (BNA) 1330 (Nov 24, 1989); EPA Stmggles with OMB /0 Re/aill its Recycling Plan in Waste 
Ineinera/or Regs, 10 Inside EPA 1,9-10 (Dec I, 1989). 
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agency's regulations were either disapproved or withdrawn by EPA}38 In 
addition, although EPA's rules amount to only about 4 percent of all OMB 
activities, four out of OMB's thirty-two desk officers review EPA rules. 139 
c. Judicial Oversight. Partly to prevent agency capture, Congress 
encouraged judicial oversight of EPA by including citizen suit and judicial 
review provisions in each of the environmental statutes and by requiring EPA 
to follow decisionmaking procedures more rigorous than those normally 
employed in informal notice and comment rulemaking. 140 The citizen suit 
provisions routinely allowed successful plaintiffs to recover their attorneys' 
fees. 141 Both environmental organizations and industry took advantage of the 
increased judicial access and together challenged between 80 and 85 percent 
of EPA's major decisions. 142 
The deadlines and mandatory duties contained in the various federal laws, 
along with their carefully crafted legislative histories, provided 
environmentalists with enormous leverage over EPA through litigation, which 
they used as their dominant tool to influence agency decisions. 143 Whenever 
EPA failed to meet a deadline, or otherwise to satisfy a statutory obligation, 
which was inevitably often, environmentalists used litigation to compel EPA to 
negotiate with them in drafting a consent decree. 144 Environmentalists 
utilized the consent decree and the threat of contempt sanctions to control 
the agency's future actions. 145 The filing of lawsuits also provided 
environmentalists with media events that provided publicity for their cause 
and incidentally aided fundraising efforts. 146 The media was naturally 
receptive to accusations of agency malfeasance, and the result was a steady 
stream of negative articles about EPA in the national press. 
138. OMB Subjects EPA Regs To More Scrutiny Than Other Agencies, Says Watchdog, 10 Inside EPA 8 
(Nov 3, 1989) (describing OMB Watch report). 
139. Id; see Office of Management and Budget Influence on Agency Regulations, 99th Cong, 2d 
Sess 19 (Comm Print, 1986) (S Prt, No 99-156). 
140. See Stewart, 69 Cal L Rev at 1366 (cited in note 37); Muskie, 18 Envir L Rptr at 10082-83 
(cited in note 37) ("Congress anticipated bureaucratic interference with the 1970 CAA and 
incorporated public access to the courts in that law and virtually every other environmental statute 
since enacted. Today there are dozens of citizen suits pending at all levels of the judiciary."); see 
generally, Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and 
Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw U L Rev 220 (1987) (authored by Jeannette Austin). 
141. Ruckelshaus v Sierra Club, 463 US 680, 682 n I, 683 (1983). 
142. See note 54. 
143. The day after EPA commenced operations, the Environmental Defense Fund filed a lawsuit 
against the agency to compel it to cancel the registration of two pesticides. Christopher Bosso, 
Pesticides and Politics: The Life Cycle of a Public ISJlle 153 (U Pittsburgh Press, 1987). 
144. See, for example. Natural ResoUl"Ces Defense Council, Inc. v Train, 519 F2d 287 (DC Cir 1975) 
(the "Flannery decree"). 
145. Natl Res Council, ed, 2 Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection Agency at 70 (cited in note 
97). 
146. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics at 216 (cited in note 143). An incidental benefit of Secretary 
Watt's apparent antagonism toward federal environmental pollution control efforts was that it 
prompted tremendous increases in memberships in, and donations to, national environmental 
organizations such as the Sierra Club. Natural Resources Defense Council, and Environmental 
Defense Fund. Id at 216 (reporting that Sierra Club membership increased from 180,000 to 300,000 
from 1980 to 1982). 
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There were likewise those who have had tremendous economic incentives 
to use litigation to challenge EPA decisions. EPA's regulations impose huge 
costs on a wide segment of economic activity; indeed, no significant economic 
activity has been unaffected. 147 The General Accounting Office recently 
estimated that the cost of EPA programs since 1970 has been $700 billion, 
and now total about $86 billion each year. 148 The estimated annual cost of 
complying with the 1976 RCRA law was itself $6 billion, and the 
Congressional Budget Office estimates the annual cost of compliance with the 
1984 amendments to RCRA at between $3 and $7 billion. 149 With an average 
cost of $30 million per site, the cost of cleaning up the 2,000 abandoned and 
inactive hazardous waste sites now thought to require cleanup will be $60 
billion. 150 The new Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 will reportedly 
require an additional $40 to $50 billion in pollution control expenditures}51 
Proclaiming "a new era in the history of the long and fruitful collaboration 
of administrative agencies and reviewing courts,"152 the judiciary did not shy 
away from careful examination of EPA's actions}53 Especially during EPA's 
early years, courts of appeals frequently rejected the agency's efforts to relax 
the statutory mandates through "loose" construction of their terms. 154 The 
courts also often remanded agency rulemaking for further proceedings based 
on perceived inadequacies in the rulemaking record. Environmentalists 
benefitted from many of the courts' more expansive constructions of the 
federal environmental laws}55 Industry, however, benefitted from many of 
147. Natl Res Council, ed, 2 Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection Agency at 2 (cited in note 
97) ("the regulatory reach of the EPA program is probably unparalleled"). 
148. S Rep 101-262 at 15 (cited in note lOl). 
149. Dower, Hazardous Wastes at 178-79 (cited in note 90). 
150. Id at 179. 
151. Barnaby Feder, The Struggle in Congress; Focus Shifts to Rules on Cleaner Air for Cars, Chemical, and 
Steel Makers, NY Times All col I (Oct 24, 1990). 
152. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d 584, 597 (DC Cir 1971); see also 
Greater Boston Television Corporation v F. T. c., 444 F2d 841, 851 (DC Cir 1970) (noting "partnership" 
between courts and agencies). 
153. See Leventhal, 122 U Pa L Rev at 512 (cited in note 41). 
154. See, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council v Train, 545 F2d 320 (2d Cir 1976) (holding 
that EPA has mandatory duty under CAA to use NAAQS upon determining that pollutant may 
adversely affect public health); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v EPA, 489 F2d 390 (5th Cir 1974) 
(upholding challenge to EPA's approval of state plan allowing emissions reduction credit for tall 
stack dispersion); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v EPA, 475 F2d 968, 970 (DC Cir 1973) 
(holding that EPA lacked authority to postpone deadlines for submission of state implementation 
plans under the Clean Air Act or to grant extensions for attainment of national primary ambient air 
standards without following statutory procedures); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v Ruckelshaus, 439 
F2d 584, 598 (DC Cir 1971) (sustaining challenge to EPA refusal to suspend registration of DDT 
pesticide). 
155. No doubt the best known example was the judicial ruling that the Clean Air Act required 
EPA to prevent significant deterioration in the air quality in those areas that already met national 
ambient air quality standards. See, for example, Sierra Club v Ruckelshaus, 344 F Supp 253 (D DC 
1972), aff'd, 4 ERC 1815 (DC Cir 1972); see Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 71-112 (cited in note 
8). According to one commentator's tabulations, environmelllalists won more often than did 
industry in federal environmelllal cases during both the 1970s and 1980s. See Jeremy Rabkin, 
Judicial Compulsions 273 n35 (Basic Books, 1990), citing Leuie Wenner, The Reagan Era in 
Environmental Litigation (unpublished paper presented at the 1988 American Political Science 
Association Convelllion). 
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the judicial remands of agency rules. 156 The deadlines compelled agency 
decisions within exceedingly short time frames, and, due to the scientific 
complexity of the mechanics of environmental pollution and the associated 
scientific uncertainty, the scientific bases for agency rulings were often quite 
sparse and subject to effective criticism. 157 
In addition, even when industry plaintiffs fared poorly in their initial 
efforts to persuade courts of appeals to require or permit EPA's consideration 
of the adverse economic impact of its rules on business, 158 individual industry 
defendants in EPA enforcement actions appear to have been more successful 
in their efforts to have trial courts fashion remedies in response to economic 
factors. 159 One explanation for the disparity is the differing perspectives of 
the district courts and the courts of appeals: courts of appeals are possibly 
more influenced by academic theories of agency capture than are district 
courts; district courts, unlike courts of appeals, are closer to the impact on 
local economics of applying the law according to its strict terms. 160 
d. Congressional Oversight. Perhaps the most important (and most often 
overlooked) of the institutional forces that have buffeted EPA has been the 
operation of congressional oversight,161 long referred to as Congress's 
"neglected" function. 162 Congress did not quietly disappear following its 
passage of the federal environmental protection laws under EPA's 
jurisdiction. It has actively overseen the agency's implementation of those 
laws through informal agency contacts, General Accounting Office and Office 
of Technology Assessment investigations, agency reporting requirements, 
formal oversight hearings, confirmation hearings, appropriation hearings, 
156. Kennecott Copper v EPA, 462 F2d 846 (DC Cir 1972); Portland Cement Assoc. v Ruckelshaus, 486 
F2d 375, 401-02 (DC Cir 1973); International Haroester Company v Ruckelshaus, 478 F2d 615, 647-50 
(DC Cir 1973); South Terminal Corp. v EPA, 504 F2d 646, 662-67 (lst Cir 1974). 
157. CEQ, Sixteenth Annual Report at 13 (cited in note 53). Illustrative is the recent decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in American Mining Congress v EPA, 
907 F2d 1179, 1188-91 (DC Cir 1990), in which the court of appeals reversed and remanded for 
further administrative proceedings EPA's decision to list six materials as "hazardous substances" 
under RCRA. The court acknowledged that the inadequacy of the agency's record may have resulted 
because "EPA was pressured to list the six materials quickly in light of this court's [prior) order." Id 
at 1191. 
158. See, for example, Union Electric Co. v EPA, 427 US 246, 256 (1976); EPA v National Crushed 
Stone Assoc., 449 US 64, 72 (l980). 
159. See Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 193-238 (cited in note 8). 
160. Id at 156-64,236-37,354,368-71. 
161. For a more detailed discussion of the issues related to congressional oversight of EPA, see 
Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodie! Ipsos Custodes 
(Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 L & Contemp Probs 205 (Autumn 1991). 
162. Kenski & Kenski, Congress Against the President at 104 (cited in note 38); see generally, Joseph 
Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Brookings Inst, 1964); Lawrence Dodd & Richard Schott, 
Congress and the Administrative State 155-323 Oohn Wiley, 1979); Study on Federal Regulation: II 
Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, S DOC No 95-26, 95th Cong, 1st Sess I (1977); 
Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies: The Need to Strike A Balance and Focus On Performance 7-17 
(Natl Acad Pub Admin, 1988) ("NAPA, Oversight Study"); Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy 
5-12 (U Pittsburgh Press, 1976). 
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appropriation riders, inspector general reports, and amendments of the laws 
themselves. 163 
Much of the oversight has been driven by a desire to prevent EPA's 
capture by industry and by those in the White House and OMB who are 
perceived (accurately) as unsympathetic to the statutory policies of the laws 
within EPA's jurisdiction. l64 Others within Congress, however, have been 
more concerned about the possibility of bureaucratic or environmentalist 
capture and have used the same oversight tools to counsel EPA against strict 
application of those laws. 165 Because the statutes demand the impossible of 
EPA and require EPA to demand the impossible, or at least very painful, from 
others, there has historically been plenty to fuel criticism from both 
constituencies within Congress. 166 "EPA bashing" has been commonplace on 
Capitol Hill as legislators from both sides of the aisle have perceived its 
political advantages. 167 
Indeed, a culture of condemnation of EPA developed early on In 
Congress. Fueled by Senator Edmund Muskie's growing presidential 
aspirations and by increasing alienation between a Democratic Congress and 
President Nixon, Muskie's Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Public Works quickly established itself as EPA's critical 
overseer. 168 Muskie and others sharply criticized agency officials in widely 
publicized media events. They strongly urged those officials to consult with 
the subcommittee prior to making any important agency decisions. Muskie 
also warned EPA officials against allowing either the White House or OMB to 
163. See generally NAPA, Oversight Study at 9-12 (cited in note 162) (describing congressional 
oversight methods); Bernard Rosen, Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable at 62-79 (cited in 
note 134). 
164. Increased congressional oversight of executive branch agencies parallels increased 
presidential oversight of those agencies and thus expresses the ongoing competition between the 
two branches for control over agency policy. See William West &Joseph Cooper, Legislative Influence 
v. Presidential Dominance: Competing Models of Bureaucratic Control, 104 Pol Sci Q 581, 589-91 (Winter 
1989-90). The agencies are "agents of different and divided masters" and their operation "reflects 
the ongoing tensions between the White House and Capitol Hill." Wilson, Bureaucracy at 259 (cited 
in note 16). For this same reason, the amount of oversight of federal agencies has also likely 
increased in recent years because of the persistence of different political parties in control of the 
executive and legislative branches. See Joel Aberbach, Keeping A Watchful Eye: The Politics of 
Congressional Oversight 59-60 (Brookings Inst, 1990) (noting 26.2% more oversight in years of split 
partisanship between 1961 and 1977); NAPA, Oversight Study at I (cited in note 162). There is a 
natural disinclination to "rake thru coals" those of your same political party. See Ogul, Congress 
Oversees the Bureaucracy at 18, 136-37 (cited in note 162). 
165. Melnick, Regulatioll and the Courts at 317-19 (cited in note 8). 
166. See Comment, Congress in 1984: A Mixed Bag, 14 Envir L Rptr 10449 (Dec 1984) 
(emphasizing degree of congressional oversight); Comment, Congress in 1983: Much Oversight, Little 
Legislation, 14 Envir L Rptr 10005 (Jan 1984) (same). 
167. William Ruckelshaus, Lookillg Back; Looking Ahead: EPA, 16 EPA J 14. 15 (Jan/Feb 1990). 
The barrage of congressional criticism may have the incidental effect of encouraging more intensive 
judicial review. See Rodgers, 3 Ellvironmental Law § 5.4 at 56 (cited in note 82) ("[Llegislative 
oversight by the congressional committees is aggressive and skeptical. supplying the courts with 
tempting snippets of legislative history and emboldening them with tales of the frailties of EPA 
decision making. "). 
168. The Committee on Public Works created the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee in 1963 
and named Senator Muskie as its first chair. See History of the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works, S Doc No 100-45, 100th Cong, 2d Sess II (Dec 1988). 
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influence unduly the agency's implementation and enforcement of the 
laws. '69 
The practice was not confined to Muskie's subcommittee, the Senate, or to 
those who believed that EPA was not doing enough pO There were plenty of 
congressional overseers equally concerned with potential agency 
overreaching. For instance, as a result of internal compromise, EPA's budget 
was initially within the jurisdiction of the House subcommittee chaired by 
Representative Jamie Whitten, an outspoken cntIC of many of the 
environmental laws. l7l He accordingly used the appropriations process to 
conduct lengthy inquiries into the details of the agency's implementation of 
those laws. 172 He quite openly opined that Congress may not actually have 
intended full implementation of the laws that it had passed: "Sometimes a 
fellow might feel that if he writes a law three times as strong as he wants it to 
be, maybe it will be carried out 100 percent."173 Whitten also described his 
ability to "limit use of money" to cut back on environmental laws.' 74 
169. Lazarus, 54 L & Con temp Probs at 214 (cited in note 161). 
170. Nor was it limited to those time periods during which Congress and the White House were 
headed by different political parties. Although there is a tendency for less oversight when both are of 
the same party (see note 164), there was not markedly less intense oversight of EPA by the Senate 
between 1981 and 1986 when the Republicans were the majority party. The ranking Republicans on 
the relevant authorization committees and subcommittees, like the ranking Democrats, generally 
supported the environmental protection policies reflected in the statutes previously enacted. See 
Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 32 (cited in note 8). 
171. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics at 154 (cited in note 143). 
172. EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus first appeared before Representative Whitten's 
committee in 1971 to defend the agency's budget request for fiscal year 1972. The tenor of the 
hearings strongly reflected Whitten's intention to use the appropriations process to oversee the 
operations of the agency and its substantive decisions. Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer 
Protection Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong, 1st Sess I (1971). Whitten questioned Ruckelshaus about 
the hazards posed by DDT, id at 382, which Whitten discounted, and Whitten and others on the 
committee demanded agency responses to a wide-ranging series of questions. See, for example, id at 
362-63 (questioning operation of specific EPA lab); id at 365-66 (questioning effort of small 
Mississippi town to obtain land from federal government); id at 398 (questioning EPA's decision to 
ban aldrin and dieldrin); id at 410 (questioning solid waste project in Alabama town). The same 
pattern repeated itself for the next several years. See Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer 
Protection Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong, 2d Sess I (1972); Agriculture-Environmental and 
Consumer Protection Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong, 1st Sess I (1973); Agriculture-Environmental and 
Consumer Protection Appropriations for fiscal year 1975, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong, 2d Sess I (1974). See Davies & Davies, The Politics 
of Pollution at 73-77 (cited in note II). In the hearing on the budget for Fiscal Year 1974, 
Representative Whitten sharply questioned Ruckelshaus about his adverse decision regarding DDT. 
See Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 
475-76 (1973). He also questioned whether EPA was encouraging lawsuits by environmentalists 
against the agency. Id at 240. 
173. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations 
for Fiscal Year 1973, Hearings before the Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the 
House Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 350 (1972) (statement of Rep. Whitten). 
174. Id. Representative Whitten surrendered subcommittee jurisdiction over EPA in 1974 to 
avoid a confrontation and possible liberal challenge to his eventual succession to chair of the House 
Appropriations Committee. Foreman, Signals from the Hill at 195 (cited in note 36); see Bosso, 
HeinOnline -- 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 339 1991
Page 311: Autumn 1991] TRAGEDY OF DISTRUST 339 
Oversight of EPA ultimately spread to both chambers and to 
authorization, government operations, and appropriations committees. The 
expansion roughly coincided with a general increase in congressional 
appreciation of the political advantages of "subcommittee government"175 
and "fire alarm" oversight,176 which in turn spurred a dramatic increase in 
committee staff and oversight during the last few decades. l77 When EPA 
failed to meet statutory deadlines, members of Congress held hearings in 
which they chastised the agency for neglecting the public trust. 178 
Conversely, when EPA made politically unpopular decisions in an effort to 
comply with its statutory mandates, other members of Congress promptly 
joined in the public denunciation (including some who originally sponsored 
the strict environmental laws). 179 
EPA's exposure to congressional criticism has been especially great 
because of the structure (or lack thereof) of congressional oversight. 180 EPA's 
jurisdiction is so sweeping, and therefore important to so many interest 
groups, that the demand for its oversight has grown commensurately among 
the committees and subcommittees in Congress. Most committees can find 
some nexus between their assigned jurisdiction and some aspect of EPA's 
work. 
The result has been increasing fragmentation of oversight authority over 
EPA. Eleven standing House committees, nine standing Senate committees 
Pesticides and Politics at 189 (cited in note 143). Whitten is presently chair of the House 
Appropriations Committee. 
175. Congressional reforms in the 1970s led to the rise of the power of the subcommittee. In the 
1950s, full committees held most hearings and debates; subcommittees held only 20 to 30% of the 
hearings. By the late 1970s and the 95th Congress, subcommittees held over 90% of all hearings: 
their decisions were more authoritative; full committee chairs were restricted to being chair of one 
subcommittee; and subcommittee chairs were increasingly the floor manager for bills. See Lawrence 
Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer, The House in Transition: Change and Consolidation, in Dodd & Schott, 
Congress and the Administrative State at 40-48 (cited in note 162). 
176. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Po/i,e 
Patrols VersllS Fire Alarms, 28 AmJ Pol Sci 165-76 (1984). Between 1968 and 1976, the number of 
House and Senate oversight hearings per Congress quadrupled and doubled, respectively. John 
Chubb, Interest Groups and the Bllreallcracy 47 (Stanford U Press, 1983). 
177. See Aberbach, Keeping a Watchflll Eye at 46 (cited in note 164); Petel' Shane, Legal Disagreement 
and Negotiation in a Government oj Laws: The Case oj Executive Privilege Claims Agail/Jt Congress. 71 Minn 1. 
Rev 461,464 (1987) (congressional staff grew from 7,091 to 17,963 from 1960 to 1984. and number 
of subcommittee staff grew from 910 to 3.183 during that same period); Foreman. Signals Jrom Ihe HiLI 
at 16 (cited in note 36) (personal and committee staff grew from 1,150 in 1930 to 10,679 by the end 
of the 1970s). 
178. See, for example, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. Hearings before the 
House Committee on Agriculture, 95th Cong, 1st Sess I (1977); Hazardous Waste Disposal (Part 2). 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong, 1st Sess I (1979); Oversight of Hazardous Waste 
Management and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 96th 
Cong, 1st Sess I (1979); Hazardous Waste Matters, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigation of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 96th Cong, 2d Sess 
I (1980). 
179. See. for example. 119 Cong Rec 41127-29 (Dec 12. 1973) (remarks of Rep. Hudnut); 119 
Cong Rec 41728 (Dec 12, 1973) (remarks of Rep. Boland); 119 Cong Rec 41305 (Dec 13. 1973) 
(remarks of Rep. Kazen); see generally Quarles, Cleaning Up Aml?17w at 20 I-II (cited in note 123). 
180. Dodd & Schott, Congress and the Administrative State at 173-77 (cited in note 162). 
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and up to one hundred of their subcommittees currently share environmental 
jurisdiction. I R I The number of times EPA officials testify before Congress is 
staggering. EPA officials have testified over 200 times and before as many as 
forty different congressional committees and subcommittees in just one 
Congress (two calendar years}.182 Other federal agencies, such as the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Food and 
Drug Administration, National Labor Relations Board, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and Securities 
Exchange Commission, have appeared before congressional committees far 
less often than EPA; even the Defense Department has appeared before 
Congress less often in some years. 183 The National Academy of Public 
Administration recently studied the degree of congressional oversight of EPA 
and other federal agencies and concluded that "EPA is in a unique situation, 
given the pervasiveness of environmental hazards and the large number of 
committees with jurisdiction over the agency."184 
e. Congressional Prescription. Congress has not confined itself to 
overseeing EPA's work. In the aftermath of repeated regulatory failures, 
Congress has favored passing increasingly detailed environmental statutes to 
guard against agency dereliction in the first instance. 185 Oversight therefore 
has been supplemented with prescription. 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in 1977,186 to the 
Clean Water Act, CERCLA, FIFRA, RCRA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and 
TSCA during the 1980s, 187 and to the Clean Air Act in 1990,188 all exhibit the 
181. Reilly. 20 Envir Rptr Curr Dev (BNA) at 9 (cited in note 51); see S Rep No 101-262. lOlst 
Congo 2d Sess 27 (1990) (noting that EPA is overseen by 34 Senate and 56 House comminees). 
182. For a detailed breakdown of the number of times EPA officials have testified before 
Congress, see Lazarus, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 213, Table I (cited in note 161). 
183. Id at 212; see Study on Federal Regulations: II Congressional Oversight of Regulatory 
Agencies, S Doc No 95-26, 95th Cong, lst Sess 81 (1977); see also NAPA, Oversight Study at 32 (cited 
in note 162). 
184. NAPA, Oversight Study at 30 (cited in note 162). 
185. Portney, Public Policies at 284-86 (cited in note II); Sydney Shapiro & Robert Glicksman, 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L J 819, 828; 
William Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History of the Enviromnental Alovement in America 
and the Implications Abroad, 15 Envir L 455,460 (1985); William Ruckelshaus, 16 EPAJ at 15 (cited in 
note 167). The use of increased detail in statutory law to curb agency discretion is not a recent 
phenomenon. See Arthur MacMahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Pawn of the Purse, in 
Theodore Lowi, ed, Legislative Politics U.S.A. 186 (1965). Indeed, from an historical perspective, it is 
the more traditional legislative approach. See Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye at. 20 (cited in note 
164); Jeremy Rabkin, AIicromanaging the Administrative Agencies, 100 Public Interest 116, 117-18 
(Summer 1990). 
186. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub L No 95-95 (cited in note 104); Clean Water Act, 
Pub L No 95-217 (cited in note 105). 
187. Clean Water Act, Pub L No 100-4, 101 Stat 7 (1987). then codified at33 USC §§ 1251 et seq 
(Supp IV 1987); CERCLA, Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1613 (1986) (cited in note 107); FIFRA, Pub L 
No 100-532, 102 Stat 2654 (1988), codified at 7 USC §§ 136 et seq (1988); RCRA, Pub L No 98-616, 
98 Stat 3221 (1984), codified at 42 USC §§ 690 I et seq (Supp II 1984); Safe Drinking Water ACl. Pub 
L No 99-339.100 Stat 642 (1986), then codified at43 USC §§ et seq (Supp IV 1986); TSCA. Pub L 
No 99-519, 100 Stat 2970 (1986), then codified at 15 USC §§ 2601 et seq (Supp IV 1986). 
188. Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2391 (1990); see Huge Clean Air Bill's Taxies Title Sets Xew Time For 
Government Regulation. 21 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1357 (Nov 16, 1990), quoting Rep. Waxman: "We're not 
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same trend. Each eliminated substantial EPA discretion, imposed more 
deadlines, and included more prescription.l 89 For example, Congress 
responded in 1977 to EPA's failure to implement the Clean Air Act's 
provision governing the emission of toxic air pollutants (section 112) by 
chastising the agency and compelling it to issue emission standards for four 
specific pollutants within an impossible time frame. 190 
Congressional reaction in 1984 to EPA's failure to meet RCRA's 
unrealistic deadlines and a host of other controversies arising from the 
statute's implementation prompted more legislative prescription. The 1984 
amendments to RCRA imposed more than sixty additional deadlines on the 
agency.191 The law dictated precisely when each of a series of regulations had 
to be published, the dates by which the permits had to be issued, and the 
substantive criteria that the permits had to contain. 192 As described by two 
commentators, the amendments were "dripping with evidence that Congress 
does not wish to entrust EPA with too much."193 The administrative tasks 
were no less enormous than those contained in earlier laws. Indeed, the 1984 
RCRA amendments extended EPA's jurisdiction to include small volume 
generators of hazardous waste (numbering approximately 130,000) and 1.4 
million underground storage tanks. 194 Congress simultaneously enhanced 
the citizen suit provisions of RCRA to promote judicial oversight. 195 
The likelihood that EPA will again fail to meet Congress's mandates seems 
great. 196 When EPA does fail, environmentalists and legislators will likely 
once again widely denounce EPA in the news media. Each agency decision or 
going to leave it to EPA this time to use its discretion to enforce the clean air law. We're spelling out 
what must be done." 
189. Shapiro & Glicksman, 1988 Duke LJ at 829-30 (cited in note 185); see Ruckelshaus, 15 Envir 
L at 460-63 (cited in note 185); Timothy Atkeson, et ai, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 16 Envir L Rptr 10359, 10371 (Dec 1986). 
190. See John Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens under 
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 Duke L J 100, 149-50. 
191. EESI, Statutory Deadlines at 1 (cited in note 49). 
192. See 42 USC §§ 6921-6925 (1988); see generally Harris, Want & Ward, Hazardous Waste (cited 
in note 21). 
193. James Rogers & Dorothy Darrah, RCRA Amendments Indicate Hill Distrust of EPA, Legal Times 
of Washington 28 (Dec 19, 1984); James Florio, Congress As Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy 
in the 1980s, 3 Yale J Reg 351 (1986). 
194. See Dower, Hazardous Wastes at 165-67 (cited in note 90); CEQ, Fifteenth Annual Report at 166 
(cited in note 91). 
195. Pub L No 98-616, § 401,98 Stat 3268 (1984) (amending 42 USC § 6972). 
196. According to a recent GAO report, EPA has failed to meet 57 of its CERCLA deadlines and 
all of its deadlines under the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act. See Nomination of William 
K. Reilly at 95, 214 (cited in note 35); GAO says EPA missed half of SARA deadlines, cites potmtialfor 
jeopardizing human health, 19 Envir Rptr (BNA) 40 (Feb 3, 1989). See Rogers & Darrah, Legal Times 
of Washington at 33 (cited in note 193) ("The sheer volume of EPA studies and regulations 
mandated and the unrealistic statutory deadlines virtually guarantee that EPA will find itself in 
default on a number of accounts. History demonstrates that this type of default triggers a number of 
unpleasant events: congressional attacks, lawsuits by environmental groups, and worst of all, hastily 
conceived regulations. "); HR Rep 99-253, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 322 (1986) (dissenting views of Reps. 
DeLany and Monson regarding report of 1986 amendments to CERCLA) ("The Committee version 
adopts scheduling requirements that effectively force the EPA to fail. ... This is a disastrous move 
which threatens the future viability of the program. The EPA, not the courts, must control the 
cleanup mechanism."). 
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"lapse" will prompt new litigation. Consent decrees will dictate agency 
behavior. 197 At the behest of environmental or industry plaintiffs, courts will 
remand the agency's regulations for further proceedings based on the 
inadequacy of administrative records prepared under short deadlines. 
Oversight hearings and the news media will again recount the "administrative 
horror stories" that result from EPA's strict enforcement of the law. 
Appropriations riders will seek to prevent such strict application, 198 while the 
committees from which the legislation originated will simultaneously draft 
even more restrictive legislation in response to EPA's "failure." The "spiral of 
unachievable standards, missed deadlines, resulting citizen suits, and even 
more prescriptive legislation by Congress continues." 199 
B. The Breeding of Controversy 
Regulatory failure was not the only product of the collision between 
institutional forces surrounding EPA. Considerable controversy also resulted. 
Indeed, EPA's past twenty years have been marked by persistent allegations of 
corruption, scandal, and abuse of public trust that have hindered the agency's 
work. 
While arising in a variety of different settings, each of the major 
controversies involving EPA finds its roots in the operation of the same 
factors that prompted regulatory failure: (1) competing (and conflicting) 
efforts to avoid agency capture and (2) the great disparity between the 
public's aspirations for environmental protection, its understanding of the 
issues, and its demonstrated (in)capacity to change. 
Accusations of improper White House attempts to influence EPA 
enforcement and improper OMB supervision of EPA originate in the 
continuing battle between the executive and legislative branches over control 
of EPA and the direction of national environmental protection policy. 200 The 
197. For example, EPA failed to meet TSCA's deadline for testing of those chemicals nominated 
by interagency testing commission, which prompted a lawsuit and in turn a court-ordered schedule. 
See Michael Shapiro, Toxic Substances Policy in Portney, Public Policies at 195, 223 (cited in note II). 
198. See Senate Amendment Would Halt EPA Fundingfor Controversial RCRA Process, 10 Inside EPA 10 
(Oct 6, 1989) (Senate Appropriations Committee approved amendment to end funding for EPA 
hearing to evaluate whether a state's RCRA authority should be rescinded). 
199. Ruckelshaus, 15 Envir L at 463 (cited in note 185). As also described by former EPA 
Administrator William Ruckelshaus: 
The history of events in the 1980s is characterized by a singular lack of trust in EPA by 
Congress. Thal is manifesled in increasingly prescriplive legislation that slrips away 
administrative discrelion from EPA managers and often sels impossible goals for lhe 
Agency. These goals may resull in polilical mileage, but lheir eXlreme nature ensures 
praclical failure. The resull has been missed deadlines, unfulfilled promises of purilY, 
failure lo achieve goals, and anolher round of EPA bashing, followed by even more 
slringent goals; and the spiral of mislrusl continues. 
Ruckelshaus, 16 EPA] al 14 (ciled in nole 167). 
200. The same conflict was presenl in President Nixon's impoundmenl in 1973, 1974, and 1975 
of congressionally approprialed funds for the Federal Waler Pollulion Conlrol ACl'S conslruction 
grants program. The Supreme Court ullimalely ruled against the Presidenl in Train v City of New 
York, 420 US 35 (1975), holding lhal the impoundmenl was unlawful. The longer lerm effect of the 
confrontalion was lo galvanize congressional forces in favor of increased oversighl of EPA. See 
NAPA, Oversight Study al 15-16 (ciled in nOle 162). 
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tendency was exacerbated by Congress's pretending to have resolved the 
many difficult conflicts between environmental quality and economic cost 
about which there was in fact no true social consensus. 
The accusations of gross agency incompetence, ignorance, or neglect 
evident in some of EPA's other misadventures likewise share common origins. 
EPA's doomed effort to include transportation control plans and indirect 
source review in state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act resulted 
from the gulf between public aspirations and public understanding. EPA 
lawyers were correct that such plans were contemplated by the Act. Their 
primary error was implementing the Act according to its terms.201 Although 
Congress and state and local officials blamed EPA for overreaching, the 
agency can be little faulted for Congress's initial policy determination and the 
public's subsequent lack of will.202 Nonetheless, it was EPA, not Congress, 
that became the focal point of public criticism. State and local officials widely 
condemned the agency, and Congress ultimately enacted an appropriations 
rider that sharply limited EPA's abil~ty to rely on either type of measure.203 
As described by one commentator, EPA took the fall for Congress and 
became "every elected official's favorite whipping boy."204 
The allegations of agency neglect arising out of the highly publicized 
Kepone incident in 1975 and the subsequent resignation of several EPA 
lawyers from the pesticides program in 1976 can be similarly explained. 
Federal pesticide legislation, like federal air pollution legislation, 
provided EPA with remarkably few 'escape clauses' that allowed the agency to prevent 
the appearance of outright policy failure. Agency officials, aware that they could not 
meet statutory deadlines, desperately sought 'out administrative mechanisms through 
20 I. The Clean Air Act required state implementation plans to include "such other measures as 
may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such [air quality standards], including, but 
not limited to, land-use and transportation controls." 42 USC § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970). The 
courts accordingly rejected EPA efforts to delay implementation of the transportation control plans 
that were necessary to meet the Clean Air Act's air quality standards. See City of Riverside v 
Ruckelshaus, 4 Envir Rptr Cases (BNA) 1728 (CD Cal 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. II 
EPA, 475 F2d 968 (DC Cir 1973). 
202. See John Quarles, The Transportation Control Plans-Federal Regulation's Collision with Reality, 2 
Harv Envir L Rev 241. 255-62 (1977). "EPA was caught in a crossfire ... between the statutory 
mandate and the court orders enforcing it on one side and vigorous public opposition on the other. 
It seems unlikely that any strategy of implementation could have succeeded under such 
circumstances." Id at 262. 
203. See Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriation Act of 1975. Pub L 
No 93-563, § 510,88 Stat 1822 (1974); Independent Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub L No 94-116, 
§§ 407, 89 Stat 581 (1975). In the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 
Congress authorized EPA to suspend for one year its parking management program and its indirect 
source regulations. See 42 USC §§ l857c-5(c)(2)(A)-(E) (Supp V 1975); see generally Krier & Ursin. 
Pollution and Potiq at 229-32 (cited in note 56). 
204. Melnick: Regulation and the Courts at 322 (cited in note 8); see Department of Housing and 
Urban Development and Certain Independent Agencies, Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987. 
Hearings before Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Committee on 
Appropriations. 99th Cong, 2d Sess 161 (1986) (testimony of Administrator Lee Thomas) 
("Everybody is accountable and nobody is accountable under the way [Congress] is selling it up. but 
they have got a designated whipping boy."). Professor Melnick contends that Congress passed laws 
that forced EPA to implement transportation control plans; but when EPA acted accordingly. "most 
members condemned the EPA for its stupidity and arrogance." Melnick, Regulation and the COllrts at 
378 (cited in note 8). 
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which they could reach authoritative registration decisions and work out some 
accommodation with the regulated.205 
In addition, as in the case of transportation control plans, EPA's early 
aggressive enforcement of FIFRA, including its cancellation of a number of 
pesticides, prompted a backlash from those in Congress and the executive 
branch (including Agriculture) who were more concerned about the cost to 
industry.206 That coalition, in turn, heavily pressured EPA to moderate its 
enforcement of FIFRA, and Administrator Russell Train ultimately responded 
by providing the General Counsel's Office, which had initiated the more 
aggressive approach, less programmatic authority.207 
When, however, in the aftermath of wide publicity concerning the dangers 
presented by the pesticide Kepone, concerned agency lawyers aided Senate 
oversight investigations of agency registration practices, EPA was once again 
the object of congressional criticism, this time for having neglected its 
statutory mandate. "The EPA, inundated by its registration and 
reregistration burdens [under FIFRA], long had abandoned any pretense of 
systematic data review, blaming their actions on tight resources and 
unrealistic statutory deadlines.''208 To Senate overseers, however, EPA's 
consequent reliance on industry data was strong evidence that industry had 
captured the agency, and that EPA had subverted congressional will at the 
expense of increased risks to public health. EPA ultimately suspended all 
registration actions in light of increasing evidence of problems with the 
industry data upon which EPA had been relying.209 
Finally, EPA's most controversial era under the leadership of 
Administrator Anne Gorsuch2IO can be seen as an expression of institutional 
conflict and public misapprehension.211 The conflict between the executive 
and legislative branches concerning the proper direction of national 
environmental policy came to a head with the election of President Reagan. 
Gorsuch's assignment was to overcome the agency's bureaucracy-which 
many In the administration believed had been captured by 
205. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics at 194 (cited in note 143). 
206. Id at 194-95. 
207. Id at 195. Congress threatened to transfer some pesticide regulatory authority back to the 
Department of Agriculture. See 121 Cong Rec 25488-91 (July 28,1975) (remarks of Rep. Brown); id 
at 32466 (remarks of Rep. McCloskey); id at 32467 (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). See Generally id at 
32514-19. 
208. Bosso, Pesticides and Pollution at 199 (cited in note 143). 
209. Id at 199-200. 
210. As noted earlier, Anne Gorsuch changed her last name to "Burford" following her marriage 
in February 1983, which was shortly before she resigned as EPA administrator. 
211. This is not to suggest that no corrupt practices occurred during Gorsuch's tenure. There 
appear to have been instances in which political appointees abdicated their statutory responsibilities 
for personal pecuniary gain. Sce Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Reconsidering Ocean Incineration as Par·t of a 
['nited States Hazardous Waste !\1anagement Progmm: Separating the Rhetoric from the Reality, 17 B C Envir 
Aff 687, 728-29 nn347-49 (1990). Still, many of the claims of agency corruption were rooted in 
policy disagreements between the executive and legislative branches. Even classic corruption 
involving bribery of governmcntal oAicials, if it occurred, likely resulted from the quality of 
appointments made during an administration that devalued EPA's mandate. 
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environmentalists212-in order to realize the administration's goal of making 
the environmental laws more cost conscious by administrative rule or, if 
necessary, by legislative amendment. 213 
But, just as EPA officials had previously overestimated Congress's and the 
public's willingness to sacrifice on behalf of its aspirations for environmental 
quality, Gorsuch likewise overestimated public willingness to compromise its 
aspirations for environmental quality. She also failed to appreciate the 
significance of those institutional forces within government that historically 
had been distrustful of EPA, and, as a result, she ultimately became their 
victim. 
Unlike her predecessors, Gorsuch showed no appreciation for the notion 
of an "independent" EPA, or for the dangers of any appearance of agency 
capture by the regulated community or by pro-development forces within the 
government itself. Gorsuch immediately violated the first tenet by occupying 
an office at the Department of the Interior prior to her confirmation and also 
by appearing to be carrying out OMB's marching orders.214 She violated the 
second tenet by refusing to take into account how certain actions 
(appointments,215 budget requests,216 meetings with industry,217 
reorganizations,218 and rule suspensions219) and statistics (precipitous drop in 
212. Davies. Environmental Institutions at 143, 144 (cited in note 21) ("The Administration was 
convinced that the regulatory agencies were staffed largely by consumer and environmental 
'extremists' who were hostile to Reagan."); Harris. Want & Ward, Hazardous Waste at 30-31 (cited in 
note 21). 
213. Even more broadly. many in the administration. including Gorsuch, "viewed environmental 
law as an excellent example of the excesses of the past that provided an opportunity to implement 
the shift back to increased reliance on the free market system and decreased dependence on 
government intervention." Martin H. Belsky. Environmental Policy Law in the 1980s: Shifting Back the 
Burden of Proof, 12 Ecol L Q 1,36-37 (1984). 
214. Jonathan Lash. Katharine Gillman & David Sheridan. A Season of Spoils: The Story of the Reagan 
Administration's Attack on the Environment 16 (Pantheon. 1984) ("The association with Watt fostered an 
impression that Anne Gorsuch never completely dispelled, that she was a mere lieutenant in [Watt's] 
army . . . . It was a largely erroneous impression, unjust to a strong-willed and opinionated 
politician, but it shaped expectations for her nevertheless. "). 
215. Feliciano, EPA: An Analysis of Its Controversies at 7-8 (cited in note 21); Susan Tolchin & 
Martin Tolchin. Dismantling America: The Rush to Deregulate 100-0 I (Houghton Mifflin. 1983) 
(describing industry ties of EPA appointees). 
216. Under Gorsuch, President Reagan proposed an operating budget for fiscal year 1984 that 
was one-third less than the agency's operating budget for fiscal year 1981 (President Carter's last 
EPA budget). See Don Lippincott. Environmental Protection Agency: Ruckelshaus Returns 5 (Harv JFK 
School ofGovt. 1985) (CI6-85-638); see also Kenski & Kenski. Congress Against the President at 99-100 
(cited in note 38). 
217. In a widely publicized meeting on December II. 1981, Administrator Gorsuch reportedly 
advised refinery operators that they need not worry about their violation of EPA's leaded gas rules 
because those rules would soon be changed. See Lash. Gillman & Sheridan. A Season of Spoils at 140-
41 (cited in note 214). 
218. Gorsuch reorgallized the agency's enforcement personnel three times in her first 12 months 
in office. thereby fueling concerns that she intended to undermine environmental enforcement. See 
Davies. Environmental Institutions at 148- 49 (cited in note 21). 
219. The most notorious rule suspension was EPA's lifting of the ban on disposal of liquid 
chemicals in hazardous waste landfills that. following tremendous public outcry, EPA [{,instated three 
weeks later. See Feliciano, EP.-l: All AllalFis of Its Controversies at 40 (cited in note 21); Lash. Gillman 
& Sheridan, A Seasoll of Spoils at 103-04. 119 (cited in note 214). 
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enforcement referrals to the Department of Justice)220 might be seen as 
evidence of agency crippling.221 Gorsuch, unlike Ruckelshaus before her,222 
steadfastly maintained that appearances should not matter. 223 She even 
eliminated the Office of Public Awareness.224 
Consequently, regardless of her true motives,225 Gorsuch lost any 
credibility with Congress and the courts almost as soon as her tenure began. 
The congressional oversight machinery commenced within months of her 
confirmation and scrutinized for any hint of agency corruption.226 
Accusations of "sweetheart deals" with industry,227 political manipulation,228 
and agency crippling soon followed. 229 
220. During Gorsuch's first year as administrator, the number of agency referrals dropped by 
84 %. See Davies, Environmental Institutions at 148- 49 (cited in note 21); Feliciano, EPA: An Analysis of 
Its Controversies at 19 (cited in note 21). 
221. Irene Bercovitch Devine, Organizational Crisis and Individual Response: The Case of the 
Environmental Protection Agency 86-92 (unpub PhD Dissertation, Case W Reserve U, 1983). 
222. Marcus, Promise and Performance at 89 (cited in note II); Quarles, Cleaning Up America at 38-39 
(cited in note 123). 
223. See, for example, Burford, Are You Tough Enough? at 90 (cited in note 123) ("I viewed the 
public-relations aspects as something that could wait until we had worked out the bugs. . . . I 
believed that there was an element of trust involved-that the media would wait until the results of 
the changes were in before making up their minds about what the reorganization really meant. "); 
Paul Starobin, Surviving at the EPA: Gary Dietrich 7 (Harv JFK School of Govt, 1984) (CI6-84-592) 
(quoting Gorsuch as rejecting advice to "give [Congress] the sense that you have your heart in the 
right place" based on her refusal to "kow-tow to [Representative] Jim Florio"). 
224. See Douglas Murray, The Politics of Pesticides: Corporate Power and Popular Struggle over the 
Regulatory Process 206 (unpub PhD dissertation, U Cal Santa Cruz, 1983). 
225. The former administrator maintains that she had no intention of undermining the agency's 
effectiveness and sought instead to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in delivering 
environmental protection and quality. See Burford, Are You Tough Enough? at 65 (cited in note 123). 
This is a difficult burden for Gorsuch to carry. It likely depends for its ultimate justification on the 
thesis that the states are in a better and more appropriate position to do much of what EPA has 
historically done. If so, then the claim that Gorsuch and her staff sought to dismantle EPA as we 
know it would seem close to the mark. 
226. In 1981, the chairs of six different committees and subcommittees began to investigate EPA 
under Gorsuch, including the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Sen Robert T. 
Stafford, Vermont); Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (Rep. Henry A. Waxman, 
California) of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce; Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Transportation, and Tourism (Rep. J. Florio, New Jersey) of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce; Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources (Rep. Tony Moffett, 
Connecticut) of the House Committee on Government Operations; Subcommittee on Investigations 
and Oversight (Rep. Albert Gore, Tennessee) of the House Committee on Science and Technology; 
and Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment (Rep. James H. 
Scheuer, New York) of the House Committee on Science and Technology; see also EPA Oversight: 
One-Year Review, Joint Hearings before Certain Subcommittees of the House Committee on 
Government Operations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the House Committee 
on Science and Technology, 97th Cong, 2d Sess I (1982). 
227. Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch COlltroversy, 
1983 Duke L J 1333, 1341 n59 (authored by Ronald L. Claveloux); Feliciano, EPA: An Analysis of Its 
Control'ersies at 32 (cited in note 21). 
228. See Feliciano, EPA: An Analysis of Its Controversies at 34, 35-38 (cited in note 21); see also 
Howard Kurtz, Political Races Discussed with S1lperfund Chief, Washington Post Al col 6 (March 22, 
1983). 
229. See Lawrence Mosher, :Hove Over Jim Watt, Anne Gonuch /s The Latest Target of Environmentalists. 
13 Natl J 1899 (Oct 1981); Devine. Olgallizational Clis;s at 92 (cited in note 221). No doubt the single 
most harmful statement was that contained in an op-ed piece written by former EPA Administrator 
Russell E. Train. See Russell E. Train. The Destruction of EPA. Washington Post A 15 (Feb 2. 1982) 
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Moreover, when Gorsuch finally took steps to address adverse 
congressional and public perceptions of her motives, she did so at the 
expense of her relationship with OMB,230 thereby cutting off her last source 
of political support.231 Even the regulated community, which welcomed the 
administration's philosophy of deregulation, could no longer afford the 
instability that she created.232 Ironically, the final event that triggered her 
departure-an assertion of executive privilege in declining to provide 
Congress with agency enforcement files-was, as she claimed, not one of her 
making.233 But her loss of credibility by then was so great that there was no 
one left to listen or care. 
Gorsuch's tenure as EPA administrator (a few months shy of two years) 
was shorter than that of any other administrator before or since. The effects 
on the institutional development of EPA and the evolution of federal 
environmental law have lasted far longer. She confirmed the worst fears of 
those in, Congress who were concerned about the agency's potential for 
deliberately undermining the federal environmental protection laws. She 
thus dramatically accelerated the cycle of distrust that had plagued EPA 
before her arrival, prompting one commentator to conclude that "the most 
poignant and irremediable [impact] was the EPA's loss of credibility; the loss 
of credibility with the Congress and, more importantly, with the American 
people. "234 
IV 
THE TRAGEDY OF DISTRUST: 
THE STIFLING OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
EPA is plainly in a dilemma. The agency strives to be responsive to both 
the environmentalists' vision and the regulated community'S pragmatism, but 
("The budget and personnel cuts, unless reversed, will destroy the agency as an effective institution 
for many years to come."); Lash. Gillman & Sheridan, ," Season oj Spoils at 61 (cited in note 214). 
230. Lash, Gillman & Sheridan, A Season oj Spoils at 57-59, 72 (cited in note 214). 
231. Davies, Environmental Institutions at 154-55, 156-57 (cited in note 21). 
232. Id at 157; see also Stanfield, 18 Nat! L J at 392 (cited in note 124). Those among the 
regulated who had already made the investments necessary to comply with EPA rules were not likely 
to favor relaxation that would provide their competitors with an economic advantage. See Foreman, 
Signals from the Hill at 37 (cited in note 36). 
233. Career staffat the Department of Justice instigated the refusal to turn over enforcement files 
because of their concerns with congressional access. See HR Rep No 99-435. 99th Cong, 1st Sess 10 
(1985) (report on Department of Justice role in withholding of EPA documents from Congress); 
Milan Savarous Yancy. All Evaluation oj the Initial Implementation oj the Comprehensive Environmelltal 
Response, Compensatioll, and Liability Act oj 1980: The Eflect oj the Withholding oj DOCllments by the 
Environmental Protertion Agenryfrom Congress in /982-83, at 76 (un pub PhD dissertation. U Texas Dallas, 
1988) ("CERCL-I Evaluation "); see generally Shane, 71 Minn L Rev at 508-1 (j (cited in note 177); 
Note, 1983 Duke LJ 1383 (cited in note 227). Representative Dingell, who was one of Gorsuch's 
principal investigators. reportedly stated upon learning of her resignation: "I see no reason why she 
should resign. I'm aware of no wrongdoing on her part that should compel that. She is taking' the 
fall for carrying out c1earlv what are the administration's policies." Feliciano, EPA: An Analysis oj Its 
COlltrove1:fies at 2 (cited in note 21), quoting Paula Schwed. UPI report (March 10. 1983). 
234. Yancy. CERCLI 1:'l'(Jluatioll at 123 (cited in note 233): see Davies, Envirolllllentallll.ltitlltiolls at 
158 (cite in note 21) ("[A] tarnished reputation takes a long time to reslore."). 
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ultimately satisfies neither.235 EPA is also a pawn in an ongoing struggle 
between the executive and legislative branches for control over national 
policy.236 Finally, EPA is pushed in one direction by public aspirations and 
pulled in the other direction by the absence of public willingness to change 
and by the public's proven incapacity for self-sacrifice.237 
To be sure, EPA is itself responsible for some of its failures and for the 
generation of some of its controversies; it is not solely a victim of historical 
and institutional circumstances. As with other federal agencies, there have 
been many instances of mismanagement and poor decisionmaking for which 
agency officials deserve to be held accountable. But placed in proper 
perspective, most of EPA's reported failures and controversies seem more 
justly viewed as the product of institutional conflict and public schizophrenia 
than as the result of systemic EPA dereliction or incompetence.238 
EPA's dilemma could nonetheless be viewed positively as a small price to 
pay in the United States' first effort to reshape its relationship with its natural 
environment. Certainly this nation's accomplishments in seeking to produce 
a legal regime for environmental protection have been extraordinary. In 
relatively few years, the nation's laws have been dramatically rewritten. 
Viewed from this perspective, repeated regulatory failure could be seen as the 
necessary cost of our attempt to address pressing environmental problems in 
the face of scientific uncertainty. There was not sufficient time to delay 
governmental action until its environmental objectives could have been fairly 
and accurately defined.239 
The conflict and controversy surrounding EPA during the last twenty years 
could be similarly viewed as a necessary evil, as the inevitable consequence of 
235. As described by former EPA Administrator Russell Train, "[i]fa decision doesn't go as far as 
our environmental friends would like, it is immediately called a sellout. If the decision goes against 
industry, we're accused of giving into [sic] environmental emotionalism." Quoted in Alfred A. 
Marcus, EPA's Successes and Failures, in Kamieniecki, O'Brien & Clarke, eds, Controversies in 
Environmental Polic), at 168 (cited in note 84); see CEQ, Sixteenth Annual Report at 2-3 (cited in note 53); 
Michael McCloskey, The Crisis of Failing Bureaucracies, 27 Nat Resources] 243, 243-44 (1987) ("The 
career civil service is caught in relentless cross-fire between industry and environmentalists. This 
tends to bring things to a halt easily, with the 'out' being to study issues endlessly in a quest for a 
scientific certainty that will stand up to anybody's scrutiny."). 
236. Id; Bruce Ackerman & William Hassler, Clean Coal, Dirt)' Air 110 (Yale U Press, 1981). 
237. CEQ, Sixteenth Annual Report at 16 (cited in note 53) ("Political forces cause stringent 
scl·.edules and ambitious goals to be written into law, ... but due to logical consequences of 
implementation, some programs become politically unfeasible."); Helen Ingram & Dean E. Mann, 
Environmental Policy: From Innovation to Implementation, in Theodore J. Lowi & Alan Stone, eds, 
Nationalizing Government 132 (Sage, 1978). 
238. See Commission on Natl Resources/Natl Res Council, Analytical Studies for the U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, in Nat! Res Council, 2 Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection 
AgenC)' at 2 (cited in note 97) C[Wjhen specific criticisms of EPA decision making are traced to their 
roots, the problems more frequently are seen to derive from the stringent directives of the 
environmental statutes than from faulty administrative action."); Robert L. Rabin. I'iewing the 
Administrative Process First-Hand, Thoughts all a rear \ Leave at EPA, 15 Stan Lawyer 19 (Fall/Winter 
1980); Note, The Politiml Economy of Supelfund Implementatioll, 59 S Cal L Rev 875, 899-900 (1986) 
(authored by .lames R. Buckley). 
239. See EESI, StatlltOl)' Df(ullillPS at 43 (cited in note 49) ("Statutory deadlines are unavoidably 
unrealistic ... because Congress is often trying to force action in a new area. and no one knows what 
it's going to take to get thejob done."). 
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administrative agency implementation of fundamental social change in our 
system of government, which heavily depends on the actions of each branch 
being overseen by the others. Isolated excesses may have resulted, and there 
may have been cases of overreaching, but the advantages of intense oversight 
have been overwhelming. 
For instance, the impossible objectives and unrealistic deadlines contained 
in "symbolic" environmental legislation place EPA in an administrative 
quandary, but they also effectively send a public message concerning the 
urgency and seriousness of environmental problems.24o Such objectives and 
deadlines also provide the environmental community, which has fewer 
resources, with an effective rhetorical advantage in its debate with the 
regulated community concerning the need for environmental protection.241 
Close judicial and congressional scrutiny of EPA has clearly also had 
significant benefits. It is likely that an active judiciary improved the quality of 
EPA decisionmaking in some cases.242 And, as was the case in Congress's 
exposure of EPA's initial mishandling of the Superfund program, persistent 
congressional examination of EPA can be credited for having revealed 
instances of agency neglect and corruption and of OMB overreaching.243 
Certainly the threat of both judicial and congressional oversight enhanced 
EPA's leverage in resisting competing forces within the executive branch.244 
There is also some advantage to the public in the way environmental laws 
have evolved in response to repeated agency failure. The statutes allow for 
less agency discretion while arguably reflecting greater congressional 
assumption of responsibility for making public policy. Congress was faulted 
240. Richard B. Stewart, The Developmmt of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in judicial 
Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L Rev 713, 727 (1977). 
241. See R. Shep Melnick, Pollution Deadlines and the Coalition for Failure, 75 The Public Interest 132 
(Spring 1984). 
242. William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L J 38, 59-60 n87 
(1975); Stewart, 62 Iowa L Rev at 731-32 n89 (cited in note 240); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and 
Benefits of Aggressive judicial Review of Agmcy Action, 1989 Duke LJ 522, 528-29, 537 ("[TJhere is some 
basis for believing that aggressive judicial review has, in many settings, increased the incidence of 
legality, prevented arbitrariness, ensured against undesirable regulation, and brought about 
regulatory controls that have saved lives or otherwise accomplished considerable good."). There are 
also weighty reasons for the judiciary to be especially concerned about the validity of 
environmentally destructive activities; for instance, those who may be adversely affected by 
environmental degradation are (as in the case of future generations) often unable to voice their 
concerns effectively in court. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public TntSt Doctrine, 71 Iowa L Rev 631, 684-85 n336 (1986) 
("[DJozens of opinions recount the language of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") 
concerning protection of the rights of 'succeeding generations' to a healthy environment."); 
Glicksman & Schroeder, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 271-72 (cited in note 39). 
243. See, for example, Leslie Maitland, Top E.PA. Official is ACCltSed of Intnvming in Behalf of 
Company, NY Times B 13 (March 24, 1983); Philip Shabecoff, Budget Office Attacked over Rulesfor Asbestos, 
NY Times A32 col I (Oct 3, 1985); see also Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions 
at 113 (cited in note 32); see also West & Cooper, 104 Pol Sci Qat 606 (cited in note 164) (active role 
for Congress in administrative process is "salutary" and "political representation brought to bear 
through legislative oversight is a healthy counterpose to that introduced by executive oversight"). 
244. See Melnick, Regulatioll and the Courts at 293-94 (cited in note 8): Quarles, Cleaning Up Amnica 
at 132. 136 (cited in note 123). Deadlines also increase an EPA manager's power to bargain for 
resources within the agency. See EESI, Statutor)' Deadlil/es at 27 (cited in note 49). 
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for unfairly (and improperly) passing the buck to EPA in the environmental 
statutes of the 1970s.245 In the more prescriptive environmental statutes, 
Congress is now making many of the difficult policy determinations necessary 
to fashion environmental quality standards.246 
Finally, there is even a positive way to view public distrust of EPA. After 
all, "political distrust has been a recurrent and perhaps a permanent feature 
of the history of the republic."247 Effective democracy undoubtedly requires 
criticism of government based on mistrust of its institutions.248 Certainly, 
much of the federal constitution is designed to protect individuals from 
governmental overreaching,249 just as separation of powers principles are 
intended to prevent overreaching by anyone branch of government. 
Appreciation of the benefits of the current institutional regime does not, 
however, mean that its adverse effects are insubstantial. Nor does it mean that 
significant reform is unnecessary. Celebration of past achievement is no 
substitute for careful planning for the future. This is certainly true for 
environmental law. There is a growing consensus that fundamental changes 
in approach will be necessary for the country to reach acceptable levels of 
environmental protection while maintaining a high standard of living.250 A 
detailed accounting of the ways in which existing institutional forces have 
impeded federal environmental protection efforts over the last twenty years 
strongly suggests, moreover, that institutional reform will be required for 
such fundamental change to be achieved. 
A. Loss of Public Confidence and Agency Self-Esteem 
Included among the most immediate and persistent impacts of the current 
institutional scheme are loss of public confidence in EPA and loss of the 
agency's confidence in itself. EPA's repeated regulatory failures and frequent 
controversies created a public image of an incompetent, neglectful, and at 
245. Schoenbrod, 30 UCLA L Rev at 818-26 (cited in note 37). 
246. Of course, Congress clearly learns from EPA's experience in legislating detailed rules and 
often codifies the agency's past practice. For example, the Clean Water Act's regulatory approach to 
toxic pollutants, 33 USC § 1311 (I) (1988), the Clean Air Act's approach to Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration, 42 USC §§ 7470-7479 (1988), and CERCLA's approach to settlement, 42 USC § 9622 
(1988), each largely reflects past administrative practice. See Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 310 n315 (cited 
in note 46); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 50-51, 86, 188 (cited in note 8). 
247. Vivien Hart, Dis/nlS/ and Democracy: Political Dis/nIS/ in Britain and America 81 (Cambridge U 
Press, 1978); see Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of TnIS/ 71 (Rutgers U Press, 1983); House 
Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service, Report and Recommendations of the National 
Commission on Public Service 79 (Comm Print, 1989) ("Committee Report"). 
248. See Barber, The Logic and Limi/s of TnlSt at 166 (cited in note 247) (Rationally based distrust 
of technical competence is necessary "for political accountability in a participatory democracy."); 
Hart, Dis/nIS/ and DemocroC)' at 183-92, 202-08 (cited in note 247) (Distrust "is the product of the 
public's realistic and accurate perception of deficiencies."); Seymour Martin Lipset & William 
Schneider, The Confidence Gap 383 (The Free Press, 1983). 
249. Rosen, Holding Governmen/ Bureaucracies Accoun/able at IS (cited in note 134). 
250. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law. 37 Stan 
L Rev 1333 (1985); Adam Babich, Res/11Ic/uring Environmen/al Law. 19 Emir L Rptr 1005 (Feb 1989); 
Reilly, The Tuming Point (cited in note 51); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Po/ic)'-lt is Time for a 
New Bef51nning, 14 ColumJ Envir L III (1989); EPA Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk: Setting 
Priorities and Stratef51es for Environmental Protection (Sept 1990) ("EPA, Reducing Risk"). 
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times even corrupt agency.251 A myth of scientific incompetence resulted,252 
which EPA can ill afford, but which others may have an incentive to 
perpetuate.253 
The level of distrust in EPA, moreover, is inconsistent with the needs of an 
administrative agency responsible for the implementation of federal 
environmental laws. An important lesson of the last twenty years is that EPA 
simply cannot do its job effectively without greater public confidence in the 
agency.254 EPA cannot effectively manage public risk without the confidence 
of the public any more than a doctor could treat a patient without that 
patient's trust.255 "[F]rom the standpoint of an American governmental 
agency charged with protecting human health and the environment, trust is 
251. See, for example. Douglas Frantz, Poiluters Put in Charge of Cleaning Up: The Environmental 
Protection Agency Is Accused of Abdicating Its Responsibilities and Sacrificing Public Health. Evidence Shows 
Private Labs Have Falsified Tests, LA Times A I col I (June 17, 1990); see generally Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Q 
at 281 (cited in note 46) ("By making promises that cannot be kept, and thus forcing EPA to 
reformulate public policy, Congress indirectly undermined public confidence in the Agency's 
competence and good faith. "); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 383-87 (cited in note 8) (current 
way of setting policy "increases cynicism and distrust of government"); Charles J. Meyers, Comment, 
in Ann F. Friedlaender, Approaches to Controlling Air Pollution 67 (MIT Press, 1978) ("The cost is not 
just the waste of resources but is also the loss in confidence in government-and in ourselves. "). In 
1972, Administrator Ruckelshaus cautioned Congress against promoting the very loss of public 
confidence in EPA that subsequently developed. In oversight hearings, he testified that the 
"tragedy" in 1972 was that the public does not trust its institutions and people "don't believe that 
the EPA is really trying to protect the environment." See Implementation of the Clean Air Act of 
1970 at 325 (cited in note 123) (testimony of Administrator Ruckelshaus). According to 
Ruckelshaus, accusations of improper OMB influence on EPA, made in the oversight hearing, could 
be used "to feed this mistrust" and undermine the dedication of EPA employees "and their ability to 
function as public employees." Id at 325, 328. This is what Ruckelshaus found "most distressing 
about the constant charges that are made." Id at 328. 
252. See Ted Greenwood, The Myth of Scientific Incompetence of Regulatory Agencies, Sci, Tech & 
Human Values 83 (Winter 1984). 
253. Id at 95 ("To argue that an agency is incompetent ... is to raise an issue that both 
commands attention and erodes the agency's authority and legitimacy."). 
254. Nominations of Douglas Costle and Barbara Blum, Hearing before the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 14 (1977) (testimony of Douglas Costle) 
("Full public support and understanding is essential if we are to do our job. "); Nomination of Lee M. 
Thomas, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong, 1st 
Sess 5 (\985); Ruckelshaus, 16 EPAj at 14, 15 (cited in note 167) ("Both public trust and a self-
confident EPA are necessary ingredients for true environmental progress."); Nomination of William 
Ruckelshaus at 5 (cited in note 35) (testimony of Dr. jay D. Hair, executive vice president, Natl 
Wildlife Federation); id at 200 (testimony of William Ruckelshaus: "If the public does not believe 
that what we are doing is in their best interest, that we are trying the very best we can to deal with 
these problems, then there is no way this Agency can function. "); see also Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1976, Hearings before a 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong, 1st Sess Part 6, 77 (\ 975) 
(testimony of Administrator Train. "It is important that EPA be perceived ... by society as a whole 
as a strong advocate of environmental protection."); Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, and Certain Independent Agencies, Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Hearings 
before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 98th Congo 2d Sess Pt I, 294 
(\ 984) (testimony of Administrator Ruckelshaus). 
255. Thomas O. McGarity, Risk and Trust: The Role of Regulatory Agencies, 16 Envir L Rptr \0 198, 
\0200-0 I (\986); Ruckelshaus, 15 Envir L at 461 (cited in note 185) ("necessity of trust between the 
EPA and the public in areas of scientific uncertainty ... especially where public emotion runs high, 
such as with carcinogenic chemicals"); Bud Ward. Communicating 011 Ellvironmental Risk. The Em'ir 
Forum 4 (Jan 1986); joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administmtive GOI'l'1"lImcllt: Institutional Designs 
for Envirollmental Decisiolllllakillg, 92 Yale L j 1300, 1324 (\ 983) ("Clarity and fullness of explanation 
are central to the legitimacy of decisions affecting individual health and safety."); see also Barber, The 
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the oil in the gearbox. . . . [W]hen [ the public] ceases to believe that the 
agency is trying to act in the public interest, that agency cannot function at 
all. "2,,6 
EPA's lack of credibility has, for instance, severely hampered the agency's 
ability to manage the Superfund program. Based on his review of the 
Superfund program, EPA's current administrator, William Reilly, concluded 
that "the legacy of public distrust" surrounding EPA's management of the 
program and "the barrage of criticism leveled at the program nationally" had 
caused the agency to lose its "most valuable asset, the benefit of the 
doubt."257 When the public's unrealistic expectations of quick cleanup were 
not met, Reilly concluded, the public became suspicious of federal efforts and 
unwilling "to completely trust EPA to represent them in confidential 
negotiations with [potentially responsible parties]. "258 As a result, cleanup 
efforts were slowed.259 
More broadly, the absence of public confidence has exacerbated the gap 
between the public's and the agency's perception of risk, undermining the 
validil y of the agency's efforts to manage risk. EPA's Science Advisory Board 
recently concluded that "the remaining and emerging environmental risks 
considered most serious by the general public today are different from those 
considered most serious by the technical professionals charged with reducing 
environmental risk."260 Not only does the public fail to accept EPA's 
assessment of the relative risks of various hazards, but EPA, too, fails to 
appreciate the public's distinct assessment. EPA discounts the public's risk 
perception as a product of ignorance and misunderstanding. Because risk 
assessment is, however, at bottom, not simply a technical determination, but 
"an ethical and political one that technical experts have neither the knowledge 
nor the authority to dictate,"261 EPA's technical approach may systematically 
fail in cases of diffuse, low probability risks.262 
Logic and Limits of Trust at 141 (cited in note 247) (public generally has great trust in competence of 
doctor). 
256. William D. Ruckelshaus, "Not in My Backyard": Institutional Problems in Environmental 
Protection (speech before Economic Club of Detroit, April 1984), reprinted in 130 Cong Rec 9803-
04 (1984). 
257. William K. Reilly, A Management Review of the Superfund Program 2, 5-4 (EPA, 1989). 
258. Id at 5-1 to 5-4; see McGarity, 16 Envir L Rep at 18 (cited in note 255) (accusations of 
sweetheart deals). 
259. EPA's current assistant administrator for pesticides and toxic substances recently 
commented that EPA's lack of credibility with the public had impeded the agency's ability to 
communicate the risks associated with the preservative ALAR and had prompted great conflict over 
its plan to ban asbestos. See New OPTS Chief Will Seek Expanded TSCA Authority, Legislative Fixes to 
FlFRA, 10 Inside EPA 1, 7-8 (Oct 6, 1989); see also Christine Russell, A Crisis in Public Confidence, 16 
EPAJ 2,4-5 (May/June 1990). Similar problems arose at an earlier time involving EPA's handling of 
public concern with ethylene dibromide ("EDB"), when a "tidal wave of public anxiety swept the 
country." See Harold Issadore Sharlin, EDB: A Case Studv in the Communication of Health Risk 2 (Jan 9, 
1985) (report prepared for Derry Allen, associate director, EPA Office of Policy Analysis). 
260. EPA Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk at 12 (cited in note 250). 
261. Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U Pa L Rev 1027, 1085 
(1990). 
262. Id at 1085. Professors Gillette and Krier argue that agencies have "a systematic tendency in 
favor of too much public risk," id at 1061, because producers of public risk "will generally enjoy a 
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Finally, the loss of public confidence in EPA has at times caused the agency 
to lose confidence in itself, as well as causing a general decline in agency self-
esteem. The morale and self-esteem of a bureaucracy can be severely 
damaged by sustained public criticism.263 Agency self-confidence is likewise 
adversely affected by increasingly prescriptive statutes and intense 
oversight.264 The adverse effects of agency demoralization are particularly 
acute in an agency such as EPA whose employees choose to work there 
primarily out of their sense of sharing in the agency's perceived mission 
ra~her than for more tangible rewards.265 Agency turnover becomes greater 
as employees are increasingly deprived of the sense of public service they 
sought in government employment. 266 For this same reason, recruitment of 
the very best employees becomes more difficult. 
EPA is suffering from all of these problems. Indeed, the adverse effects 
may be especially acute for agency technical staff whose salaries have 
historically been much lower than those of their legal counterparts within the 
agency. The low salary scale and reduced agency self-esteem have made it 
difficult to attract such technical employees and, even more so, to retain them. 
As a result, EPA is losing the sustained technical expertise it needs most to 
address long-term environmental problems.267 
considerable comparative advantage in mobilizing interest groups and exercising influence. whether 
by benign or sinister means."' Id at 1068. According to Gillette and Krier, however, judges and juries 
are better able to redress public conception of risk precisely because they are "not experts." Id at 
1101 (emphasis in original). 
263. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy at 40 (cited in note 45). 
264. Steven Kelman, Making Public-Policy: A Hopeful View of American Government 294 (Basic Books, 
1987); Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriatiolls for 
Fiscal Year 1980, Hearings before the Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House 
Appropriations Committee, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 243 (1979) (testimony of Administrator Douglas 
Cos tie; OMB oversight adversely affects agency morale); Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and Certain Other Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 502 (1978) 
(testimony of Administrator Douglas Costle; EPA's high turnover rate a product of congressional 
deadlines); Implementation of the Clean Air Act of 1970 at 328 (cited in note 123) (testimony of 
Administrator William Ruckelshaus; accusations undermine employee "dedication" and "ability to 
function as public employees"). 
265. See Devine, Organizational Oisis at 71 (cited in note 221); Kelman, Alaking Public Policy at 247, 
261-62 (cited in note 264); Steps Toward A Stable Future 3 (Natl Acad Pub Admin, 1984); see also 
Wilson, Bureaucracy at 95 (cited in note 16) ("sense of mission confers a feeling of special worth on 
the members, provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members and enables the 
administrators to economize on the use of other incentives"). 
266. See Devine, Organizational Crisis at 90-91 (cited in note 221); Committee Report at 84-85 
(cited in note 247). 
267. EPA clearly lost a significant amou~t of agency expertise by the exodus of career staff during 
Administrator Gorsuch's tenure. See Lash, Gillman & Sheridan, A Season of Spoils at 62 (cited in note 
214); Surviving at the EPA: Mike Cook (Harv JFK School of Govt, 1984) (C 16-84·590); Surviving at the 
EPA: Mike Walsh (Harv JFK School of Govt. 1984,) (C 16-84-589); Surviving at the EPA: David 
Tundermall (Harv JFK School of Govt. 1984) (C 16-84-588); Yancy. CERCLA Evaluatioll at 121·22 
(cited in note 233); Devine, Orgallizatiollal Crisis at 119 (cited in note 221) (54% of EPA employees 
questioned in 1982 said they would make a genuine effort to look for new employment outside the 
federal government within following year,). There are indications that a high turnover rate persists. 
See Nomination of William K. Reilly at 108 (cited in note 35); Dillgell Probes Effects of Illdoor Air 
Pollutioll 011 Mamie. TUl7lover, II Inside EPA 7 (july 27, 1990); EPA L'lIveils RCRA Overhaul Plall: Set 
P1iorities, Reward Staff to Curb TUl7lover. II Inside EPA 1·2 (july 13, 1990). 
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B. Polarization of Debate and Proliferation of Litigation 
Another significant adverse effect of the current scheme is its tendency to 
polarize the debate on environmental issues and to encourage litigation. 
Environmentalists, the regulated community, Congress, and even EPA 
repeatedly rely on extreme allegations in seeking public support for their 
respective posItIOns. There is little, if any, candid dialogue. As one 
commentator put it, symbolic legislation such as the Clean Air Act of 1970 
"infantilized rather than matured public opinion. "268 
Moreover, by making impossible demands and attacking EPA for any 
compromise, environmentalists have "discouraged EPA from being honest 
with the public. "269 Nor has EPA hesitated to use its own scare tactics to shift 
public opinion in its favor. In 1980, for example, the agency systematically 
exaggerated the relative hazards presented by abandoned hazardous waste 
sites in order to increase public pressure on Congress to pass CERCLA.270 
One harmful result of such issue polarization is excessive reliance on 
litigation to resolve conflicts. Indeed, agency decisionmaking becomes a mere 
prelude to litigation. 271 The rulemaking proceedings tend to be adversarial; 
the competing sides exaggerate or minimize the relative risks, suppress 
relevant information, and distort scientific data. 272 Agency lawyers 
consequently take on more responsibility in the preparation of agency 
decisions at the expense of other agency professionals.273 The dividing line 
between legal advice and policy advice becomes blurred, and, as a result, 
268. Schoenbrod, 30 UCLA L Rev at 819 (cited in note 37); see Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 234 (cited 
in note 46). 
269. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 126 (cited in note 32). 
270. Id at 279-80; see id at 167 ("For EPA to have conceived of its duty in a manner more 
conducive to the enhancement of public education and political responsibility, it needed to be part of 
a larger political system in which statesmanship, not salesmanship, was the mark of a good agency 
executive."). Another illustration of the problem with polarization is presented by the controversy 
surrounding EPA's refusal to provide Congress with access to its enforcement files. See note 233. 
Although the confrontation with Congress ultimately led to Anne Gorsuch's resignation. lost in the 
uproar was any meaningful discussion of the merits of the executive branch's legal position. The files 
may well have contained documents, the release of which might have been harmful to ongoing 
enforcement efforts. One can therefore well imagine why career lawyers at the Justice Department 
were concerned about the release of these documents to congressional stafr, some of whom might 
have had industry ties. See Note, 1983 Duke LJ at 1348-49 (cited in note 227). 
271. Wilson, Bureaucracy at 283-84 (cited in note 16). 
272. Nat! Res Council, Decisionmaking at 79-81 (cited in note 97) (recommendation with reasons 
that there be reduced reliance on trial-type procedures); Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion at 114-15 
(cited in note 37); Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 L & Con temp 
Probs 57, 99-102 (Autumn 1991); see also Administrative Law Symposium: Questioll & Answer with 
Professors Elliotl, Strauss, and Sunstein, 1989 Duke L J 551, 557 (remarks of Professor Don Elliott, 
questioning efficacy of "overjudicialization of the regulatory process and the concomitance of 
lawyers in policymaking positions within agencies"). 
273. J. William Hirzy, The Other Voice from EPA: The Role of the Headquarters Professiollals' Cllioll, 20 
Envir L Rptr 10057 (1990) (,The science element of EPA became not only subordinate but also 
subservient to the legal element."); Melnick, Regulatioll and the Courts at 341 (cited in note 8); Wilson, 
Bureaucracy at 284 (cited in note 16); see also Ashley C. Brown, The Overjudicializatioll of the Regulatory 
Process, 5 Nat! Resources & Envir 20, 22 (Fall 1990). Agency lawyers are also reputed to be more 
adversarial and litigation oriented than other agency professionals. See Wilson. Bureaurrary at 60 
(cited in note 16). 
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lawyers in the EPA General Counsel's Office have become increasingly 
influential on matters of agency policy.274 Internal agency meetings also 
become more adversarial, with published agency decision documents tending 
to resemble legal briefs rather than candid presentations of the competing 
arguments. 275 Technical expertise is devalued, and opportunities for public 
education are missed.276 
C. Wasted Resources and Misdirected Priorities 
The legacy of distrust created by the current institutional scheme also 
creates tremendous delay and poorly allocates the limited agency resources 
among competing prionties. The combination of impossible statutory 
mandates and increased judicial access has created a situation in which more 
than 80. percent of EPA's major decisions are finally decided by formal 
negotiated settlement or court decision. 277 EPA officials are compelled to 
spend as much as 90 percent of their time defending their actions in court and 
in congressional hearings.278 They are left little time to make thoughtful, 
considered determinations279 and are forced to spend excessive time on a few 
issues in order to satisfy the various overseers.280 There is accordingly little, 
274. EPA, Program at a Crossroads at 34 (cited in note 110). 
275. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong QlUstions at 283-84 (cited in note 32 ) (EPA 
decisionmaking becomes battle for "turf' between different decisionmaking units; agency lawyers 
are preoccupied with anticipated litigation rather than with public education); see id at 78-82 (EPA 
determination of ozone standard failed to educate the public about difficulty of the issues because it 
became an adversarial process between competing bureaucrats); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 
40-41, 382-83 (cited in note 8) (describing conflict between agency lawyers and technical specialists 
in implementing the Clean Air Act); Ackerman & Hassler, Clean Coal, Dirty Air at 79-86 (cited in note 
236) ("agency at war with itself'). 
276. Compare E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as Compensable Injury 
and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Houston L Rev 781, 797 (1988) ("If the American people are ever 
going to have a more informed, mature, and balanced attitude toward the risks of chemicals in the 
environment, toxic tort litigation, like other forms of our public discourse, must educate the public, 
and not pander to its fears and prejudices."). 
277. Ruckelshaus, 15 Envir L at 463 (cited in note 185); see Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion at 39 
(cited in note 37). 
278. NAPA, Oversight Study at 27 (cited in note 162) (Milton Russell, former EPA assistant 
administrator for policy and planning, stat."d that "oversight and litigation drive 90 percent of the 
agency's priorities, and there is very little opportunity to do anything else. "); see id at 28 (former 
EPA Deputy Administrator James Barnes said, "It wouldn't surprise me to find there are four people 
doing oversight, for everyone doing the job to begin with."). 
279. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 111-12 (cited in note 32) 
(congressional oversight diverted agency resources from developing RCRA regulations); see also 
Foreman, Signals from the Hill at 4 (cited in note 36) (subcommittee ties with administrative agencies 
are so strong, and committee meddling in administrative and policy detail so pervasive and 
unpredictable, that coordinated, responsible governance is not much of a prospect). 
280. See Alden F. Abbott, The Case Agai/lSt Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit 
Approach, 39 Admin L Rev 171, 186-200 (1987); Douglas M. Costle, Brave New Chemical: The Future 
Regulatory History' of Phlogiston, 33 Admin L Rev 195, 199-20 I (1981) (describes delays associated with 
promulgation of rule regarding imaginary chemical and discusses how, under FIFRA, EPA's process 
for canceling a single pesticide can take two to three years); Michael Arnold Berry. A Method for 
/:.xamining Policy Implementatioll: A Stud" of Decisionlllakillg for the Natiollal Ambient Air Quality Standan/s. 
1964-84,215-26 (1984) (unpub PhD dissertation, U ofN C at Chapel Hill, 1984) (discussing great 
delay in EPA decisionmaking because of threat of congressional and judicial oversight); see also 
Note, I Fordham Envir LJ at 65 (cited in note 77) (impact of deadline on agency ability to address 
other problems). 
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if any, time left to respond to internal agency demands.281 Indeed, 
congressional oversight of EPA has periodically been so intense that the 
agency has been effectively paralyzed as a result.282 Ironically, therefore, 
much of the delay about which Congress complains may be the product of its 
own oversight of the agency.283 
Another adverse effect of excessive oversight of EPA is that it has caused 
the agency to go "underground" in its lawmaking. To avoid overseers, EPA 
has increasingly resorted to less formal means of announcing agency policy 
determinations. Instead of promulgating rules pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act,284 EPA now frequently issues guidance memoranda and 
directives. Also, many important agency rulings are not reflected in generic 
rulemaking, but in individual permit decisions. OMB oversight is thereby 
avoided, and judicial review of agency action is limited.285 
Excessive congressional, OMB, and judicial oversight also has resulted in 
poor allocation of agency resources and skewed national environmental 
priorities. Each overseer can use his or her leverage (that is, power to delay or 
reduce appropriations, hold up confirmation of agency appointments, create 
bad publicity, eliminate agency discretion, or impose appropriations riders to 
redefine agency priorities),286 but the end result is unlikely to reflect any 
broad or thoughtful determination of environmental priorities. In fact, quite 
the opposite is true. 
Members of the House and Senate routinely respond to narrow parochial 
concerns and to their own need to receive maximum favorable publicity.287 
281. Wilson, Bureaucracv at 32 (cited in note 16). 
282. Feliciano, EPA: in Analysis of Its Controversies at 23-27 (cited in note 21); Yancy, CERCL-I. 
Evaluation at 110-13 (cited in note 233) (estimated percentage of time spent by EPA's Office of Waste 
Programs Enforcement on addressing congressional oversight, and therefore not available to 
develop enforcement orders, support pending litigation, or develop new enforcement cases: 50% in 
1982; nearly 100% in early 1983 (before resignations); 25% in 1983 (following resignations and 
arrival of new agency appointees». 
283. See Walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern 165 (Praeger, 1977). 
284. 5 USC §§ 551-556 (1988). 
285. See Bryan G. Tabler & Mark E. Shere, EPA's Practice of Regulation-by-Memo, 5 Natl Resources 
& Envir 3 (Fall 1990); D.C. Circuit Asked To Remand EPA "Rule" Eliminating PRP Role In Risk Assessment, 
5 Toxics L Rptr 884 (Dec 12, 1990); Burnham Corp. v EPA, 32 ERC 1666 (SO Ohio, Oct 25, 1990) 
(regulatory interpretation letter signed by assistant regional co tinsel not final agency action subject 
to judicial review). 
286. See Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 295 (cited in note 46) (power of individual committee members); 
Aberbach, Keeping a IVatchlul Eye at 7 (cited in note 164); see Foreman, Signals from the Hill at 105-58 
(cited in note 36) (describing examples of appropriation riders limiting EPA authority); see, for 
example, HR Rep 101-490, IOlst Cong, 2d Sess 145-46 (1990) (describing how Congress barred 
EPA from using appropriated funds to impose sanctions under the Clean Air Act on certain violators 
of the Act); EPA Nominees Break Free from Hold by Senator Concerned about Superfund Site, 10 Inside EPA 4-
5 (Nov 24, 1989) (Sen. Metzenbaum placed "hold" on two nominees to assistant administrator 
positions at EPA until Administrator Reilly satisfied him that EPA would rectify specific problem at 
Superfund site in Ohio); see also, Tom Watson, Panel Cuts Budget In Showdown with justice Department, 
Legal Times of Washington 17 (June 25, 1990) (recommending 10% budget cut in Office of Legal 
Counsel because it issued opinion without prior opportunity for review by House subcommittee). 
287. NAPA, Oversight Study at 26 (cited in note 162); id at 14 (maximum publicity and political 
advantage); id at 27-28 (statement of Lee Thomas, former EPA administrator: "[Olversight often 
becomes what I term a king of witch hunt oversight ... motivated, sometimes to a large extent, by an 
overzealous staff, sometimes by a member who is particularly interested in publicity."); see also 
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There is thus no reason to assume that the views of a particular subcommittee 
·chair are consonant with those of Congress as a whole,288 or even consistent 
with the views simultaneously expressed by a different subcommittee.289 
Oversight is likely to empower a few isolated interest groups that are able to 
persuade the chair to express their concerns to the agency. 290 Indeed, a 
congressional subcommittee may be as likely as an agency, if not more so, to 
be "captured" by a special interest group.291 
The competence of congressional staff to draft environmental legislation 
containing increasingly detailed prescriptions can also be questioned. 
Because authority among congressional committees is so fragmented, it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for anyone committee to undertake a 
broad, coordinated look at a complex problem.292 Rather, each committee 
tends to "view[] the bill through the narrow lens of its own particular 
mandate. None tr[ies] to critically examine the structure of the program as a 
whole. "293 
Finally, there is also some reason for questioning the wisdom of exacting 
judicial review of EPA decisions.294 Commentators increasingly believe that 
the benefits of such review may have been overstated and the harms 
Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye at 46 (cited in note 164); Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the 
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum L Rev 452, 509 (1989). 
288. Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 510 n248 (cited in note 287); Arthur MacMahon, Congressional 
Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse, in Theodore J. Lowi, ed, Legislative Politics 196 (Little, 
Brown, 2d ed 1965) ("The hazard is that a body like Congress, when it gets into detail, ceases to be 
itself; it acts through a fraction that may be a faction."). In ruling that EPA improperly relied on 
comments made during congressional oversight to support its rulemaking, the D.C. Circuit recently 
commented: "It should go without saying that members of Congress have no power, once a statute 
has been passed, to alter its interpretation by post-hoc 'explanations' of what it means." Hazm'dous 
Waste Treatment Council v EPA, 886 F2d 355, 365 (DC Cir 1989). 
289. Agriculture-Environment and Consumer Appropriations for 1974, Part 5-Environmental 
Protection, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 98th 
Cong, 1st Sess 790 (1973) (testimony of Administrator William Ruckelshaus: "I think one of the 
dilemmas that I am placed in is that I appear before various committees of Congress .... [F]or me to 
try to make a recommendation to any committee of the Congress as to what we ought to do often 
flies right in the face of another committee's claim of jurisdiction."). 
290. Randall L. Clavert, Mark J. Moran & Barry R. Weingast, Congressional Influence over 
Policymaking: The Case of the FTC, in Matthew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Stmcture and 
Policy 514-15 (Cambridge U Press, 1987); see also Comment, The Hatfield Riders: Eliminating the Role of 
the Courts in Environmental Decision l\1aking, 20 Envir L 329, 364, 369 (1990) (authored by Linda M. 
Bolduan) (improper empowerment of special economic interests); Dean Mann, Democratic Politics and 
Environmental Policy, in Kamieniecki, O'Brien & Clarke, eds, Controversies ill Environmental Policy 18-20 
(cited in note 84) (fragmentation enhances ability of environmentalists to influence policy). 
291. Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental /vlind, 1989 
Wis L Rev 463, 505 n 196; see Paul Starobin, Merchallt Marine: "Too Close to its Clients "r, 46 Cong Q 
Wkly Rptr 1559-63 (june II, 1988); but see Jonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, Agenda Control, 
Committee Capture and the Dynamics of Illstitutional Politics, 80 Am Pol Sci Rev 1187, 1202-07 (1986) 
(interest group capture of congressional committee may be short-lived). 
292. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye at 199-200, 208 (cited in note 164); see also Peter Strauss, 
Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 Colum L Rev 427, 450 (1989). 
293. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 164 (cited in note 32) 
(describing House consideration of Superfund legislation); Foreman, Signalsfrom the Hill at 178 (cited 
in note 36) (with multiple overseers, there is "no overall sense of institutional priorities or collective 
endorsement of agency activity"). 
294. See text accompanying notes 152-56. 
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underestimated. Some question the extent to which judicial review prompted 
process changes within the agency that may have improved its decisions.295 
Other commentators question the competency of the courts to second-guess 
the policy judgments and complex technical determinations underlying EPA's 
major regulatory decisions.296 Still others point out that, because courts 
cannot choose the cases brought before them, they, unlike EPA, are unable to 
consider the "complex interactions among various cleanup strategies."297 
Finally, because courts are not in a position to make a considered judgment 
concerning how the agency might best allocate its limited resources among 
competing priorities, court orders force agency choices that may misallocate 
those resources.298 
For all of these reasons, EPA's statutory priorities are diverging from the 
agency's own perception of the relative risks presented by various 
environmental hazards. Agency staff believe that too little attention has been 
paid to certain hazards and, at least in relative terms, too much to others.299 
In addition, the demands for immediate results and agency action made by 
Congress and the courts have left EPA with little room for long-term 
planning, which, as noted above, is an essential aspect of environmental 
protection.30o 
295. Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 Iowa L 
Rev 839, 904-05 (1977); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 241-42 (cited in note 8). 
296. Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 311-12 (cited in note 46) (agency better able to make policy 
decisions); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 14 (cited in note 8) (judge "uniquely unqualified"); 
see generally, Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363 
(1986); Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 Tex L Rev 1243 (1987); 
Justice Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 Houston L Rev 
97, 107-09 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to "Hard Look" Review, 1989 Duke L 
J 538; see also Illinois v Costle, 12 ERC 1597, 1599 (D DC 1979), affd sub nom Citizens for a Belter 
Environment v Costle, 617 F2d 851 (DC Cij- 1980) ("I would urge upon the parties with everything at 
my command, that they consider the appropriateness of continuing to rely on courts to accomplish 
objectives which can only be effectively accomplished in a democracy by resort to the polls .... "). 
297. Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071, 2088 (1990) ("If 
the problems are treated separately, they- will not be treated well."). 
298. Natl Res Council, Decisionmaking at 69 (cited in note 97); Rosemary O'Leary, The Impact of 
Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S. Environmental ProtectIOn Agency, 41 
Admin L Rev 549, 561-64 (1989); see EESI, Statutory' Deadlines at ii (cited in note 49) (court deadlines 
more effective in prompting agency action than statutory deadlines). 
299. EPA's 1987 report, Unfinished BlISiness: A Comparative Assessment of Environmelltal PnOtifies, 
strongly suggests that the agency's priorities have been misdirected. Too little attention has been 
paid to certain hazards and environmental threats (such as hazardous air pollutants and indoor air 
pollutants), while relatively too much attention has been paid to others (including abandoned and 
inactive hazardous waste sites). Id at 95-97; EPA, Reducing Risk at 7 (cited in note 250). See 
generally, CEQ, Sixteenth Annual Report at 27 (cited in note 53); Reitze, 14 ColumJ Envir L at 114-20 
(cited in note 250). 
300. For example, the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act became a "self-
perpetuating crisis" largely because of the absence of any broad, long-term congressional strategy 
concerning how best to manage this nation's generation of hazardous wastes. Landy, Roberts & 
Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 125 (cited in note 32). RCRA's short deadlines did not 
provide the agency with any meaningful opportunity to supply the necessary long-Ierm perspective. 
They instead encouraged lawsuits against the agency, forcing the agency into incremental and 
premature decisions. Other commentators have remarked on the same phenomenon occurring 
within the context of EPA's implementation of the Clean Air Act. See Ackerman & Hassler, Clean 
Coal, Dirty Air at 25 (cited in note 236); Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretioll at 116 (cited in note 37). 
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D. Chilling of Innovation 
The worst result of the current administrative scheme is that it has 
undermined environmental protection by chilling agency and congressional 
innovation. Increased statutory prescription comes at the expense of agency 
discretion and flexibility. 30 I Intense agency oversight, repeated regulatory 
failure, and frequent controversy likewise discourage agency initiative.302 
EPA officials have long recognized the need for administrative 
experimentation and reorganization. Congress, however, has increasingly 
denied the agency the option of exercising administrative innovation. 
Moreover, even when the opportunity remains, EPA officials have often shied 
away from innovation because of actual and anticipated objections from those 
elsewhere in the executive branch, the regulated community, Congress, and 
environmental organizations who are suspicious of the agency's motives. 
For example, Congress's sharp restriction of agency discretion in its 
regulation of hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act 
has apparently prompted the agency to take less action than it might have 
under a more flexible statutory scheme. By mandating what is often 
infeasible, such as disallowing any significant consideration of economic 
costs,303 Congress prompted EPA to do very little.304 EPA chose not to list a 
pollutant as "hazardous" in order to avoid triggering the statute's rigid 
requirements. 305 The agency has consequently acted on only seven out of 
hundreds of toxic air pollutants over the last twenty years,306 leaving the 
others unregulated. 307 
The collision of institutional forces on Capitol Hill exacerbates matters by 
impeding the passage of new legislation. One obvious source of this problem 
is the sheer number of committees with overlapping jurisdiction, which can 
make it extremely difficult to pass a new law or a significant amendment to an 
existing law. For instance, conference committees for environmental statutes 
301. See Paul R. Portney, Overall Assessment and Future Directions, in Portney, Public Policies for 
Environmental Protection at 286 (cited in note 11) ("The most important reason to be concerned about 
this recent trend is that flexibility and discretion are key to really effective environmental 
management. ... [E]nvironmental problems are too diverse and complex for the use of uniform, 
across-the-board solutions ... ); see also Gene A. Lucero, Response to j. William Futrell, 24 Houston L 
Rev 143, 146 (1987) (Congress placed restriction on mixed funding settlement under CERCLA 
because of distrust of EPA). 
302. See, for example, EPA, Program at a Crossroads at 8-9 (cited in note 110) (describing how 
intensive congressional oversight limited agency flexibility in RCRA implementation). 
303. See Graham, 1985 Duke L J at 123, 130-32 (cited in note 190). 
304. See EPA's Air Pollution Control Program: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigation of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 17-18 
(1983) (testimony of EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus) ("Where the mandates ... appear to 
suggest unfeasible programs, they tend to slow down, to 'study the problem', as the saying goes. "); 
see generally Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 251-60 (cited in note 46). 
305. Graham, 1985 Duke L J at 117, 124 (cited in note 190). 
306. See S Rep No 101-490, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 151 (1990). 
307. Congressional efforts to force EPA's listing of particular pollutants have not been especially 
effective. These efforts have led to disruptive litigation, compelled agency determinations in the 
absence of adequate scientific information, and diverted EPA resources from other problems (and 
other hazardous air pollutants). which might be more pressing. Id; Graham, 1985 Duke LJ at 126-27 
(cited in note 190). 
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are often so large that they are unwieldy. Former EPA Administrator Lee 
Thomas described his "disgust" with the process of reauthorizing CERCLA in 
1986: "We have six different committees on the House side and three or four 
on the Senate side and they all have created a camel that they are trying to 
make a race horse of. The end result is that they have spent a lot of time 
looking for a room big enough to hold everybody. "308 Efforts to amend the 
Clean Air Act in 1990 similarly became bogged down when nine senators and 
132 members of the House were appointed to the conference committee.309 
The legislation that finally emerges, as happened with the Clean Air Act, 
reflects an amalgam of special interests considerations rather than a coherent 
and comprehensive approach to the problem of air pollution.3lO 
There are other casualties. EPA was long impeded in its efforts to develop 
an administrative program to address acid rain.311 There has been little 
concerted action to address global warming or indoor air pollution. Even a 
matter so seemingly uncontroversial as elevation of EPA to cabinet status, 
which had bipartisan support,312 became a victim of the same clash of 
institutional forces. Congress may pass the legislation sometime soon, but it 
will be long after the planned Earth Day 1990 (April 22) announcement. Like 
every other environmental initiative in recent years, the legislation became 
bogged down when controversies originating from the ongoing battle for 
control over EPA nearly overwhelmed the bill. President Bush threatened a 
veto when Congress proposed making the director of a "Bureau of 
Environmental Statistics" free from plenary presidential control,313 And 
there was widespread rebellion among certain congressional committees, 
OMB, environmentalists, and the regulated community concerning the 
proposed creation of a presidential commission to study administrative 
reorganization of federal environmental protection. All feared that any 
308. Fiscal Year 1987 Appropriations Hearing at 160 (cited in note 204); see Atkeson, et ai, 16 
Envir L Rptr at 10369 (cited in note 189) (SARA conference in House and Senate took six months, 
and involved 19 Senators and 53 members of the House from II different committees) . 
309. Lengthy List of House Con[erm Promises an Unwieldy CAA Conference. Most Say, II Inside EPA 13 
Ouly 6, 1990). 
310. Glicksman & Schroeder, 54 L & Con temp Probs at 285-86 (cited in note 39). Although 
fragmentation most often impedes passage of effective legislation, it may also, on rare occasions, 
actually facilitate passage of ground breaking legislation that might otherwise have little chance of 
being enacted. Thus, when Senator Muskie effectively used his Air and Water Pollution 
Subcommittee to promote his aspirations for higher office though the Clean Air Act of 1970, 
fragmentation may actually have been a necessary feature of the background of the Air Act's passage. 
See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward A Theory Of Statutm)' Evolution: 
The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J L Econ & Org 313,334 (1985). 
311. Vig & Kraft, eds, Environmental Policy in the J 980s at 365 (cited in note 21) (epilogue); see 
Philip Shabecoff, Monitoling the Cleanup at the EPA; RuckelshallS Postpones Plans to Curb Acid Rain, NY 
Times A 16 (Oct 23, 1983). 
312. See Philip Shabecoff, BlISh Would Agree to Elevate E.PA., NY Times Al col lOan 22, 1990). 
313. See HR Rep No 10 1- 428, 10 I st Cong, 2d Sess 25-29 (1990) (discussing proposed Bureau); 
House Ovenl,helmingly Passes EPA Cabinet Bill Despite White House Veto Threat, II Inside EPA 4-5 (April 6, 
1990) (Bush veto threat). 
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reorganization might adversely affect their jurisdiction, access, and ultimately 
their influence over the agency's operations.314 
The significance of the pall of suspicion that has been cast over EPA 
initiatives and new legislative proposals. extends, moreover, far beyond 
impeding presidential commissions. One of the most damaging effects may 
have been its thwarting of any meaningful EPA effort to implement a cross-
media approach, despite longstanding support for it within government and 
among commentators.315 As EPA's first administrator, William Ruckelshaus 
decided against organizing the agency along functional lines, which would 
have facilitated cross-media approaches, because of the possibility of 
engendering controversy in Congress.316 Ruckelshaus had early on borne the 
314. During the summer of 1990, Senate majority leader George Mitchell sought to break the 
legislative logjam related to internal disputes over turf between the Senate Government Affairs 
Committee, from which the bill originated in the Senate, and several Senate committees (Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation; Environment and Public Works; and Energy and Natural Resources), 
each of which had placed a "hold" on the bill because of their concern with its possible impact on 
their jurisdiction. See Majority Leader Intervenes to Break Senate Deadlock Over EPA Elevation Bill, II 
Inside EPA 3 Uune 8, 1990). Similar committee jurisdictional concerns led to the defeat of President 
Nixon's proposal in 1971 to create four "supercabinets," including a Department of Natural 
Resources, see Dodd & Schott, Congress and the Administrative State at 341 (cited in note 162), and have 
similarly thwarted efforts before and since to reorganize the federal natural resources administrative 
framework. See Harold Seidman. Politics. Position, and Power 46 (Oxford U Press, 2d ed 1975); Susan 
Abbasi, Environmental and Natural Resources Reorganization (Cong Res Serv, Feb 15. 1978) (Issue Brief 
No 1877106). See generally. Seidman, Politics. Position and Power at 37 (cited earlier in this note); 
Wilson, Bureaucracy at 221-22 (cited in note 16) (innovation always resisted by vested organizations). 
The issue that ultimately prevented passage of the EPA Cabinet legislation in 1990 concerned 
whether states should be allowed to impose civil penalties on federal facilities to force their cleanup 
of hazardous waste. See Michael Weiskopf. Drive to Elevate EPA to Cabinet is Stalled: Peripheral Issues 
Create Stalemate Between White House and Congress, Washington Post A 19 col 2 (Oct 12. 1990); EPA 
Cabinet Bill Dead This Year, Some Fault Administration Inaction, 11 Inside EPA 3 (Nov 2, 1990). The same 
issue threatens passage of legislation elevating EPA this year (see Dingell. Commitment to Federal 
Facilities Provision. May Doom Cabinet Bill, 12 Inside EPA 19 (April 5, 1991)), but by late 1991 some 
form of legislation elevating the agency seemed ready to pass. On October I, 1991, the Senate 
passed a "stripped-down" version of earlier bills. which eliminated some of the more contoversial 
provisions. See 137 Cong Rec SI4012-32; Senate Passes EPA Cabinet-Level Bill, Adds Amendment on 
Statistics and Confidentiality. 22 Envir Rptr CUff Dev (BNA) 1407 (Oct 4, 1991). The House had not yet 
acted on the legislation at the time this article went to press. 
315. See Reorganization Plan No 3 (cited in note 2) ("environment must be perceived as a single, 
interrelated system"); Guruswamy, 1989 Wis L Rev 463 (cited in note 291); Lakshman Guruswamy, 
Integrated Pollution Control: The Way Forward, 7 Ariz J Inti & Comp L 173-202 (1990) (statement of EPA 
Administrator Lee Thomas) ("If the EPA is ever going to live up to its name in the fullest sense. if it 
is going to become more than a holding company for single medium programs. we are going to have 
to re-examine the roots of environmental policy."); Frances H. Irwin, Could There Be A Beller Law, 15 
EPA J 20-23 (1989); Marcus, Promise and Perfomwnce at 9-10 (cited in note II); Landy. Roberts & 
Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 35 (cited in note 32); Single Statute Pushed by Reilly to Replace 
Existing Environmental Laws, 20 Envir Rptr CUff Dev (BNA) 1351 (Dec I, 1989). A recent article 
outlines the basic disadvantages of a fragmented approach; these disadvantages include 
consideration of the impact of various inputs in the creation of residuals. holding the end product 
accountable for harmful residuals, looking at problems created by transfers from one medium to 
another. and dividing waste between three media to make optimal use of assimilative capacity of 
each. See Guruswamy. 1989 Wis L Rev at 472-76 (cited in note 291). Professor Guruswamy 
eloquently argues that the agency should implement a cross-media approach by organizing itself 
along functional lines and abolishing its media-specific offices. Id at 536. See also Lakshman 
Guruswamy. The Case of /nlegmled Pol/Illioll COlllrol. 54 L & COnlemp Probs 41 (Autumn 1991). 
316. Ralph Nader's organization at the time appeared to be suspiciolls of an integrated approach 
and agency capture and. for this reason. promoted the more fragmented, media-specific approach. 
Guruswamy. 1989 Wis L Rev at 487 (cited in note 291); see also Barry G. Rabe. Fragmelltatioll alld 
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brunt of what he viewed to be a congressional misconstruing of agency 
motives, fueled by disgruntled agency employees. 317 Once bitten, he shied 
away from other possible confrontations,318 arguably at the expense of 
implementing a far more rational and effective approach to pollution 
control. 319 
In addition, Ruckelshaus created a distinct problem for the agency by 
adopting what was supposed to be a temporary compromise approach under 
which functional and media-specific offices would exist side by side. The 
agency's persistent inability to move to a fully integrated organizational 
scheme has impeded effective decisionmaking. There is necessarily 
overlapping authority within the agency on all issues, and there has been a 
tendency for the two sides to take different approaches; the media-specific 
offices look to Congress for its signals, while the functionally defined offices 
look more to the executive branch.320 There is also a clash of disciplinary 
perspectives. 321 The effect has been conflict and a decisionmaking process 
encumbered by efforts to include all interested parties within the agency in 
the process.322 It is settled EPA lore that internal agency meetings typically 
include fifty to one hundred of the agency's employees most expert on the 
issue to be debated. Not only are there multiple representatives from both 
the functional and media-specific offices but also individuals from the relevant 
regional and enforcement offices and from the General Counsel's office. 
Other significant agency initiatives that have been impeded include the 
development of pollution prevention and market incentive programs. Both 
schemes hold considerable promise for improving environmental quality at 
lower cost. 323 Each promotes the elimination of pollution at the source 
instead of through more costly end-of-pipe treatment. Both initiatives, 
however, depend on a departure from the command and control scheme for 
pollution control that has been the legislative touchstone for safeguarding 
against agency capture and neglect. 324 More specifically, each requires 
providing the federal environmental agency with more discretion and 
flexibility to respond to case-specific factors. 325 The existing polarization of 
Integration in State Environmentall'danagement 126-27 (Conservation Foundation, 1986) (environmental 
agencies and professionals, congressional committees, and environmental advocacy groups all had 
vested interests in the existing media-specific program and inherent suspicion of change). 
317. Guruswamy, 1989 Wis L Rev 463 at 489 (cited in note 291). 
318. Marcus, Promise and Performance at 105-06 (cited in note II). 
319. The federal environmental statutes also discouraged a cross-media approach by focusing on 
specific media. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act IVorks Badly, 129 U Pa L Rev 1059, 
1069-70 (1981). 
320. Marcus, Promise and Performance at 101, 109 (cited in note II). 
321. McGarity, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 62-64 (cited in note 272). 
322. Id. 
323. See EPA, Reducing Risk at 22 (cited in note 250). 
324. Howard Latin, Ideal Verslls Real Reglliatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
"Fille-Tllning" Reglliatory Refonns, 37 Stan L Rev 1267, 1271 (1985). 
325. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewarl. Reforming Environmental Law. 37 Stan 
L Rev 1333 (1985); Schultze, The Public C'Je of the Private Illtemt at 26-27 (cited in note 72); Stewarl, 69 
Cal L Rev at 1265. 1274-77 (cited in note 37); see also Davies & Davies. The Politirs of POl/lltiOIl at 227 
(cited in note II). 
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institutional forces has, however, prevented any meaningful effort to 
implement these alternative approaches.326 Many, but not all, 
environmentalists commonly equate any consideration of economics in the 
establishment of environmental standards or the use of market incentives for 
their achievement with caving in to industry.327 Hence, any agency step in 
that direction is typically met by a charge that the agency is undermining its 
public trust. Similarly, individual members of Congress have been so 
suspicious of EPA motives that a conflict has recently arisen with the agency 
concerning how best to organize the agency internally in order to emphasize 
pollution prevention.328 
v 
CONCLUSION 
REVERSING THE CYCLE: INSTILLING TRUST AND PROMOTING INNOVATION 
Reversing the current pathological cycle of regulatory failure, crisis, and 
controversy will not be easy. Indeed, to some extent, the problems that have 
been realized in the implementation of federal environmental law bear an 
uneasy resemblance to those forecasted by William Ophuls in his impressive, 
albeit gloomy, essay, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity.329 In that work, Ophuls 
suggested that democracy might have great difficulty fashioning technological 
solutions to the problems presented by ecological scarcity. He identified the 
potential problems associated with fragmented and dispersed policymaking 
responsibility; in particular, he questioned whether the public and its elected 
officials would be competent to make the correct technological decisions.33o 
Fragmentation of authority and the gap that Ophuls intimated might 
develop between technical "experts," on the one hand, and the public and its 
elected representatives, on the other, apparently emerged. The issues are 
complicated and perhaps too complex for many members of the public to 
grasp. Moreover, because the benefits of environmental controls are realized 
over generations while the cost to society is immediate, few politicians are 
likely to have the electoral incentives necessary to embrace the kinds of 
societal changes now needed. Finally, interest group politics, which have 
rooted themselves deeply into modern democratic political processes, 
326. Congress did. however. enact a limited pollution prevention bill in the closing moments of 
the 10 I st Congress. entitled the "Pollution Prevention Act of 1990." See Pub L No 10 1-508. 
§§ 6601 el seq. 104 Stat 1388 (1990); 136 Cong Rec HI2517 (Oct 26.1990). The new law provides 
for the establishment of an "Office of Pollution Prevention" within EPA and for that office to create a 
strategy to promote source reduction. The law also requires designated facilities to report on their 
level of source reduction and recycling. 
327. Portney. ed. Public Policies Jar Environmental Protection at 128. 147 (cited in note II); Carol M. 
Rose. Environmental Fallst SlIccumbs to Temptations oj Economic iHephistopheles. Or. Va/lie By An)' Other Name 
Is Preference. 87 Mich L Rev 1631. 1632-35 (1989). Environmentalists who work with industry are 
similarly susceptible to such charges. See EDF"s Cooperative Approach To Industl)' Drauos Fire Among 
Environmentalists. II Inside EPA 3 (Aug 24. 1990). 
328. See r.on!5'·essmPII tn Push .\landatol)' High-Level EPA Pol/utioll Prevention Office, 10 Inside EPA 5 
(Nov 3. 1989). 
329. William Ophuls. f:mlogy and the Politics oj Scanit)' (W. H. Freeman & Co .. 1977). 
330. Id at 159-63. 193-95. 
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exacerbate the problem by promoting incremental, fragmented 
decisionmaking. 
In his essay, Ophuls presented what many might view as a Hobson's 
choice: either deemphasize technological solutions to environmental 
problems or replace democratic processes with elitist decisionmaking 
institutions. 331 The choice, however, need not be so stark. Other valuable 
reforms can be undertaken; their implementation will engender resistance but 
not nearly to the same degree as Ophuls' choices, and some may succeed. 
One such reform would be to reduce the level of distrust directed at EPA 
by other governmental institutions. Much of the distrust is derived from an 
intellectual mistake concerning the possibility of EPA's capture. Second, 
some of the unintended organizational mistakes of the past need to be 
redressed. With the benefit of hindsight, we can better organize the federal 
environmental protection agency, reducing conflict and facilitating 
environmental decisionmaking by the government. Finally, the existing gap 
between public aspirations for environmental quality and public 
understanding of the issues needs to be bridged, as does the gulf between 
public and agency perceptions concerning the nature of environmental risk. 
A. Dispelling the Myth of Agency Capture 
Much of the momentum behind the constant clashes that have marked 
EPA's existence originates in concerns about agency capture.332 These 
concerns have been needlessly destructive of effective environmental 
protection. There is good reason to believe that the risk of agency capture 
would be slight, even without the intense oversight mechanisms that various 
competing factions have utilized to prevent capture. Indeed, the only 
plausible justification for the intensity of each of those mechanisms is the 
threat now presented by the excesses of the others. For instance, OMB 
justifies its intense oversight as a necessary response to congressional 
supervision, while Congress justifies the intensity of its oversight in part as a 
response to the supervision of OMB. 
No single interest group is likely to capture an agency with characteristics 
similar to those of EPA. Unlike the agencies considered by the original 
agency capture theorists, EPA has a "social mission"; and unlike agencies 
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, EPA does not manage a 
distinct kind of economic activity. EPA is subject to a complex set of 
constituencies. There is no single dominant interest that threatens to capture 
the agency.333 
331. Id at 159-63. Ophuls also describes the choice as being between "the minimal, frugal steady 
state," and "a degraded and tyrannical version of the steady state," and he warns that the latter "may 
become almost inevitable" if there is too much delay in our moving towards the former. Id at 243. 
332. See text accompanying notes 10-41. 
333. Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 278, 309- IO (cited in note 46). 
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Contrary to the assumption of agency capture theory,334 public interest in 
environmental issues has not been fleeting. 335 National environmental 
organizations have enjoyed sustained public support. Technological advances 
have greatly enhanced the ability of such citizen groups to marshall public 
support and to influence agency decisionmaking.336 And, conversely, the 
agency is itself capable of avoiding decay and capture by enlisting the 
environmental organizations in support of controversial agency actions.337 
In the case of environmental protection, the regulated community or 
industry does not speak with one voice, as agency capture theory assumes. 
Because environmental protection laws sweep so broadly, those affected are 
an exceedingly diverse group. Accordingly, their interests frequently conflict, 
making capture improbable.338 Companies that have already invested 
substantial sums in pollution control are less likely, for instance, to support 
the relaxation of restrictions that would result in their competitors avoiding 
similar expenditures. 339 Such companies generally desire regulatory 
stability.340 The manufacturers of pollution control equipment, a sizeable 
industry in itself, resist deregulatory efforts, as do states and localities, which 
have become dependent on federal largesse in aiding their own pollution 
control efforts. 341 
In addition, because employees of agencies like EPA tend to share the 
agency's social mission,342 the agency staff is less susceptible to ideological 
conversion by those regulated.343 Indeed, quite the opposite might be true. 
334. Paul]. Quirk,lndustry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies 14 (Princeton U Press, 1981). 
335. Professor Jaffe, with characteristic omniscience, predicted that it would be "suicidal for the 
agencies to ignore ... " environmental protection, given the depth of public sentiment on the issue. 
Louis L. Jaffe, The Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Administrative Limitations in a Political Selling, 
II BC Indust & Comm L Rev 565, 569 (1970). The impact of President Reagan's misreading of 
public opinion on the experiences of both Anne Gorsuch and James Watt testifies to the correctness 
of jaffe's assertion. See George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagle, "Nothing Beside Remains ": The 
Legal Legacy of james C. Wall's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior 071 Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 BC Envir 
Aff L Rev 473, 545- 46 (1990); see also Robert C. Mitchell, Public Opinion and Environmental Politics in 
the 1970s and 1980s, in Vig & Kraft, eds, Environmental Policies in the 1980s at 70-71 (cited in note 21) 
(discussing Reagan's misapprehension of public sentiment on environmental issues). 
336. Guruswamy, 1989 Wis L Rev at 531 (cited in note 291); Paul Sabatier, Social Movements and 
Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More Adequate and Less Pessimistic Theory of "Clientele Captllre, " 6 Policy 
Sciences 301, 318 (1975); Wilson, Bureaucracy at 83-84 (cited in note 16). 
337. See Paul Culhane, Federal Age11C)' Organizational Change in Response to Environmentalism, 2 
HumboldtJ Soc Rei 31, 37 (1974); Sabatier, Sociall'vlovements alld Regulatory Agencies at 304-05 (cited in 
note 336). 
338. Ackerman & Hassler, Clean Coal, Dirty Air at 119-20 (cited in note 236) (argues that there will 
always be some economic actors aligning themselves with environmentalists to try to impose 
pollution control costs on their competitors); Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 310 (cited in note 46); Quirk, 
Industry Influence at 13-14 (cited in note 334). 
339. Foreman. Signals from the Hill at 37 (cited in note 36); see also Coggins & Nagle, 17 BC Envir 
Aff L Rev at 545-50 (cited in note 335). 
340. See Stanfield, 18 Natl LJ at 392 (cited in note 124). Hence, as EPA became more unstable 
under Anne Gorsuch, industry withdrew its support, notwithstanding its sharing of her deregulatory 
philosophy. See note 232. 
341. Davies & Davies. The PolitiCJ of Polllltion at 114 (cited in note II). 
342. Wilson, BllrPflllrrar,l' at 66-67 (cited in note 16); see text accompanying note 265. 
343. For this same reason, the career staff at EPA is less susceptible to Professor Sax's concern 
that agencies will bargain away environmental values over time in a series of political compromises. 
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The greater risk could be their tendency to discount the needs of the 
regulated,344 which serve as a useful counterweight to the inherent difficulty 
of evaluating environmental benefits. 345 Nor, contrary to agency capture 
theory,346 does there appear to be any significant threat of agency corruption 
presented by the lure of career opportunities in the private sector. Past 
experience indicates that agency employees enhance their employment 
prospects by engaging in more aggressive action, rather than by appearing to 
coddle future employers.347 
Finally, there may also be reason to question the traditional agency 
capture concerns underlying heightened judicial review of EPA 
decisionmaking. As one commentator has pointed out, the empirical data 
upon which the "new era of administrative law" was based looked mostly to 
"entrenched bureaucracies administering well-established programs. "348 
Such agencies were faulted for failing to consider innovative techniques and 
for their relative timidity.349 EPA has never shown a systematic bias in favor 
of underachievement (fairly measured). 
It is nevertheless difficult to be optimistic that oversight of EPA will 
become less intense or adversarial in the near future. To be sure, the 
judiciary already appears to have cut back on the degree of its scrutiny of 
agency decisionmaking. 350 And there is reason to believe that Congress may 
See notes 18-20 and accompanying text; Sax, Defending the Environment at 240 (cited in note 18) 
(noting that "the question we must ask ourselves is whether we are prepared to leave the public 
interest to hired hands"). Sax, who wrote his book before the creation of EPA, overestimates the 
value of judicial review and underestimates the significance of career staff; after all, the career staff 
supplied the information that was critical to the favorable judicial outcome in the case study that 
serves as the initial focus for Sax's thesis. See id at 21-30. The agency staff, not the court, is the true 
unsung hero in the narrative. Nevertheless, Professor Sax's thesis is the one among the various 
capture theories that appears to have continuing force even with EPA, although less than his 
argument might suggest. 
344. Murray L. Weidenbaum, Business, Government, and the Public 21 (Prentice-Hall, 3d ed 1981). 
345. The extent to which an agency employee's ideology affects her behavior within the agency is 
also far from clear. See Wilson, Bureaucracy at 51 (cited in note 16). 
346. Quirk, Industry Influence at 164 (cited in note 334). 
347. Id at 164-65, 172; Wilson, Bureaucracy at 86-87 (cited in note 16). My own observations of 
the field of environmental law are consistent with this view. The demand for environmental 
expertise has historically been so great (because enforcement has been so aggressive) that high-
ranking governmental officials have enjoyed a bevy of job opportunities in the private sector. 
Similarly. there have been many instances of those in environmental groups moving to the private 
sector, notwithstanding their longstanding resistance of the short-term economic interests of 
industry. See, for example, Transitions, 7 Envir Forum 33 (Sep/Oct 1990) (reporting on the move of 
former senior attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council's ("NRDC's") toxic substances 
program to Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison); Peter Carbonara, The Greening of Waste 
.Hanagemellt, 12 Am Lawyer 42 (Dec 1990) (description of former NRDC lawyer working for major 
cOl'poration): \V.John Moore, Greens Moving to Greener Pasture, 23 NatlJ 746 (March 30,1991) (NRDC 
co-founder joining O'Melveny & Myers law firm as partner). 
348. Melnick, Regulation alld the Courts at 3 (cited in note 8). 
349. Id at 3- 4. 
350. Glicksman & Schroeder. 54 L & Contemp Probs at 296 (cited in note 39); Shapiro & 
Glicksman. 19&8 Duke q at 845-63 (cited in note 185). Professors Shapiro and Glicksman posit that 
Congress increased its own oversight and prescription partly in response to reduced judicial 
oversight without recognizing the connection between the judicial and legislative review. Id at 820-
21. In an article in this symposium. Prufesso:'s Glicksman and Schroeder argue in favor of 
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succeed in reducing OMB's excesses,351 which may have the incidental effect 
of reducing Congress's incentive to engag'e in an unhealthy escalating 
competition with OMB for agency control. 
The more likely result, however, is that Congress will prove to be a much 
tougher nut to crack. A shift in judicial philosophy has resulted because of the 
power of presidential appointment of federal judges. And if a change occurs 
with regard to OMB oversight, it will be because of Congress's great power 
over the purse strings. Realistically, there is currently no such countervailing 
authority in a position to compel Congress to change its ways. 
Virtually every administrator has complained about the phenomena of 
fragmented congressional jurisdiction over EPA's programs, excessive 
congressional oversight, and the harm caused by the imposition of unrealistic 
deadlines.352 Despit~ the administrators' urging, the legislators have shown 
little disposition to improve the situation.353 Nor do the lawmakers appear to 
have any particular incentive to do SO.354 Jurisdiction to oversee EPA 
provides an individual member of Congress with greater access to the news 
media, which is naturally attracted to the conflict and controversy associated 
moderately aggressive judicial review. Glicksman & Schroeder, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 309 (cited 
in note 39). 
351. Congress is presently considering legislation that would impose public disclosure of the 
particulars of OMB review of agency rules, set deadlines for the completion of OMB review, and 
require wrinen explanation of all changes made by EPA to a rule in response to OMB comments. 
See House Panel Acts to Curb OM B Powers, Establish Federal InfomlOtion Policies, 21 Envir Rptr Curr Dev 
(BNA) 1894 (March 23, 1990) (discussing HR 3695). President Bush may promulgate an executive 
order limiting OMB review in an effort to defuse any such legislative initiative. See Congress, White 
HOllse Agree on Executive Order to Limit 0/11B Review oj EPA Regs, II Inside EPA 3 Ouly 20, 1990); see 
also note 134. 
352. See Bower & Christenson, Public Management: Text and Cases at 114-15 (cited in note 14); 
Douglas M. Costle, A Regulator'S Path Isn't a Rose Garden, NY Times E21 (April 24. 1983); Abbon, 39 
Admin L Rev at 204 (cited in note 280); Environmental Policy Division, Congressional Research 
Service of the Library of Congress, Congress and the Nation's Environment, Environmental and 
Natural Resources Affairs of the 92nd Congress, Senate Comminee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
93d Cong, 1st Sess 845 (1973); Peggy Wiehl, Ruckelshalls and EPA 13 (Harv JFK School of GoV!, 
1974); Reilly, The Turning Point at 1389 (cited in note 51). In 1978, the Administrative Conference 
recommended two alternatives to the type of rigid statutory deadlines that typify the federal 
environmental protection laws: (I) "Congress could by statute require agencies to establish their 
own deadlines for agency decision making [which] would allow the agency (and also the oversight 
committees in the Congress) to monitor and review the agency's performance"; and (2) "Congress 
could assign a similar role to a statutory limit by providing that the time limit was not a matter of 
legal obligation but only established the normal time period during which Congress expected the 
agency to act." Edward A. Tomlinson, Report on The Experience oj Vmio/lS Agencies With Statutol), Time 
Limits Applimble To Licensing Or Clearance Functions And To Rulemaking, in Administrative Conference oj the 
United States, Recommendations and Reports 122 (Govt Printing Office, 1978). 
353. Congress made some initial efforts in the mid-1970s to restructure its comminee jurisdiction 
to diminish fragmentation of authority over environmental maners, Although the Senate did achieve 
some consolidation with the creation of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public 
Works, a similar effort was defeated in the House, and fragmentation persists in both chambers 
today. See Dodd.& Schott, Congress and ;he Administrative State at 186-88 (cited in note 162); History of 
the Senate Comminee on Environment and Public Works at 14-18 (cited in note 168). An earlier, 
more modest effort to create a joint committee on the environment likewise never bore fruit. See 
Environmelllal Policy Division at 833-36 (cited in note 38), 
354. Dodd & Schott, Congms and the Administrative State at 273. 326 (cited in note 162). 
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with EPA.355 It also provides the legislator with enhanced leverage over the 
agency when responding to constituent concerns. 
Hence, persuading the legislators that their initial agency capture concerns 
were largely illusory is unlikely to make much of an impression on the 
congressional psyche. Agency capture concerns have been replaced by 
interest group politics; and the latter and subcommittee government have 
formed a strong bond likely to resist successfully any efforts to reduce 
oversight through centralization and consolidation of EPA jurisdiction. Only 
across-the-board reform of congressional practices is likely to be sufficient, 
and there is nothing on the political horizon that appears likely to prompt 
such a dramatic and uncharacteristically altruistic step by Congress.356 
B. Reorganizing the Institutional Framework for Federal Environmental 
Protection to Eliminate the Vestiges of Distrust 
The practical hurdles that may prevent congressional reorganization of its 
own d~cisionmaking processes with regard to federal environmental policy 
need not preclude Congress and the White House from now revisiting how 
best to organize and structure a federal environmental agency. As described 
above, many of the compromises made by the White House in designing EPA 
in 1970 were made for narrow political reasons. These compromises have 
hindered EPA's operations and its delivery of federal environmental 
protection. It is now time for their undoing. 
President Nixon rejected the option of making EPA a cabinet agency. As 
members of both parties now appear to recognize, EPA should be elevated to 
cabinet status.357 Contrary to what some might think, EPA's elevation would 
not be mere window dressing. It could provide a meaningful opportunity for 
agency renewal and a fitting occasion for reversing the pathological cycle of 
distrust that has plagued the agency over the last twenty years. 
For example, the endorsement of the agency's mission implicit in such an 
elevation in status would likely reinvigorate the agency. Agency morale could 
355. Id. See also NAPA, Oversight Study at 12 (cited in note 162). The increase ill congressional 
oversight of EPA partly may have reflected a response to the 1982 elections in which there appeared 
to be a significant "green vote'" backlash to Secretary of the Interior Watt and EPA Administrator 
Gorsuch. See Michael E. Kraft, A New Environmental Political Agenda: The 1980 Presidential Campaign 
and Its Aftermath, in Vig & Kraft, eds, Environmental Policies in the 1980s at 45-47,67-70 (cited in note 
21). Elected representatives prefer high visibility committees with jurisdiction over pressing national 
issues like environmental protection. See Barbara Sinclair, The Distribution of Commillee PositiollJ in the 
United States Senate: Explaining 11lJtitutionai Change, 32 Am] Pol Sci 276, 297 (1988); see also Charles S. 
Bullock, United States Senate Commillee Assi{!1lments: P;4erence, Motivation, and Success, 29 Am] Pol Sci 789 
(1985). 
356. I address the issue of congressional oversight and the kinds of reforms that would be 
necessary in greater depth later in this same symposium issue in Lazarus, 54 L & Contemp Probs 205 
(cited in note 161). The National Academy of Public Administration recently issued a report in which 
it studied congressional oversight of several agencies, including EPA, and made a series of 
recommendations for congressional reform of its oversight practices. Those recommendations seek, 
inter alia, to address problems caused by fragmented committee jurisdiction and by the absence of 
systematic, coordinated oversight. See generally NAPA, Oversight Study (cited in note 162). 
357. At the time this symposium issue went to press, Congress seemed close LO passing the 
needed legislation. See note 314. 
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significantly improve, which would in turn enhance employee retention and 
recruitment.358 It would also have the added benefit of ameliorating some of 
the agency's historical problems. The agency's leverage within the executive 
branch would be greater, making it theoretically less subject to OMB's 
influence and . providing the agency head with more ready access to the 
President when controversies arise.359 In addition, because EPA's elevation 
would increase the prestige and visibility of a presidential appointment at the 
new agency, the reorganization might make it more likely that those 
nominated and confirmed to top positions are reasonably capable.360 
The creation of a cabinet-level EPA would be one important step, but 
more would be necessary to redress the institutional vestiges of past political 
compromises. In particular, fragmentation of environmental protection 
authority within the executive branch needs to be reduced. To be sure, 
fragmentation probably can never be eliminated, given the huge scope of 
activities affecting environmental quality.361 But the degree of fragmentation 
can be substantially lessened, with a concomitant increase in integration and 
decrease in interagency conflict. 
To that end, serious consideration should now be given to transferring to 
the new department the various pollution control activities that have 
remained in agencies other than EPA. The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Agency ("NOAA") is a good example. NOAA is currently within 
the Department of Commerce largely as a byproduct of President Nixon's 
1970 compromise with Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, who was 
concerned about Nixon's creation of EPA.362 It would seem sensible to 
combine EPA's and NOAA's two jurisdictions in one cabinet department.363 
A strong argument can likewise be made in favor of merging into that same 
358. No less significant in terms of boosting agency morale, self-confidence, and employee 
recruitment would be moving the agency to a new, less depressing physical loqltion. All who have 
worked or spent any significant time at the agency recognize the need for such a move, whic~ seems 
increasingly likely. See Nomination of William K. Reilly at 145 (cited in note 35); see also EPA 
Employees File $35 Million Negligence Suit Alleging Air In Workplace Is Contaminated, 5 Toxics L Rptr 847 
(Dec 5, 1990) (Bahura v S.E. W Investors, No 90-CA 10594 (DC Super Ct, answer filed Oct 26, 1990)). 
359. The problems associated with the absence of cabinet status were compounded under Anne 
Gorsuch; the EPA, lacking cabinet status, was not a member of the president's Cabinet Council on 
Natural Resources, which was chaired by Interior Secretary Watt. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, 
EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 248 (cited in note 32). In addition, although Administrator Reilly 
has been invited to sit at cabinet meetings, see Trip Gabriel, The Greening oj the White House, NY Times 
Magazine 25 (August 13, 1989); Nomination of William K. Reilly at 41-42 (cited in note 35), these 
invitations are not the equivalent of regular membership in the cabinet. Invitees are aware of their 
status and rarely volunteer comments. Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power at 210 (cited in note 314). 
360. See Lash, Gillman & Sheridan, A Season oj Spoils at 10 (cited in note 214); Note on the EPA 
under Administrator Anne Gorsuch 3 (Harv JFK School of Govt, 1984) (N 16-84-587) (Gorsuch reportedly 
upgraded when others rejected job). 
361. Davies & Davies, The Politics oj Pollution at 118 (cited in note II); see also Guruswamy, 1989 
Wis L Rev at 483 n91 (cited in note 291). 
362. See text accompanying notes 24, 26. 
363. Congress is presently contemplating placing NOAA within the new Department of 
Environmental Protection. Several former NOAA officials testified before Congress in May 1990 that 
such a shift would assist NOAA. Ironically, one of the larger remaining hurdles is congressional 
committee jurisdiction. Congress Begills Talks 011 Making .VOAA Part oj EPA, More Likely Staff Sa)'s, II 
Inside EPA 9-10 (May 18, 1990) ("One EPA source suggests a merger of EPA and NOAA could have 
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department another relic of past political compromise: the Army Corps of 
Engineers' jurisdiction over wetland pollution.364 Other areas of federal 
environmental protection jurisdiction whose transfer to a Department of 
Environmental Protection could achieve greater integration and reduce 
conflict include: surface mining control at the Office of Surface Mining in the 
Department of the Interior, endangered species protection at the Fish and 
Wildlife Service in Interior, remaining' parts of the pesticides program still at 
Agriculture and elsewhere,365 and pollution control aspects of scattered 
programs within the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. Greater consolidation of authority is needed if the new 
department is going to fulfill its stated mission of being responsible for 
fashioning pollution control standards, including those ultimately applicable 
to federal as well as private activities. 
Within the existing agency, a shift in perspective may now be in order. 
While the current media-specific, command and control approach has 
certainly achieved much success, the returns are diminishing. The current 
system is very inefficient, at times counterproductive, and ultimately defended 
as the most we can do in a "second-best" world. The perceived advantages of 
organizing the agency by function to facilitate a cross-media approach may be 
substantial; and, even if overstated,366 they are promising enough to be 
worthy of greater emphasis and experimentation.367 
One lesson of the last twenty years is that such a programmatic shift may 
also diminish the conflicts underlying EPA's pattern of regulatory failure. 
Much of that conflict is invited by each decisionmaking unit considering the 
impact of its decision only on one specific medium, to the detriment of 
different media about which a different decisionmaking unit is concerned. 
EPA's current organization exacerbates the problem by promoting further 
conflict between decisionmaking units by organizing them (in parallel) based 
on both media and function. 368 Reorganizing the agency by function to 
facilitate a cross-media approach would likely eliminate many of these past 
sources of conflict and facilitate and expedite agency decisionmaking. 
taken place a dozen years ago if advocates could have found a way around committee 'parochialism' 
that leads members of Congress to defend their committee's jurisdiction at all costs."). 
364. Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Fedl'ral Wetlands Protection Cnder the Clean Water Act: 
Regulating Ambivalence. Intergove17lmental Tensions. and A Call for Reform. 60 U Col L Rev 695, 771-72 
(1989). 
365. Rodgers, 3 Environmental Law § 5.1. at 19 (cited in note 82) (describing how research 
responsibilities and risk assessment duties in pesticide control remain scattered among offices at 
EPA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, State, Forest Service, and Agriculture). 
366. Latin. 37 Stan L Rev at 1267 (cited in note 37). 
367. For an especially lucid presentation of the advantages of a cross-media approach. including 
some of the associated difficulties of agency re-organization. see Guruswamy. 1989 Wis L Rev at 498-
99. 536 (cited in note 291); see also Thomas L. Adams & Kyle E. McSlarrow. Seizing 1989 As A Window 
of Opportunity: An Environmental Challenge to the Next Administratioll. 18 Emir L Rptr 10419, 10420 
(1988); William Reilly, The Greening of EPA. 15 EPAJ 8. 10 (\989). 
368. A recent study on EPA agrees that this source of conflict should he eliminated, but 
recommends the elimination of the functional categories instead. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, 
EPA: Askillg the Wrollg Questiolls at 298-99 (cited in note 32). 
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Another change needed within the agency itself is greater emphasis on 
long-term planning. A major casualty of the current scheme is that it has 
discouraged meaningful long-term planning; in the case of environmental 
protection policy, that discouragement can be a recipe for disaster. Serious 
consideration should be given to the creation of a specific office within a 
cabinet-level EPA dedicated to long-term planning.369 There also needs to be 
a parallel effort to encourage career employees, especially those professionals 
with technical expertise, to remain at the agency, where turnover has 
historically been high. Otherwise the agency will lack the continuity of 
technical expertise necessary for the creation and subsequent infusion of 
long-term planning within the agency. The National Academy of Public 
Administration recently offered several recommendations concerning 
incentives that might lessen turnover at EPA.370 
Finally, the institutional framework within the Executive Office of the 
President warrants modification. OMB has been the lead unit within the EOP 
during EPA's twenty years, while the president's Council on Environmental 
Quality ("CEQ:') has had a diminishing voice. As a result, one perspective 
dominates the dialogue with EPA; because of OMB's basic opposition to the 
precepts underlying the federal environmental laws, the upshot has been an 
unhealthy, escalating competition with Congress for agency control. 
Reduction of OMB's oversight is one option,371 but a complementary, and 
perhaps more significant measure, would be to establish a more balanced 
voice within EOP itself. 372 There is, at bottom, a pressing need for an 
"environmental policy decisionmaking unit" within EOP to serve the 
clearinghouse function that OMB has served, but with a broader outlook.373 
There needs to be an office within EOP with the clout of the Council of 
Economic Advisors or even the National Security Council that is in a position 
to give thoughtful consideration to the many environmental protection issues 
that cut across important questions of national policy.374 Environmental 
369. Professors Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler made a similar recommendation in the 
aftermath of their study of EPA decisionmaking in mandating the use of scrubbers for air pollution 
control. See Ackerman & Hassler, Clean Coal, Dirty Air at 128 (cited in note 236). 
370. One recommendation provided greater opportunity for advancement through the 
conversion of certain high-level positions from political appoimments to career slots. See NAPA, 
Steps Toward A Stable Future at 4 (cited in note 265); see also Comminee Report at 17 (cited in note 
247). Recent legislative proposals for EPA's elevation to cabinet status included a provision that 
served that end. It discouraged the filling of certain positions based on political affiliation and 
provided that governmental service in environmental affairs is a qualification for the job. See HR 
Rep No 101-428 at22 (cited in note 313). The version of EPA cabinet legislation recently passed by 
the Senate, however, included no such provision. See 22 Envir Rptr Curr dev (BNA) 1407 (cited in 
note 314). 
371. See note 351. 
372. The Domestic Policy Office devotes minimal staff to the issue and, as a result, simply looks to 
OMB and EPA for guidance. See Bach, Govemmellt Constrainis at 176-77 (cited in note 35). 
373. See J. Michael McCloskey, Reorganizing the Federal Envirollmental Effort, II Duquesne L Rev 
484 (1973); see also Sierra Club l' Costle, 657 F2d 298, 406 (DC Cir 1981) ("An overworked 
administrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to a dedicated but zealous staff needs to know the 
arguments and ideas of policymakers in other agencies as well as in the White House."). 
374. See 136 Cong Rec S8930 (June 28, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Nunn: "However, I am 
persuaded that there is also a new and different threat to our national security emerging-the 
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protection must become fully integrated in the workings of the entire federal 
government-ranging throughout the implementation of federal tax, energy, 
agriculture, and international policies375-which is a task beyond the 
capability of anyone agency outside the EOP. A reinvigorated CEQ could 
play that role, but the council has historically failed to do SO.376 
Finally, presidential leadership on environmental issues will be required. 
Presidents have historically been less sensitive to environmental protection 
matters and more attune to shifts in national economic indicators. This may 
in part be because the electorate has traditionally held the President more 
accountable for the performance of national economic indicators, or at least 
for the effects of their performance on economic measures that strike voters 
more closely to home, such as stock market activity and interest rates. To 
provide the President with the proper incentive, national economic indicators 
need to be modified to take into account the impact of environmental 
pollution and resource utilization on the nation's environmental wealth. For 
instance, as recently described by EPA's Science Advisory Board, "[n]ational 
accounting schemes typically characterize revenue generated by activities that 
deplete or degrade environmental resources as 'income' while failing to 
consider the resulting depletion of society's environmental capital asset. "377 
To promote presidential environmental leadership, EPA needs to make it a 
high priority to develop a methodology to redress this discrepancy in national 
economic indicators.378 
C. Bridging the Gap Between Public Aspirations and Understanding and 
Public and Agency Perception of Environmental Risk 
Only public education, including a sustained effort to promote 
environmental literacy in the public, will bridge the gap that has persisted 
between public aspirations for environmental quality and public 
understanding of the complexity of the associated trade-offs. Only bilateral 
education of both the public and EPA will bridge the recent gap that has 
developed between agency and public perception of the nature of 
environmental risk and of environmental protection priorities. 
A revolution has taken place in this nation's environmental laws over the 
last twenty years. No accompanying revolution occurred, however, in the 
nation's classrooms to enhance the public'S appreciation of the underpinnings 
destruction of our environment. "); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, S Rep 
No 101-384, IOlst Cong, 2d Sess 223 (1990) ("The committee believes that threats to the 
environment should be regarded as national security threats .... "). 
375. EPA, Reducing Risk at 6 (cited in note 250). 
376. Bach, Governmental Constraints at 174 (cited in note 35); Davies & Davies. The Politics of 
Pollution at 120 (cited in note II); Reitze, 5 ColumJ Envir L at 120-21, 151-52 (cited in note 250). 
377. EPA, Reducing Risk at 15 (cited in note 250). 
378. Considerable ongoing research exists in this area, and several European nations are 
apparently experimenting with altemative methods of national accounting that better reflect costs of 
resource depletion. See Madise Simons, Europeans Begin To Calculate The Price Of Pollution, NY Times 
E3 col I (Dec 9, 1990); Peter Passell, Rebel Economists Add Ecological Cost To Price Of Progress. NY Times 
CI col 4 (Nov 27, 1990). 
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of the environmental laws and their ramifications. More environmental 
educators and fewer environmental lawyers are now necessary. Creative 
environmental curricula need to be developed and made a regular part of 
secondary school education. The subject matter warrants intensive coverage 
as an independent course in every student's curriculum.379 
Public education will also do much to bridge the gap between public and 
agency perceptions of environmental risks and priorities, but more than that 
will be necessary. The gap finds its roots in the very different perspective each 
brings to the pollution problem. Much of the public starts with the premise 
that pollution is morally and culturally unacceptable; by contrast, the agency 
professional seeks to determine the optimal level of pollution for a specific 
human activity at a particular location. Little common ground exists at the 
outset, and whatever there might have been is quickly lost in the aftermath of 
repeated agency regulatory failure and its repeated denunciation by elected 
representatives, environmentalists, and industry.38o 
To bridge the existing chasm, EPA must supplement formal public 
education with candid explanations of the competing factors, including the 
scientific uncertainty underlying its decisions.381 In addition, EPA must not 
view the dialogue with the public as a one-way street, with the "expert" 
agency having the responsibility to educate the "ignorant" public. The 
success of a program of public risk management depends on its acceptance by 
the public. EPA therefore must educate itself about public perception of risk 
at the same time that it seeks to enhance the public's understanding of the 
agency's perspective. 
Risk assessment is not simply a technical matter. It also depends on value 
judgments that turn on basic notions of justice and equity. Both EPA and the 
public therefore have much to learn from each other.382 Moreover, when EPA 
ignores the public's distinct perception of risk, the agency's resolution of 
acceptable levels of risk and relative agency priorities will find little 
acceptance where the agency needs it most: in the public.383 If nothing else, 
379. Happily, on November 16, 1990, President Bush signed the National Environmental 
Education Act, which should further these ends. See Pub L No 10 1-619, 104 Stat 3325. The new law 
establishes, inter alia, an Office of Education within EPA, an environmental education and training 
program, an environmental education grants program, an environmental internship and fellowship 
program, an Environmental Education Advisory Council and Task Force, and a National Educational 
Training Foundation. See 136 Cong Rec Sl7160 (Oct 27,1990). 
380. Compare Elliott, 25 Houston L Rev at 797 (cited in note 276). 
381. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 279-80 (cited in note 32); 
see also Nat! Res Council, 2 Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection Agenc.v at 7-8 (cited in note 97) 
(need for public candor concerning scientific uncertainty). 
382. EPA, Reducing Risk at 12 (cited in note 250), 
383. In a recent article, Professors Gillette and Krier make a forceful case for the proposition that 
federal agencies might systematically make decisions in favor of too much risk, as viewed from the 
public'S perspective. Systematic bias is likely because risk producers have greater access to the 
administrative process thim do risk consumers, and because agency officials commonly refuse to 
acknowledge the ethical and political dimensions of public risk that are of concern to the public. See 
Gillette & Krier, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1027, 1061, 1068, 1085 (cited in note 261). Gillette and Krier 
argue that the present challenge of public risk management "is to devise solutions as powerful as the 
programs they confront. . . . We need to imagine institutional breakthroughs that match our 
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the last twenty years make clear that EPA cannot afford the tragedy associated 
with that result. 
technological ones, and we may need a new politics to replace the old." Id at 1109. Professor 
Donald Hornstein likewise warns against undue reliance on comparative risk analysis as part of his 
even broader critique of such analysis based on its inability to accommodate either relevant equitable 
considerations or legitimate public judgments regarding risk. See Donald Hornstein, Reclaiming 
Environmental Law: A Namwtive CriliqlU! a/Comparative Risk Analysis, Columbia LJ (forthcoming 1992). 
